한국 대규모 기업집단 가족 지분율의 결정요인에 관한 제도론적 고찰 (The Determinants of Founding Family Ownership of Korean Big Business Groups: An Institutional Approach)

서지정보

· 발행기관 : 한국경영학회
· 수록지 정보 : 경영학연구 / 37권 / 4호 / 691 ~ 721페이지
· 저자명 : 윤채린, 송재용

초록

본 연구는 한국 대규모 기업집단의 가족경영을 한국의 경제 체제 내에 존재하는 제도의 하나로 인식하고, 그것이 어떠한 이해관계와 지분 소유 방식에 근거해서 작동하고 유지되는지를 분석하였다. 2001년부터 2006년까지 출자총액제한 집단에 계속 지정된 11개 기업집단 소속 1.061개의 기업-연도 관측치를 대상으로 가족 지분율의 결정요인을 규명한 본 논문의 실증분석 결과, 기업집단의 소유경영자 가족들은 투자자로서 개별 기업의 성과에 근거한 경제적 이해를 추구하는 대신, 그룹 전체에 대한 통제권과 사회적 정당성의 요소들을 고려한 지분투자 의사결정을 내리는 것으로 나타났다. 특히 가족은 그룹 전체에 대한 통제권을 유지하는 과정에서 계열사 간 출자관계에서 발생하는 관계적 자원을 적극적으로 개별 기업들의 단순 합으로 인식하는 효율성 중심의 관점이 일정 수준 한계를 지니고 있음을 제시한다. 기업집단이 지배적인 조직 형태로 자리 잡은 한국에서 외환위기를 계기로 중대한 제도적 전환기를 경험한 기업집단의 소유경영자 가족들이 어떠한 동기와 이해관계의 요소에 근거해서 계열사에 대한 직접 투자의 수준을 높이는지를 살펴봄으로써 한국의 대규모 기업집단 지배구조문제를 이해하는 시야를 넓힐 수 있을 것이다.

영어초록

Until recently the dominant theoretical perspective applied in corporate governance
research has been the agency theory. Agency theory offered the first satisfactory explanation to the governance of modern corporations since Berle and Means(1932) pointed out the essential problems inherent in the separation of ownership and control. However. it is undeniable that the exclusive reliance on agency theory has constrained the advances incorporate governance studies. Therefore. an alternative approach to corporate governance is necessary to recognize the various mechanisms and structures that may operate across the different forms of corporations. Recent studies brought up the issues of corporate governance to the forefront of organization theory. If we take the perspective of organization theory. corporate governance can be broadly conceptualized as a problem of managing various interdependences(Fligstein & Freeland. 1995). Diversified business groups are sets of legally separate firms bound together in formal or informal ways. They are under tight control of founders as entrepreneurs and their family members (Granovetter. 2005 : Guillen. 2001). The national economies of most countries. except for Anglo-American economies. have been dominated by various forms of business groups for decades or even centuries. Hence. understanding business groups is still a very important issue in modern capitalist economies. Most business groups are closely associated with family members of the founder who exert controlling power directly or indirectly through diverse means. Among these multiple means. the equity structure among the group-affiliated companies is the most powerful mechanism to maintain the dominant control of families in most business groups. Drawing on theoretical insights from institutional theory, we view the family control of big business groups as an institutional factor that exist s in the Korea economic system. Also the family's equity investment can be recognized as a family's strategic response to the institutional pressures from both foreign and domestic markets. The family ownership and cross-share holding among group-affiliated companies are both direct and prevalent mechanisms that enable the owner family members to keep on controlling the entire business group. In Korea, these family member s have institutionalized their dominant status in the entire business group. To understand the family's control as an institutional mechanism, we should consider the underlying logics that differentiate the interests of family from those of other stakeholders. In order to clarify the family's control mechanism, we focus more closely on both the economic and non-economic interest s th at influence the incentives of the family member's equity stake in each affiliate company. In this paper, we investigate the factors th at affect the family ownership using a sample of group -affiliated firms in Korea during the period of 2001-2006. The Korean Fair Trade Commission(KFTC) legally defines a business group and identifies a set of firms as a big business group which is often called as chaebol. Since group-affiliated companies ar e of our major interests, we restricted our sample to firms which have been designated as big business groups by the government for six consecutive years. Under this criterion, 11 business groups are selected, and the final sample consists of 1061 firm-year observations. Drawing on
institut ion theory, we propose six hypotheses and test them empirically. Specifically, dimensions of (1) profit seeking, (2) group control. and (3) social legitimacy are considered as major factors that influence the level of the founding family's equity investment. We argue that the family's ownership stake can be determined by not only economic interests but also noneconomic factor s such as an investment in symbolic assets of the affiliated- firm's history and the pursuit of social legitimacy. The random effect tobit regression results show that the families did not pursue their economic interests based on the expectation of superior individual firm performance. Instead, they made investment decisions in terms of group control and social legitimacy. In particular, families mobilize the relational resources originated both from equity structures of group-affiliated companies and intra-group transactions. Families have more equity stakes in group- affiliated companies higher up in the hierarchy of the equity structure. The high level of equity-holding status measured by the centrality index gives controlling power over the whole group to the family. Families also invest more in group-affiliated companies that have longer history. Firm hist ory can enhance group identity among family members and historical legitimacy of family control. In ad dit ion. we found that the impairment of social legitimacy by NGOs. especially. shareholder activists groups can influence the level of families' equity investments. Shareholder activist groups can hurt reputations of business groups by raising issues related to corporate governance problems. Families reduce the level of their direct equity ownership when their members or affiliated companies are involved in
a legal suit from NGOs. Implications of our study are as follows. First. although recent studies of neo-institutional theory take into account power and interest s in their explanations, researchers need to consider more diverse interests as a crucial factor that sets on the institutionalization as a process. In this research, institutional and interest-based explanations for the family's ownership structure can enrich our understanding of various issues related to the Korean business groups and complement the efficiency-based perspectives of corporate governance research. Second. our findings highlight the importance of further investigation of various institutional logics which operate differently following the divergent paths of each business system. The Anglo-Saxon view of an ideal organization is largely grounded in the neo-classical economic tradition. In the neoclassical economic paradigm. firms are conceived as isolated units and keeping them apart is a crucial condition for advanced capitalism. However, business groups display distinctive organizational patterns of ownership. management, and production. We need to understand that the emergence of particular organizational forms can be best understood in the context of a country-specific system of inter-relations among suppliers. consumers. regulators and many intermediaries operating in the country. Even though component firms are legally separate. business groups are more than just the sum of individual companies. Internally they are socially structured, and each of them plays a different role within a group. In business groups. families are very well aware of the role structure of equity ties among member firms and actively utilize these relational resources to maintain their control over the entire business group. In this study. we suggest that a more balanced theoretical approach
is needed to fully understand different organizational forms and the ways these institutions operate. An Anglo-Saxon view can not be a general theory of capitalism. and it should be cautiously applied to non-western economies where institutional assumptions are different.

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