Evolution of Marriage Contracts under Conformism

서지정보

· 발행기관 : 한국사회경제학회
· 수록지 정보 : 사회경제평론 / 28권 / 1호 / 143 ~ 170페이지
· 저자명 : 오승연

초록

Why have patriarchal family institutions remained so persistent? Could stronger conformism to patriarchal norms retard the evolution of more egalitarian contracts even when egalitarian contracts are in some respects more efficient? To address these questions, I study the evolution of marriage contracts from patriarchal to egalitarian forms. In particular, I explore the ways in which normative dynamics such as asymmetric conformity could shape the evolution of marriage contracts—specifically, the equilibrium selection and the time that elapses in the transition from one contract equilibrium to another. I set up a micro stochastic process model to study the equilibrium selection of marriage contracts in various economic environments. Using parameters capturing the payoff within families and the degree of conformism between families of each contract, the model identifies the parameter range in which even though the egalitarian contract is optimal choice within family, the patriarchal contract pervades due to the strong conformism. Also I aggregate the micro stochastic process to obtain macro level stochastic process, which is the Birth and Death Markov process, to calculate the fixation probabilities of patriarchal and egalitarian regime. The result shows that the transition time from a patriarchal to an egalitarian equilibrium can be longer than the opposite direction under the conformism.

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