Reductive Collectivism and Complicitous Liability in War: Against Bazargan’s Account on the Moral Principle for Killing in War

서지정보

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· 저자명 : 김상수

초록

My purpose in this paper is to analyze Bazargan’s complicitous liability account for evaluating the liability of unjust combatants and unjust noncombatants in war, based on reductive collectivism, and to show its limitations. Those who concede the necessity of a moral principle for killing in war believe that an adequate moral principle for determining justifiable killing in war should be capable of satisfying both conditions at the same time. The first condition is that most unjust combatants are legitimate (or permissible) targets in war, and the second condition is that most unjust noncombatants are not. According to Bazargan’s complicitous liability-based account hinged on reductive collectivism, an individual can be liable to be killed by possessing the intention to participate in collective unjust actions. His complicitous liability-based account is significant in that it avoids the responsibility dilemma that reductive individualism faces, while at the same time, based on reductive collectivism, it justifies individual liability based on the shared participatory intention of those who participate in a collective unjust action. In my view, however, his account faces a centrality dilemma, which is a matter of establishing the degree of centrality of a role in relation to an unjust collective action. This dilemma has a significant problem that blurs the judgment of complicitous liability for killing in war.

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