담합의 소비자피해와 규제효과 분석 (Analysis on Consumer Damage by Cartels and Results of Regulations)

서지정보

· 발행기관 : 한국소비자학회
· 수록지 정보 : 소비자학연구 / 23권 / 1호 / 1 ~ 28페이지
· 저자명 : 오지영, 여정성

초록

본 연구는 법적 규제에도 불구하고 지속적으로 소비자피해를 유발하고 있는 담합의 규제추이를 살펴보고, 2005년 이후 심결된 최종소비재 담합 20건의 의결서를 토대로 구체적인 담합의 내용과 규제, 발생유인을 내용분석 하였다. 또한 규제이후 시장이 실질적으로 경쟁기능을 회복하고 있는지의 여부를 전화서비스 시장을 중심으로 분석하였고, 계량경제학적 방법 중 예측접근법을 이용하여 빙과와 설탕 담합사건에 대한 소비자피해액을 추정함으로써 그규모와 금전규제의 수준을 비교하였다. 이러한 연구를 통해 도출한 결과는 다음과 같다.
첫째, 행정규제를 받은 담합유형은 가격합의가 가장 큰 비중을 차지하고 있었으며, 최근 들어 시정명령과 과징금부과가 병과되는 비율이 매우 높아지고 과징금 부과의 규모도 커진 것으로 나타났다. 그러나 고발건수는 최근의 증가세에도 불구하고 여전히 낮은 수준에 그치고 있었다.
둘째, 심결례 분석결과 담합사건은 기존사업자의 영향력, 제조원가의 변화, 행정지도, 새로운 시장경쟁자의 등장,산업 성장성의 정체 및 악화, 대형마트의 영향력 증가 등의 유인으로 발생하고 있는 것으로 분석되었다. 또한 담합내용은 ‘가격의 결정․유지․변경’, ‘상품거래 및 대금지급 조건 결정’, ‘상품의 생산․출고․수송 또는 거래 제한’,‘상품의 종류․규격 제한’ 등으로 나누어졌다.
셋째, 원재료의 가격변동을 기준으로 추정한 빙과와 설탕의 소비자피해액은 각각 217억 원, 1조 1,826억 원으로나타났으며, 이는 위반업체들에게 부과된 과징금인 40억 원, 511억 원을 크게 초과하고 있어 위반행위를 통한 사업자의 부당이득이 막대한 수준인 것으로 드러났다.
넷째, 최종소비재 담합사건은 일반적인 담합사건에 비해 검찰고발 비율이 높게 나타났으나, 그 사유는 비고발 사건에 대해서도 적용 가능한 내용인 것으로 나타났다. 또한 과징금 부과과정에서는 기간이나 위반횟수, 부당이득의규모 등이 실질적인 가중사유로 적용되지 않았고, 사업자의 사정을 과도하게 반영하는 사유로 인해 과징금이 낮은부과기준율을 적용받거나 크게 감경되고 있는 것으로 드러났다. 규제당국의 재량권이 참작사유를 다소 자의적으로적용하는 문제도 나타났다.
다섯째, 담합규제 이후 시장이 경쟁기능을 회복하였는지 여부를 분석한 시외전화, 시내전화, 국제전화 사례의 경우시정조치인 행위금지 명령과 보고명령이 거의 실효성을 갖지 못하는 것으로 나타났다.

영어초록

Cartel is one of the most common economic crimes in market economy. Cartel practices take place in a variety of industries and products ranged from materials and components to daily necessities such as detergents, flours, petrols, ice creams, beverages. Despite stringent laws against them, however, the number of cartel cases has been on the rise, which makes us wonder if they are genuinely effective. This study aims to shed light on the cases of consumer damage done by cartels and suggest policies by analyzing related cases in order to raise the effectiveness of relevant regulations.
In this study, we examined 20 cartel cases where manufactures of end-products were ordered to correct their action and fined for breaching the antitrust regulations between January 2005and July 2009. We analyzed the details of each case, related regulations and reasons behind it. In order to find out whether regulations function properly, we tracked out-of-town, in-town and international calls. As for the cases on ice creams and sugar, we estimated the amount of the consumer damage by taking a “forecasting approach,”(economic modelling) using commodity prices and inflation rates as price variations. The results are as follows:First, we found in the analysis that price-fixing tops the list of cartel cases, while the number of correction orders has remained stable since the year 2000. Nevertheless, more and more companies get criminal charges and imposed with surcharges, although the number is still relatively low.
Second, analyzing details of cartel cases, we found that the rates of bringing law suits against manufactures and their senior executives are quite high, but it is actually very low considering that they are cases on end-products. Besides, the period, the number of violation, the amount of illegal profits were not fully reflected in the process of determining the amount of surcharges.
Third, analyzing the details of cartel cases, we discovered that cartels involve price fixing,terms of product transaction, production․delivery․shipment, restriction on types and size of products. Reasons for cartels are as follows: influences of manufactures, production cost,administrative instructions, new competitors, slower growth, increasing power of hypermarkets,etc.
Fourth, in this study we found that orders to prohibit acts and to report turned out not to be effective in cases on out-of-town, in-town and international calls. In fact, those prohibited by the regulators remains unchanged. Besides, telephone operators lowered prices of international calls when ordered, and then changed them back to where they were.
Fifth, the prices fixed by cartels were set above commodity prices. The estimated amount of consumer damage fromice creams is 21.7 billion won and 1.18 trillion won from sugar respectively,which are larger than surcharges imposed on them: ice cream(4 billion won) and sugar(51.1trillion).
Following is the results of the analysis.
First, we need to boost regulation to address and prevent cases of consumer damage. In this study, the estimated amount of consumer damage from collusion on ice creams and sugar are 5.4 times and 23.1 times larger than penalty surcharges imposed for violating companies. This means that illegal profits they made from their cartel agreements are tremendous. In order to collect unfair profits and unroot the practice, regulatory authorities should raise surcharges,especially because giving compensation to consumers by manufacturers makes it difficult for regulators to collect their illegal profits in the form of surcharges. In addition, criminal regulation against companies and individuals need to be strengthened.
Second, we should identify the exact amount of damage caused by all collusion cases and consider it in the process of strengthening regulations. The authorities as a watchdog whose role is to protect consumers, it is obliged to investigate consumer damage. In addition, given that the amount of consumer damage is equivalent to illegal profits violating companies gained from their agreement, the amount of consumer damage must be taken into account in setting the level of regulation. More importantly, we need to seek ways of providing compensation for consumer damage as penal fines flow only into the state coffers.
Third, we should take into account elements that determine surcharges. Those elements include the number of violation, period, illegal profits, etc. And they need reexamining so as not to reflect too much those in favor of the companies in setting surcharges. In Korea, however, regulatory agencies are wielding their discretionary powers to do exactly the opposite, thereby hurting its reliability. Therefore, it is necessary to redefine the scope and degree of which the authorities could use in.
Fourth, we should implement corrective measures from each violation case and put in place a system to make sure whether markets meet administrative regulations in an appropriate manner. The authorities are entitled to issue corrections in order to enforce corrective measures,prevent a repeat of violation and improve market forces. If they could use discretion in employing a variety of corrective measures, then we could enhance the effectiveness of each regulation,which would lead to market functioning properly. But as this study showed in the analysis,corrective measures become meaningless if they are not implemented the way they should be.
And sometimes, they can be used as a way of monitoring companies caught breaching laws.
For example, in the case of a cartel, regulators order companies to report changes in prices that occur during a certain period of time. That way, those companies feel the pressure in setting prices, which makes it easier for the authorities to supervise the manufacturers.

참고자료

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