신용카드 시장의 높은 이자율의 원인에 관한 연구: 도덕적해이와 역선택문제를 중심으로 (A study on the causes of high interest rates in the credit card market: centering on moral hazard and adverse selection)

서지정보

· 발행기관 : 한국경영학회
· 수록지 정보 : 경영학연구 / 39권 / 5호 / 1277 ~ 1297페이지
· 저자명 : 박영석, 고혁진

초록

미국시장을 중심으로 1990년 초반 이후 신용카드시장의 높은 이자율의 원인을 밝히는 다수의 연구들이 진행되어 왔다.
선행연구에서 제시한 원인으로는 신용카드시장에서의 역선택의 문제, 카드사용자의 도덕적해이, 전환비용ㆍ탐색비용ㆍ거래비용 그리고 카드사용자의 비합리성과 같은 기타요인들이 있다. 본 연구에서는 국내 전업카드사의 미시자료를 이용하여일차적으로 국내 신용카드 시장에 이자율 하방경직성이 존재하는지를 검증하였고, 검증가능한 분야인 역선택과 도덕적해이의 문제가 존재하는가를 분석하였다.
본 연구의 주요결과는 다음과 같다. 국내 신용카드 시장에서 조달금리가 상승하는 경우에서의 이자율 상승폭이 조달금리가 하락한 경우에서의 이자율 하락폭보다 크게 나타나 이자율 하방경직성은 존재하는 것으로 나타났다. 한편 역선택과 관련해서는 금융한도가 증가된 경우 신용도가 높은 그룹에의 금융소진율은 변하지 않는 반면 신용도가 낮은 그룹의 금융잔고는 유의적으로 증가하여 역선택의 문제가 존재할 가능성이 관찰되었다. 그러나 이자율과 관련해서는 하락하는 이자율에서도 상승하는 이자율에서도 역선택의 문제는 발견되지 않았다. 마지막으로 연체월에 근접할수록 소진율이 증가하기는 했지만 이는 한도의 감소에 의해 기인된 것으로, 카드사용자들이 채무불이행확률이 극대화된 시점에서 옵션의 가치를 행사할 것이라는 가설은 지지되지 않았다.

영어초록

Ausubel (1991) reported that interest rate stickiness was present in the US credit card market, which in turn led to a market failure, citing switching costs, adverse selection problems and consumer irrationality as prime culprits. Furthermore, Zwicki (2000) and Park (1997)pointed out moral hazard of credit card users which eventually raised interest rates of the market. As mentioned in the introduction, interest rates of the Korean credit card market are fairly high. Based on previous studies, this study examines whether interest rate stickiness exists in the Korean credit card market, and whether adverse selection and moral hazard issues are present due to the high interest rates. If there are problems of adverse selection and moral hazard in the domestic credit card market, it may explain the rationales behind high interest rates. If it is not the case, however, it may indicate that the market should lower the credit card interest rates.
Major findings of this study are as following. First, interest hikes of credit cards due to increases in borrowing rates are greater than interest declines due to decreases in borrowing rates of the previous month. This clearly confirms that there exists interest rate stickiness in the domestic credit card market. When delinquency rates are considered, the model becomes more relevant and the stickiness of interest rates affected by changes in borrowing rates becomes greater. Meanwhile, when finance limits expand, finance balances of high credit rating groups hardly change while those of low credit rating groups do rise. This reveals that adverse selection issues are relevant to the credit limit. Considering that previous studies failed to reach an agreement over adverse selection pertaining to interest rates, the finding is more interesting. If there is an adverse selection problem, either of the following cases should be true; 1) when interest rates are on the rise, people with high credits should meaningfully decrease their credit card usage while those with low credits hardly cut back on the usage,or 2) when interest rates go down, people with low credits should meaningfully increase their credit card usage while those with gooediredits hardly change the usage. However, the empirical analysis did not idely fy adverse selection issues either of the cases, burueounmore incredit balances of the low credit group meaningfully decrease when interest rates declines.
Therefore, it can be construed that Korean credit card market is free from adverse selection problems concerning interest rates. Lastly, if moral hazard of credit card users exist in the market as Park (1997) claimed, defaulters should spend on credit up to or nearly the limit in the month right before they are behind on the payment when their credit default risks maximized. However, in the previous month before default, bad credit groups show little tendency to spend up their credit. Even if some used bigger portions of their credit, it is not because of increases in spending but because of decreases in credit limits. As a result, groundless are the concerns about moral hazard that card users would exercise their option when their credit default risks are at the peak.
In conclusion, interest rates of the Korean credit card market are unreasonably high in that there is no substantial risk of adverse selection or moral hazard. Although the Korean economy is recovering from the global financial crisis at a fast rate, the sense of recovery fails to spread every corner of the society. On the contrary, expected income level of the lowincome class is going down. In addition, as risk tolerance in the financial markets declined due to the global financial crisis, ever-rising interest rates of non-banking institutions distress low-income households. One consolation is that the government has recently implemented policies to lower interest rates of the non-banking sector so that low-income people could take out loans at lower costs. Opponents argue that such policies distort market interest rates and even raise default risks in the long run. However, as Ko Hyuk-jin et al (2009)have already found, expanding the credit limits of poor-credit households and/or lowering their borrowing rates does not necessarily translate into higher default risks. Therefore, it is expected that lowering interest burdens of the low-income class by slashing the borrowing rates of the non-banking sector will deliver positive effect. Unfortunately, most studies on interest rates in the financial market have largely, if not only, focused on the corporate finance and the banking institutions thus far. Considering the fact that household debts have already outgrown corporate debts and how important the household finance is, it is expected that this study will serve as a good starting point for long-overdue studies on optimal interest rates in the non-banking sector.

참고자료

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