경영자의 과신성향이 판매관리비 신호효과에 미치는 영향 (The Effects of Managerial Overconfidence on the Signal-to-noise Effect by SG&A Cost)

서지정보

· 발행기관 : 한국회계학회
· 수록지 정보 : 회계저널 / 31권 / 2호 / 35 ~ 60페이지
· 저자명 : 허강성, 정준희, 김동현

초록

본 연구는 경영자의 과신성향에 따라 판매관리비 신호가 미래 기업성과에 미치는 영향을 분석한다. 전통적으로 판매관리비 신호는 경영자의 비효율성을 나타내는 지표로 인식되어 왔으나, Andersen et al.(2007)은 일부 조건에서 판매관리비 신호가 미래 기업성과와 정(+)의 관련성이 있음을 실증하였다. 그러나 여전히 다수의 선행연구에서 판매관리비 신호와 미래 기업성과간 관련성에 대해 혼재된 결과를 보여주고 있다. 이러한 혼재된 결과의 원인 중 하나로 본 연구에서는 경영자의 과도한 투자와 비효율적 지출을 나타내는 과신성 향을 주목하고자 한다. 경영자는 미래 매출 증가에 대한 과도한 기대심리로 인해 매출이 감소하여도 적극적으로 판매관리비를 줄이지 않고 오히려 판매관리비를 확대하는 잘못된 의사결정을 할 가능성이 있다. 이러한 관점에서 본 연구는 경영자 과신성향이 없을 때 판매관리비가 신호가 미래 기업성과와 정(+)의 관련성을 가지는지를 살펴본다. 실증분석결과, 판매관리비 신호와 차기 이익증가 간 정(+)의 관련성은 경영자의 과신성향이 없는 기업이 매출이 감소할 때 혹은 판매관리비가 증가할 때 유의적으로 나타났다. 이러한 결과는 판매관리비 신호가 미래 기업가치에 미치는 영향이 경영자의 과신성향 여부에 따라 달라질 수 있음을 직접적으로 보여주는 결과이다. 본 연구는 판매관리비 신호가 미래 기업가치에 미치는 영향에 대한 혼재된 결과의 원인을 일부 제공하였으며, 부정적으로 인식되어온 판매관리비 신호는 경영자의 효율적 집행에 따라 기업의 자본적 지출에 해당될 수 있음을 보여주었다는 점에서 그 의의가 있다.

영어초록

This study examines the effect of SG&A signals on future firm performance according to managerial overconfidence propensity. Traditionally, SG&A signals have been recognized as an indicator of managers’ inefficiency, but Andersen et al. (2007) demonstrated that under some conditions, SG&A is positively related to future firm performance. However, it still shows mixed results with SG&A signals and future firm performance. One of the causes of these mixed results is that this study points out the managerial overconfidence propensity, which indicates excessive investment and inefficient expenditure of managers. It is highly likely that managers will not actively reduce SG&A, but rather make wrong decisions to increase sales and management expenses even if sales decrease due to excessive expectations of future sales growth. Specifically, most of a company’s revenue is from sales of services and products provided to its customers. In order to increase sales and maximize profits, managers make expenditure decisions on costs such as the cost of goods sold and SG&A expenses. At this time, in addition to the cost decision-making, the manager’s important role is to make decisions about whether and when to acquire tangible and intangible assets and invest in assets under construction. In general, in a situation where sales are declining, most managers will defer the remaining possible investment expenditures to the next year, except for essential investments directly related to sales, and suppress unreasonable additional investment. Unlike variable costs, the cost of sales, which is a fixed cost of sales, is an expense item that cannot be controlled. Although sales and administrative expenses have a discretionary scope due to the nature of variable costs, excessive containment will increase adjusted costs when sales increase in the future because of the loss of long-term and painstaking sales networks and the outflow of excellent R&D and sales personnel. Therefore, it is necessary to precisely analyze whether investment spending increases or decreases and the signal of increase or decrease in the proportion of SG&A expenses in a situation where sales are declining. Therefore, this study examined whether the sales and management cost signal had a positive (+) relationship with future firm performance when there was no managerial overconfidence propensity. As a result of empirical analysis, the positive (+) correlation between SG&A signal and next profit increase was significant when sales decreased or SG&A increased in companies without managerial overconfidence propensity. In addition, the relationship between the SG&A signal and the next increase in operating income also shows a larger positive relationship. Specifically, in the same way as the result of accounting income, a company with no managerial overconfidence propensity due to a decrease in sales, or a company with no managerial overconfidence propensity as the proportion of SG&A expenses increases. Also, the result of measuring the SG&A signal and the dependent variable as the next market value also showed the same result. This is an empirical result showing that the correlation between SG&A signal and corporate value can vary depending on whether managers are overconfidence propensity or not. finally, the result of measuring the SG&A signal and the dependent variable as the next enterprise value shows the same result as above. This is an empirical result showing that the correlation between the SG&A signal and corporate performance (accounting income, operating income, market value) can vary depending on whether managers have an overconfidence propensity or not. The contribution of this study is as follows. The cause of the mixed results regarding the effect of the SG&A signal on future corporate performance was identified. If previous studies analyzed the causes of the mixed results on the relationship between SG&A signals and future corporate performance by simply focusing on the results of positive and negative attributes of SG&A expenses, in this study, the final decision maker of SG&A expenses has been empirically shown that SG&A expenses can have different effects on corporate value depending on the manager’s overconfidence propensity. As such, the analysis results of this study are showing that the signal of SG&A, which has been negatively recognized in previous studies, can be a capital expenditure that increases the value of the company according to the efficient execution of the managers, it provides an important clue for the relationship between SG&A and managerial characteristics in the future.

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