경영자의 경력관리와 성과보수 (Performance-Contingent Compensation for CEO in the Presence of Career Concerns)

서지정보

· 발행기관 : 동국대학교 사회과학연구원
· 수록지 정보 : 사회과학연구 / 19권 / 3호 / 103 ~ 120페이지
· 저자명 : 이경원

초록

본 논문은 자신의 능력에 대해 사적 정보를 가진 경영자(CEO)가 경력관리(career concerns)를 고려하는 경우 경영자에 대한 성과기반 보수체계의 효과를 분석한다. 특히 경력관리를 통해 기대되는 보수가 높은 경우, 성과보수가 없다면 능력이 낮은 경영자가 능력이 과도한 위험을 추구하여 높은 경영자와 동일한 투자패턴을 보이게 되는 비효율적 집단행동(herd behavior)의 상황이 성과에 연동되는강도가 높은 보상체계(high powered performance contingent compensation)를 도입함으로써 개선되어 효율성이 달성됨을 본 논문은 보인다. 이 결과는 대부분의 산업에서 총보상금액 중 성과보수의 비중이 높다는 실증분석에 대해 경력관리가 경영자에게 중요한 경우 높은 성과보수의 비중의 타당성을 설명하는데 기여하고 있다. 뿐만 아니라 본 논문의 결과는 경력관리로부터 발생하는 보수수준이 높은 한,성과보수 비중을 직접적으로 낮추려는 최근의 정책적 시도가 효과적으로 작동하기 어려울 수 있음을 시사한다.

영어초록

This paper investigates the role of incentive compensation for managers in the presence of career concerns when the manager’s type for his ability is private information. Without incentive compensation, the manager’s career concerns may lead to herd behavior in that bad type manager mimics good type manager’s investment pattern, which is not only inefficient but also detrimental to the financial firm and the investor. The paper shows that incentive compensation can correct the manager’s herd behavior, thereby leading to efficiency enhancing outcome. In particular, the rate of performance-contingent payment may need to be larger in the presence of career concerns than without career concerns. The result of this paper explains why the proportion of incentive components out of total compensation is large in the financial service industry in which career concerns is much important.
The implications that the result has are as follows. High powered incentive compensation in the financial service sector has been recently criticized because it has been allegedly the main cause of the manager’s myopic investment pattern. As discussed above, the high powered incentive compensation can play a positive role for mitigating the agent’s inefficient investment pattern. More importantly, the paper implies that the large proportion of incentive component may arise when the manager has a strong incentive to seek herd behavior that career concerns create.
Put it differently, the high rates of performance-contingent payment arises when the bad type manager’s incentive to mimic the good type’s investment pattern is strong because such a behavior can yield higher future compensation due to reputational concerns. Our result implies that in order to lower the proportion of incentive component, the size of the future compensation from career concerns should be lower. In other words, the policy to lower the proportion of incentive component may not work successfully as long as the size of the future compensation from career concerns grows further.

참고자료

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