A Theoretical Model and Empirical Tests of Government Formation with Presidential Heads of State in European Democracies

서지정보

· 발행기관 : 한국정치학회
· 수록지 정보 : 한국정치학회보 / 47권 / 3호 / 5 ~ 32페이지
· 저자명 : 강신구

초록

The primary goal of this paper is to explicate the strategic interactions that occur among the president and parliamentary parties through a mathematical model of the government formation bargaining process, and to test empirically the observable implications drawn from the model. The equilibrium analysis of the model shows that the equilibrium selection strategy by the president depends critically on the configuration of ideological policy positions of the president and the parliamentary parties as well as the degree to which the president cares about the distribution of transferable office-related benefits for her own party. Empirical analysis of 146 governments of seven Western European democracies with presidential heads of state provides partial support for the theoretical implications drawn from the model. It is partial in that the theoretical expectation is supported very well when the president is elected by popular vote, but only partially when the president is selected by parliament. In particular, the results show that the more ideologically distant the president’s party is from the parliamentary median party, the more likely the party is to be appointed Prime Minister, when the president is elected by popular vote, as the model predicts. The conflicting findings suggest that we need a more thorough investigation for a better understanding of the mechanisms through which presidential heads of state influence the government-formation bargaining process under different institutional arrangements.

참고자료

· 없음