PART 3 Conclusion PART 2 PART 2 PART 1 Contents 1. G. Washington 2. John Adams 3. Thomas Jefferson 4. James Madison 5. James Monroe 6. J. Quincy Adams 7. Andrew Jackson 8. Martin Van Buren 9. W. H. Harrison 10. John Tyler 11. James K. Polk 12. Zachary Taylor 13. Millard Fillmore 14. Franklin Pierce 15. James Buchanan 16. Abraham Lincoln 17. Andrew Johnson 18. Ulyssess S. Grant 19. R. D. Hayes 20. James A. Garfield 21. Chester A. Arthur 22. Grover Cleveland 23. Benjamin Harrison 24. Grover Cleveland 26. T. Roosevelt 27. W. Howard Taft 28. Woodrow Wilson 29. W. G. Harding 30 . Calvin Coolidge 31. Herbert Hoover 32. F. D. Roosevelt 33. Harry S. Truman 34. D. D. Eisenhower 35. John F. Kennedy 36. L. B. Johnson 36. Richard Nixon 38. Gerald Ford 39. Jimmy Carter 40. Ronald Reagan 41. G. H. W. Bush 42. Bill Clinton 43. George W. Bush 44. Barack Obama 25. William Mckinley ` U.S. INTELLIGENCE Development and ReformsWe are going to study… How the American intelligence structure functions as a syositions were transferred from the IRIS to the National Intelligence Authority, the CIG, and the military services. The second DCI, Lieutenant General Hoyt Vandenberg , proved more aggressive than this predecessor, gaining authority for the CIG to hire personnel and acquire its own administrative support, as well as expanding clandestine collection, research and analysis, and the overall size of the organization. Vandenberg saw an opportunity to incorporate legislative language crating an independent central intelligence agency with several features modeled on the existing charter of the CIG. → He submitted a proposal describing the new entity, with the support of the Truman Administration, which consisted basically of the pertinent language from the 1946 presidential directive and language that had been previously published in the Federal Register. → After submitting the proposal, several issues emerged about the role of the DCI.Harry S. Truman (1945-1953) Signed into law the Nationalearched the study by itself lacked persuasiveness partly and tendency of CIA perspective Passed to the President and the NSC by Colby Pointed the “Dilemma,” so congress should rewrite the National Security Act of 1947 The National Security Act had made the DCI responsible in all intelligence ---- The Defense Department was the owner of most of American Intelligence collection system as not anticipated the technological marvels and accompanying budgetary imperatives The Taylor Report (October, 1975) CIA Deputy Comptroller James Taylor Three studies in 1975Proposed Changes toward the DCI Authors urged their superior to use this unique opportunity to propose changes that would ease the inefficiency and friction that the imbalance between the DCI`s mission and authority inflicted upon the community Changes that would ease the inefficiency friction from the imbalance between the DCI`s mission and authority Questioned how to enhance the DCI`s powers - offered a way to increase the authoritoperation Desert Storm outstripped the abilities of the battle damage assessment system. . Unable to meet the requirements for timely data on a variety of new types of targets or targets struck in new ways Exposed weaknesses in the military’s and the intelligence Community’s ability to support modern air campaigns. The Change in American IntelligenceStep 1 Step 2 Step 3 In March 1991, to create “joint intelligence centers” like that built in Central command just before the war. Intelligence support at the theater or “operational ” level- Receive better national and organic intelligence support in future conflicts. The larger problem of how intelligence Community elements origin! Step by Secretary of defense Richard CheneyOverview of The Aspin- Brown Commission (1995-96) The collapse of the Soviet Union and the 1991 war over Kuwait Spending cuts in defense and intelligence budgets during the 1990s The continuing evolutions of military doctrine after the Gulf war The Aldrich Ames spy scagement of the CIA 4 While the 9/11 Commission conducted its work over the next 18 months, several congressmen introduced bills to implement proposals similar to those drafted by the joint inquiry. The 9.11 Commission Report, 2004DCI The DCI’s duties should be split between a chief of the Intelligence Community (the National intelligence director, or NID) and a director of the CIA. NID Wield full authority over the national foreign intelligence program budget which would come to him or her in a separate appropriation. Supervise three deputy NIDs for homeland security, defense intelligence, and foreign intelligence Each of whom would also hold joint appointment as senior deputies in the FBI, the defense department, and the CIA, respectively. Domestic and foreign terrorism analysis and ‘strategic planning’ to be done by National Counterterrorism center (NCTC), under the NID’s authority - Hybrid organization to bridge the divides between foreign and domestic intelligence, and between decrehow}
Revolution of Mobile phone in Africa(Theories of Area Studies)INTRODUCTIONThe statement of mobile phone in AfricaICT in five African countriesRwandaMozambiqueTanzaniaZambiaNamibiaProfile of mobile users and non-users in the communities (case of Tanzania, South Africa)Concern about Gender, EducationImpacts of mobile phoneJob opportunityWhat explains mobile phone use?Mobile BankingCONCLUSIONINTRODUCTIONWhen you are thinking about Africa, what is the best keyword? Poverty? Warfare? or Famine? And then, why we should have pessimistic view about Africa?Nowadays, Africa's rate of economic growth increased, averaging 5% in 2007. Some countries experienced still higher growth rates, notably Hyperlink "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Angola" o "Angola" Angola, Hyperlink "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sudan" o "Sudan" Sudan and Equatorial Guinea, all three of which had recently begun extracting their Hyperlink "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Petroleum" o "Petroleum" petroleum reserves or had expandrates. So there is no simple way to summarize the penetration patterns across countries. According to the most recent ITU figures, shown in Table 1, in most of the continent’s biggest economies, penetration rates lie in the 20-40 per cent range, although with exceptions such as Nigeria (2.55 per cent).Table 1: Mobile penetration rates in AfricaHowever, there can be little doubt that spread of mobile was triggered partly by the liberalization of the telecoms markets in many African countries from the mid-1990s. And including the issuing of private mobile licenses, often to international operators. According to research by the World Bank looking at 41 African countries found that the introduction of a second and subsequent (private sector) competitors accelerates mobile penetration, whereas the presence of a state-owned telecoms incumbent in the market inhibits diffusion. Understanding the differences will be important for the design of policy by African governments and telecoms regulatoss to mobile phones (regardless of whether or not the respondent used them), 97 percent in Tanzania stated that they could access a mobile phone if they wished to, whereas only 28 percent could access a landline somewhere in the community. This indicates a very high awareness of the potential to use mobile phones for communication, and very high perceived accessibility, even in these very poor rural communities. The survey found that the perception of ownership of mobile phones in Tanzania is different to that in South Africa. When the respondents stated that they owned a mobile phone, they often considered it as a household asset rather than a personal or individual one. This was particularly the case for female respondents. However cultural norms in Tanzania dictate that ownership of such items lies with male members or heads of the households. It was that a broadly similar proportion of male and female were owners and users of mobiles. While it may be explained by the fact that the ommunities require and the implications of those needs for the models of ICT access – in particular the difference between one-way and two-way communications. The surveys therefore included a number of questions designed to ascertain the most important influences on the use of mobiles. One obvious candidate was income, but we did not consider this relevant in the Tanzanian communities surveyed. Most of them are dependent on subsistence farming and people earn very little cash income. In addition, the income they earned was seasonal, and dependent on the harvests. A more detailed survey would have been required to get an appropriate estimate of how much the respondents could earn in a typical month.Mobile bankingKenya’s success story has demonstrated mobile money’s potential, and its benefits are starting to be more widely appreciated. More enlightened regulators are no longer insisting that these services meet the rigid rules for formal banking. Some banks, meanwhile, have come to see then take the text message to a local M-PESA agent and withdraw cash. These examples of the very important role mobile phones in Africa have come to play on an everyday basis are also supported by the high proportion of household income typically allocated for mobile phone services. This high proportion of income used for mobile telephony suggests that people in Africa really do see mobile telephones as nearly invaluable parts of their everyday lives. Third, African economic growth drives mobile phone penetration. But many skeptics of the African Mobile Phone Revolution may contend that Africans earning only a dollar a day can't afford a mobile phone. And while African consumers may indeed include some of the world's poorest people, the robust economic growth of around 6 percent per year Africa has registered since the turn of the century is putting more disposable income into the pockets of more Africans. And while the reverberations of the financial crisis continues to hinder AfricaAT 1
유럽인권재판소의 개괄 및 개인청원 제도 실행의 문제점과 활성화 방안목 차 ECHR 의 개괄 개인청원제도 문제점 활성화 방안17 명의 재판관들로 구성 2 개의 Grand Chamber 로 구성 중요한 결정이 필요시 7 명의 재판관으로 구성 허용불가로 판단하지 않은 사건의 허용여부 개별 사건들을 판단 3 명의 재판관으로 구성 개인청원의 허용성 여부 판단 예비검 토 실시 실제 사건의 판결문제에 관여하지 않음 Chamber 의 의장 결정 Chamber 의 구성 절차규칙의 구성 ECHR 의 구성과 절차 Plenary Court Committee Chamber Grand Chamber 전원재판부 소재판부 대재판부 위원회판결의 효력과 집행 Grand Chamber 로의 이송 본안의 검토 우호적 해결 청원 의 허용여부 결정 청원의 제기 ECHR 의 재판 절차개인청원제도의 문제점 개인청원의 허용성 본안심리절차의 객관성 진행 및 결정의 소요시간 직접희생자 3 자 NGO 법인 B 규약 개인청원 제도 본안심리절차의 객관성 선택의정서 : 서면절차만을 언급 인권이사회의 심리를 비공개 구두심리절차 미 비 진행 및 결정의 소요시간반드시 동의를 거쳐 시행 현상황 : 피해자로부터 위임받은 사실이 증명되지 않으면 어떠한 청원도 불가능 개인청원제도의 활성화 방안 NGO 자격부여 효과적인 심리절차 증거방법 도입 인권이사회 기능강화 진행 및 결정의 소요시간 특별보고관 활용 작업단의 활용 병합심리 채택 개별의견 추가 모든심리절차 공개 증인신문 현장검증 구두심리절차 UN 인권제도로 확산 사법 적 성격 강화 선진국들의 적극적인 추진Thank you{nameOfApplication=Show}
Introduction Human trafficking is a multi-dimensional threat. It deprives people of their human rights and freedoms, it increases global health risks, and it fuels the growth of organized crime. Human trafficking has a devastating impact on individual victims, who often suffer physical and emotional abuse, rape, threats against and family, and even death. But the impact of human trafficking goes beyond individual victims. There is an ever-growing community of nations making significant efforts to eliminate this atrocious crime. A country that fails to make significant efforts to bring itself into compliance with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking in persons. like TVPA(Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000)