‘등불의 비유’로 본 자기인식의 문제 (Self-Cognition through the Metaphor of a Lamp)

서지정보

· 발행기관 : 보조사상연구원
· 수록지 정보 : 보조사상 / 38호 / 131 ~ 161페이지
· 저자명 : 김성옥

초록

자기인식(svasaṃvedana)의 논리는 유형상지식론의 전제 위에서 출발한다. 유형상지식론은 인식 속에 나타난 대상의 형상을 인식한다고 주장함으로써, 모든 인식은 결국 인식 그 자신의 인식이라는 ‘자기인식의 논리’를 전개한다.
자기인식의 논리는 「대비바사론」에서 마음과 마음작용은 자신을 알 수 있다고 주장한 대중부에서 그 근원을 찾아볼 수 있다. 이들은 등불의 비유를 들어 자신들의 견해를 주장하는데, 이것은 유부와 중관학파의 입장에서 각각 비판받게 된다.
반면에 경량부에서는 대상의 형상을 통해 인식이 이루어진다고 주장함으로써 유형상지식론을 확립시키고, 그 형상의 인식이란 곧 자기인식일 뿐이라는 결론에 도달한다. 또한 유식학파에서는 경량부에서 인식의 원인으로 설명되었던 외부대상과 그 형상의 인식을 한 찰나 이전의 識으로 바꿔놓음으로써 외부대상의 존재를 인정할 필요 없이 인식의 과정을 설명하고 있다. 디그나가의 영향 아래 「쁘라마나바르띠까」를 집대성한 다르마끼르띠에게 있어 ‘자기인식의 논리’는 그의 인식론이 경량부에서 유식학파로 전환되는 과정에서 중심축으로 작용하고 있음을 보여준다.

영어초록

This paper is composed by the Dharmakīrti's description “All mind and mental activities are the self-cognition.” The theory of self-cognition(svasaṃvedana) most of all has developed with the theory of sākāravādin. It is insisted that the object of cognition is not the external object, but we can only recognize the ākāra which appears in awareness. The ākāra could be said the cognition itself. Therefore all the cognition is the reflexive awareness, the self-cognition.
The origin of self cognition back to the Mahāsāṃghika. They admit the self-cognition of the mind and mental activities. They said that mind is like a lamp. It illuminates other things, simultaneously it illuminates itself. So the mind can recognize other things simultaneously it can recognize itself.
However the metaphor of lamp was refuted by Sarvāstivādin and Mādhyamika. They insisted that the metaphor of lamp is not achieved. The lamp can not illuminate itself, like as the fingers can not point out itself. In the same manner the cognition can not cognize itself.
The Sautrāntika and Yogacāra developed the theory of self-cognition, although they was standing on the different point. Sautrāntika approve the existent of external things, but Yogacāra does not approve it. Notwithstanding they have something in common that the external object itself does not perceived and we can only recognize the ākāra of object in awareness.
Dignāga was the first Yogacāra scholar to systemize the theory of self-cognition in his epistemological system. And it was Dharmakīrti who succeed the epistemology of Dignāga. When he wrote the Pramāṇavārttika, he approved the self-cognition regardless of the difference between Sautrāntika and Yogacāra. He referred the metaphor of lamp again. He insist that all the cognition is reflexively the cognition of itself like a lamp.
It is necessary to notice the commentary of Pramāṇavārttika. Manorathanandin and Devendrabuddhi approve the self cognition. But it does not mean they approve the self cognition from the viewpoint of paramārtha. It must be said that the lamp illuminates itself in the meaning of upācara. It is worth while to notice the self-cognition with the problem whether it was approved by the Buddhist afterwards on the level of paramārtha or saṃvṛtti. The theory of self-cognition could suggest the alternative to understand the theoretical difference between Yogacāra and Mādhyamika.

참고자료

· 없음