정부관료제에대한경제학적

소개

제출레포트입니다

목차

Ⅰ. 서설

Ⅱ. 공공선택론: 1960s~70s
1. 관료제에 대한 공공선택론의 맹아
2. Niskanen과 후속 연구들
3. Vincent Ostrom
4. 이익집단 중심 이론

Ⅲ. 조직에 대한 신경제학: 1980s~90s
1. 주인-대리인 이론(1): 의회지배성과 관료제에 대한 사후통제
2. 주인-대리인 이론(2): 의회지배성과 관료제에 대한 사전통제
3. 관청형성모형
4. 정치적 통제에 대한 공간모형
5. 거래비용접근법

Ⅳ. 맺음말

본문내용

정부관료제에 대한 경제학적 이론의 전개


Ⅰ. 서설
정치․행정 현상에 경제학적 접근법을 적용한 연구들은 크게 공공선택론과 신조직경제학으로 구분된다. 이견의 여지가 있을 수 있지만 두 범주는 시기적으로는 80년대 이전과 이후로 구분되고, 내용 면에서는 후자가 전자와 달리 제도(institution)라는 변수를 설명에 추가한 차이가 있다.
관련 문헌들을 보면 공공선택론에서는 Tullock․Downs․Niskanen․Ostrom․이익집단론자 등이 주요 이론가들로 보이고, 신조직경제학에서는 주인-대리인이론․거래비용이론․게임이론 등이 주요 이론들로 판단된다. 그리고 최근에 합리적 선택 신제도주의의 부상과 관련하여 Dunleavy의 관청형성 모형도 신경제학의 일부로 간주될 수 있을 것이다. 분류기준에 따라 혹은 연구자의 초점에 따라 학자들이나 이론들의 범주화에는 다소 이견이 있을 것으로 생각된다. 그러나 이 문제가 본 논문의 핵심은 아닌바 여기서는 이론의 발전 순서대로 (각 시각의 최초 연구가 나타난 순서대로) 각 이론들을 고찰하고자 한다.

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