피감대상기업은 감사인 선정 시 회계법인 별 품질차이를 고려하는가? (Do Audit Clients Perceive Quality Differences between Accounting Firms in Audit Market?)

서지정보

· 발행기관 : 한국회계학회
· 수록지 정보 : 회계학연구 / 40권 / 6호 / 119 ~ 163페이지
· 저자명 : 손성규, 강민정, 박현영

초록

정책적으로 감사서비스 공급자 입장에서 회계법인 품질관리의 중요성이 강조되는 것에 반해 감사시장에서 서비스 수요자가 감사인의 품질관리수준을 얼마나 고려하는가에 대한 검토는 부족하다. 실무상 회계감사에 대한 비판 중 하나는 회계정보 이용자가 어떠한 회계법인이 감사를 수행하였는지에 대해서 신경을 쓰지 않는다는 점이다. 즉, 감사 서비스가 차별적으로 인식되지 않는다는 것이다. 회계정보 이용자가 감사품질을 차별적으로 인식하지 않는다면, 감사인 선임 시 감사수임료만이 의사결정 변수로 남게 될 것이다. 이와 같이 우리나라 감사시장에 대해 저가수임 경쟁의 문제점이 지적되고 이러한 구조적 문제가 궁극적으로 감사품질을 저하시킨다는 일반적인 합의가 이루어졌으나, 감사시장 측면의 연구는 거의 이루지지 않았다.
이에 본 연구는 감리제도의 변화와 더불어 점차 중요성이 강조되는 회계법인의 품질이 감사시장에서 차별적으로 인식되는가를 살펴보았다. 또한 품질과 연계하여 회계법인의 재무적 안정성에 대해서도 감사인 선임에 고려되는가를 살펴보았다. 구체적으로 품질수준에 대해 감리지적과 소송 피소된 경우를 살펴보고 재무적 안정성으로는 회계법인의 공인회계사수 변동 및 매출액 성장률이 감사인 선임 결정에 고려되어, 회계법인 감사고객 수의 변동에 영향을 주는가를 분석하였다. 분석 결과 위와 같은 실무상 비판에도 불구하고 양질의 감사인이 시장에서 더욱 선호됨을 확인하였고, 재무적 안정성이 높은 회계법인이 감사인으로 선임될 가능성이 증가함을 제시하였다. 또한, 내부 품질관리 시스템이 체계화된 외국제휴법인과 아닌 경우를 구분하여 살펴본 결과, 선임 결정요소의 선호 정도가 제휴 여부에 따라 상이함을 확인하였다. 제휴법인의 경우에는 성장률이 더욱 고려되고, 제휴법인이 아닌 경우 소송피소 및 공인회계사수의 변동이 감사인 선임에 더욱 중요하게 고려된다는 결과를 보고하였다.
본 연구는 다음의 공헌도를 기대한다. 첫째, 회계법인의 품질수준이 감사인 선택의 주요 결정요소로서, 회계법인의 매출 확대에 긍정적인 효과가 있음을 제시하였다. 실증결과가 회계법인의 품질관리 제고를 위한 자발적 동기부여에 영향을 줄 것으로 기대한다. 둘째, 제휴회계법인인 경우와 아닌 경우 감사인 선임 시 고려요소가 상이함을 발견하였다. 셋째, 국내의 감사선임 연구는 기업 수준에서의 분석이 이루어졌는데, 처음으로 회계법인 수준에서 분석함으로써 감사시장 측면에서의 시사점을 제시할 것이다.

영어초록

Upon enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley Acts in 2002, U. S. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) was established and began its investigations on the public accounting firms to evaluate their audit quality control system. In Korea, the Financial Supervisory Service (FSS), the Korean regulatory authority, implemented its quality control review program on Korean accounting firms auditing public companies listed in the Korean stock exchanges in 2007. These changes are based on the assumptions that regulatory authority’s investigation on the quality controls of the auditors would eventually improve audit quality.
Despite the increasing focus on the auditor’s quality control system, there is little existing empirical research on whether accounting firms’ quality influences on auditor appointment decisions. To shed light on the importance of accounting firms’ quality control in audit market, this paper tests whether accounting firms’ quality affects appointments and dismissals of audit firms. If audit clients perceive quality differences between accounting firms and considered these for auditor appointment decisions, we expect that clients appoint accounting firms whose quality are perceived high.
As the proxies of accounting firms’ quality, we use the number of weaknesses identified by statutory quality control review and litigation amounts related to the audit work. We expect that audit clients are less likely to appoint accounting firms that have been identified more weaknesses as weaknesses identified by statutory quality control review impair assurance value and reputations of audit firms. Also, we posit that audit clients are less likely to appoint accounting firms that are subject to greater litigation amounts related to the audit work as those accounting firms are expected to be exposed to higher litigation risk. In contrast, a firm that is experiencing poor or deteriorating financial performance may prefer an auditor who permits the client to increase or inflate earnings. Given the potential differential effects, we believe it is an empirical question whether accounting firms’ quality is associated with auditor dismissal or appointment decisions.
Accounting firms’ audit quality control efforts should be grounded in the financial stability of the accounting firms. Financially distressed accounting firms are likely to engage in audit contracts at low cost or accept high risk audit clients, which consequently leads to audit failure. Since financial status of accounting firms affect audit quality, as the proxies of financial status of accounting firms, we use the number of CPA (Certified Public Accountants) that is measured by change rate in CPA working for accounting firms and sales growth.
Using 482 accounting firm-year data, the results suggest that the number of deficiencies is negatively associated with subsequent change in the number of audit clients held by accounting firm. Also, we find accounting firm on average gains clients as the number of CPA increases. This demonstrates that the results of statutory quality control review and the number of CPA increases of accounting firms on average affect the dismissals and appointments of accounting firms. The litigation amounts and growth rate in sales of the accounting firm, however, are not significantly associated with subsequent change in the number of audit clients held by accounting firm.
On the other hand, in the subsample analysis, when accounting firm is a member firm of global accounting networks or associations, sales growth rate in addition to the number of deficiencies negatively influences the subsequent changes in the number of audit clients. In contrast, in case of non-member firms, litigation amounts and the number of CPA increases as well as the number of deficiencies affect clients’ audit firm choice.
Our study contributes to the literature in three ways. First, we provide initial evidence on whether public companies consider accounting firms’ quality for choice of auditors. We expect that our findings lead to positive influence on accounting firms’ motivation for enhancing quality control in order to increase their market shares. Second, we document that different accounting firms’ quality characteristics influence on auditor appointment decisions according to the auditor type –member firms vs. non-member firms. Finally, our analysis are conducted at the level of the audit firm while prior studies regarding auditor selection were conducted at the level of the client. Focusing on audit firms rather than their clients as the unit of analysis provides a fairly unique perspective in audit market research.

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