불확실성과 선도자가 있는 국제 시장에서 공정 연구개발 정책 (R&D Subsidy and Tax Policy with or without International Market Leaders Amidst Uncertainty)

서지정보

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· 저자명 : 양일석

초록

This paper analyzes the equilibrium level of R&D subsidy or tax from international markets without a leader and with one in an uncertain world. Governments in each of the two countries simultaneously select R&D subsidy or tax in an attempt to shift profits in favor of domestic, imperfectly competitive firms. It is shown that: (i) the optimal level of R&D subsidy or tax with a leading firm is zero for all the degree of differentiation between goods. The optimal policy with a following firm is the imposition of an R&D tax when the goods are sufficiently less differentiated and an R&D subsidy when the goods are sufficiently differentiated; (ii) the government with a leading firm in the international market provides higher R&D subsidies to the domestic firm than the international markets without a leader.
The government with a following firm in the international market provides lower R&D subsidies to the domestic firm than the international markets without a leader if the goods are sufficiently less differentiated, and vice versa, if the goods are sufficiently differentiated; and (iii) expected welfare for the country with a leading firm can be lower than the international markets without a leader if the goods are sufficiently less differentiated and covariance of two random variables is positive and relatively great. Expected welfare for the country with a following firm can be greater than the international markets without a leader if the goods are sufficiently less differentiated and covariance of two random variables is positive and relatively small. Furthermore, this finding holds for the more differentiated goods with uncertainty.

영어초록

This paper analyzes the equilibrium level of R&D subsidy or tax from international markets without a leader and with one in an uncertain world. Governments in each of the two countries simultaneously select R&D subsidy or tax in an attempt to shift profits in favor of domestic, imperfectly competitive firms. It is shown that: (i) the optimal level of R&D subsidy or tax with a leading firm is zero for all the degree of differentiation between goods. The optimal policy with a following firm is the imposition of an R&D tax when the goods are sufficiently less differentiated and an R&D subsidy when the goods are sufficiently differentiated; (ii) the government with a leading firm in the international market provides higher R&D subsidies to the domestic firm than the international markets without a leader.
The government with a following firm in the international market provides lower R&D subsidies to the domestic firm than the international markets without a leader if the goods are sufficiently less differentiated, and vice versa, if the goods are sufficiently differentiated; and (iii) expected welfare for the country with a leading firm can be lower than the international markets without a leader if the goods are sufficiently less differentiated and covariance of two random variables is positive and relatively great. Expected welfare for the country with a following firm can be greater than the international markets without a leader if the goods are sufficiently less differentiated and covariance of two random variables is positive and relatively small. Furthermore, this finding holds for the more differentiated goods with uncertainty.

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