銀行規制의 바람직한 모습 —美國에서의 銀産分離政策을 모델로 하여— (Desirable Form of Banking Regulation - Modeled on the U.S. Policy of Separating Banking and Commerce -)

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초록

The Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC) recently announced that it
would amend the Commercial Banking Act of Korea in order to allow korean
style conglomerates (so called chaebols) to get bank ownership in the near future.
Under the current Act, chaebols has been limited to hold their maximum shareholding
to 4% of total outstanding shares with voting rights. This kind of
ownership regulation beforehand is anachronistic to the recent deregulation
movement in the financial world. To make matters worse, chaebols are able to
hold secretly majority shares of commercial banks so long as these holdings are
inferior to qualified foreign shareholders provided that their holdings did not
exceed those of foreigners. For that reason, some scholars have criticized that the
anti-holding regulation against chaebols should be abolished immediately since it
has no reasonable justification.
However, the author believes that the current amendment is not adequate
nor timely in considering the serious financial difficulties worldwide caused by the
insolvency of Lehman Brothers’. In addition, people have an enormous doubt
about chaebols’ real intention why they have pursued to get bank ownership in
Korea. Last year, one whistle-blower who was one of the highest in-house lawyer
and retired from the Samsung Group confessed that the owner of the Samsung
Group had maintained lots of borrowed accounts to conceal dirty money at its financial subsidiaries. Due to this scandal, people are very afraid that if chaebols
are allowed to own a bank they will surely use it either as a private funding
source or as a illegal vehicle for a tax evasion and a money laundering and so
forth. Thus, most korean people do not support this kind of reform at this time,
and strongly believe that banking and commerce should be separated for the time
being.
Part II deals with the U.S. policy of separating banking and commerce. In
the U.S., a highly publicized battle was triggered from mid-2005 through mid-2007
when Wal-Mart, the world’s largest retailer, applied for permission to establish
Wal-Mart Bank, a new Utah-chartered industrial banks. In particular, three
significant issues were raised including, ① whether commercial ownership of
industrial banks is contrary to the U.S. policy of separating banking and
commerce, ② whether commercial ownership of industrial banks creates serious
risks for the U.S. financial system and the broader economy, ③ whether the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) has adequate supervisory powers to
control such risks, despite the FDIC’s lack of consolidated supervisory authority
over the parent companies of industrial banks. Part III analyzes deeply the
current amendment in Korea comparing the 2008 policy statement of the Federal
Reserve Board in the U.S. This analysis shows clearly that the FSC made serious
errors in reforming the Banking Act due to its excessive favoritism toward
chaebols. That is, the FSC mis-translated the 2008 policy statement and distorted
the truth itself. Based on these analyses, part IV is the conclusion of this paper.

영어초록

The Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC) recently announced that it
would amend the Commercial Banking Act of Korea in order to allow korean
style conglomerates (so called chaebols) to get bank ownership in the near future.
Under the current Act, chaebols has been limited to hold their maximum shareholding
to 4% of total outstanding shares with voting rights. This kind of
ownership regulation beforehand is anachronistic to the recent deregulation
movement in the financial world. To make matters worse, chaebols are able to
hold secretly majority shares of commercial banks so long as these holdings are
inferior to qualified foreign shareholders provided that their holdings did not
exceed those of foreigners. For that reason, some scholars have criticized that the
anti-holding regulation against chaebols should be abolished immediately since it
has no reasonable justification.
However, the author believes that the current amendment is not adequate
nor timely in considering the serious financial difficulties worldwide caused by the
insolvency of Lehman Brothers’. In addition, people have an enormous doubt
about chaebols’ real intention why they have pursued to get bank ownership in
Korea. Last year, one whistle-blower who was one of the highest in-house lawyer
and retired from the Samsung Group confessed that the owner of the Samsung
Group had maintained lots of borrowed accounts to conceal dirty money at its financial subsidiaries. Due to this scandal, people are very afraid that if chaebols
are allowed to own a bank they will surely use it either as a private funding
source or as a illegal vehicle for a tax evasion and a money laundering and so
forth. Thus, most korean people do not support this kind of reform at this time,
and strongly believe that banking and commerce should be separated for the time
being.
Part II deals with the U.S. policy of separating banking and commerce. In
the U.S., a highly publicized battle was triggered from mid-2005 through mid-2007
when Wal-Mart, the world’s largest retailer, applied for permission to establish
Wal-Mart Bank, a new Utah-chartered industrial banks. In particular, three
significant issues were raised including, ① whether commercial ownership of
industrial banks is contrary to the U.S. policy of separating banking and
commerce, ② whether commercial ownership of industrial banks creates serious
risks for the U.S. financial system and the broader economy, ③ whether the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) has adequate supervisory powers to
control such risks, despite the FDIC’s lack of consolidated supervisory authority
over the parent companies of industrial banks. Part III analyzes deeply the
current amendment in Korea comparing the 2008 policy statement of the Federal
Reserve Board in the U.S. This analysis shows clearly that the FSC made serious
errors in reforming the Banking Act due to its excessive favoritism toward
chaebols. That is, the FSC mis-translated the 2008 policy statement and distorted
the truth itself. Based on these analyses, part IV is the conclusion of this paper.

참고자료

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