2대주주의 소유지분과 이익조정 (Ownership Holding by Second Largest Stockholder and Earnings Management)

서지정보

· 발행기관 : 한국증권학회
· 수록지 정보 : Asia-Pacific Journal of Financial Studies / 35권 / 6호 / 103 ~ 139페이지
· 저자명 : 백원선, 조현우

초록

외부소액주주들에 대한 법적인 보호장치가 약한 자본시장에서는 터널링, 즉 대주주지분율이높을수록 대주주의 기회주의적인 행동 및 외부소액주주들에 대한 이익침해유인이 커져서 대주주자신의 이익을 위해 보고이익을 높일 가능성이 커진다고 알려져 있다. 그러나 소유지분이 분산된기업의 경영자들은 보고이익에 대한 자본시장압력이 상대적으로 높기 때문에 이익을 상향조정하여 보고할 유인을 갖는다. 또한 대주주지분율이 높더라도 상대적으로 2대주주의 영향력이 강하다면 대주주 자신의 기회주의적인 유인은 제한될 것이며, 대주주지분율이 낮더라도 상대적으로 주식이 골고루 분산되어 있다면 2대주주의 영향력이 낮아 강력한 경영권을 가질 수도 있다.
이와 관련하여 본 연구에서는 지분소유구조와 2대주주의 영향력이 대주주지분율과 이익조정의관련성에 미치는 효과를 분석하였다. 이익조정여부에 대한 측정치로는 재량적 발생액을 사용하였다. 재량적 발생액은 수정Jones(1995)모형을 비롯해 수정Jones(1995)모형에 전기 총자산이익률(ROA)을 통제한 모형 및 성과대응 재량적 발생액 등을 이용하였다.
본 연구의 분석결과는 다음과 같다. 첫째, 대주주지분율이 높을수록 경영자는 이익을 상향조정하고 있는 것으로 나타났다. 둘째, 경영자 지배기업에서는 자본시장의 압력 등으로 인해 대주주지분율이 낮을수록 경영자는 이익을 상향조정하고 있었고, 소유자 지배기업에서는 대주주지분율이 이익조정에 미치는 효과를 발견하지 못하였다. 특히 이익조정의 정도도 소유자 지배기업에 비해 경영자 지배기업에서 더욱 큰 것으로 나타났다. 셋째, 대주주지분율이 경영자 이익조정에 미치는 효과는 2대주주의 영향력이 높을수록 제한되고 있음을 관찰하였다.
본 연구의 결과에 의하면 기업을 둘러싸고 있는 주된 이해관계자, 즉 투자자 및 채권자 등에게 대주주지분율의 정보유용성을 명확히 하는데 공헌할 수 있을 것으로 기대된다. 또한 대주주지분율이 이익조정에 미치는 효과가 지분소유구조에 따라 차별적으로 나타날 수 있음을 보임으로써 기존의 지분소유구조와 이익조정에 관한 연구의 틀을 확대하였다는 점에서 의의가 있다. 특히기존 연구들이 살피지 못했던 2대주주 영향력을 추가적으로 고려함으로써 대주주지분율과 경영자 이익조정이 2대주주의 영향력에 따라 차별적일 수 있음을 시사해준다.

영어초록

In a capital market which has a weak legal safeguard for external minority stockholders, it is highly likely that the bigger the largest stockholder’s equity holding is, the more probable its reported earnings are to be managed since the largest stockholder’s opportunistic behavior and incentives to infringe minor stockholder’s interests also increase in this situation of information asymmetry. On the other hand, for companies with more diversified ownership structures, the managers have incentives to manage reported earnings because they are under high pressure from the capital market. Yet, even though the largest stockholder’s equity holdings are huge, the manager’s incentive to engage in opportunistic behaviors will be limited when the second largest stockholders have a stronger monitoring role. In case the largest stockholder’s equity holdings are relatively small, manager’s opportunistic behavior is expected to be also limited if the second largest stockholders play an active monitoring role.
In this regard, this study analyzes whether the largest stockholder’s equity holdings actually cause a firm to manage its earnings and whether this depends on a firm’s equity ownership structure. Especially, this study focuses on the second largest stockholder’s influence on the relation between the largest stockholder’s equity holdings and the managers’ incentive to adjust upward the earnings figures. First of all, it is hypothesized that: (1) the bigger the largest stockholder’s equity holdings become, the more likely a manager opportunistically increases the earnings; (2) earnings management is more prominent in manager-controlled companies than in owner-controlled companies; and (3) the bigger the second largest stockholder’s monitoring role is, the more limited the largest stockholder’s incentive is to engage in opportunistic behaviors.
In this study, the sample is entirely composed of non-financial companies which are newly listed in the Korea Exchange from 1999 to 2004 and whose fiscal years-end is December (2,982 firms-years). This study comprehensively analyzes the influence of the largest stockholder’s equity holdings on managers’ earnings management. All the sample companies are divided into quintiles based on the largest stockholder’s equity holdings including the related parties’ equity. Further, the companies in the bottom quintile are classified as manager-controlled companies while those in the top quintile as owner- controlled companies. And, discretionary accruals are used as a means to determine whether earnings management has been made. Discretionary accruals are estimated using the modified-Jones model (1995). Also, we use performance-matched discretionary accruals that reflect additionally prior years’ return on assets. The influencing power of the second largest stockholder is measured by dividing the largest stockholder’s equity holdings by the sum of the largest stockholder’s equity holdings and the second largest stockholder’s equity holdings.
Empirical findings are as follows. The bigger the largest stockholder’s equity holdings are, the more managed the earnings are. However, we also find that, by analyzing manager- controlled companies’ equity ownership structures, the smaller the largest shareholder’s equity holdings are, the more managed the earnings are also, out of the market pressure.
Yet, in owner-controlled companies, the largest stockholder’s equity holdings have no effect on a firm’s earnings management behavior. In fact, the earnings are more managed in manager-controlled companies than in owner-controlled companies. In particular, the stronger the second largest stockholder’s monitoring role gets, the more limited effect the largest stockholder’s equity holdings have on the managers’ attempt to manage earnings.
The result of this study contributes to defining information value of the largest stockholder’s equity holdings for a company’s main interested parties such as investors and creditors. Additionally, this study extends the literature on the relation between equity ownership structures and earnings management by showing that the effect of the largest stockholder’s equity holdings on earnings management may differ depending on firms’ equity ownership structures. Further, this study examines the effect of the second largest stockholders’ monitoring role, which has not been addressed in the previous studies. The relation between the largest stockholder’s equity holdings and earnings management may take different shapes depending on the degree of second largest stockholder’s influencing power.

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