이동통신 서비스용 주파수 재할당의 대가 산정 기준: 예상 및 실제 매출액 vs 경매 낙찰가 (Criteria for determining the price of reassigned spectrum for mobile telecommunication services: Expected or actual sales vs a winning bid of a previous auction)

서지정보

· 발행기관 : 한국정보사회학회
· 수록지 정보 : 정보사회와 미디어 / 22권 / 1호 / 113 ~ 129페이지
· 저자명 : 최용제

초록

최근 주파수의 재할당과 관련해서 재할당 대가의 산정에 과거의 유사한 주파수 대역의 낙찰가격을 고려할 것인가 여부가 논란이 되고 있다. 본 연구에서는 주파수 재할당대가 산정 시 예상 및 실제 매출액의 3%와 유사한 대역의 가격경쟁을 통한 과거 낙찰가격 사이에 차이가 발생할 수 있는 주요한 원인 몇 가지를 살펴보고, 이러한 논의의 결과로부터 다음과 같은 시사점을 도출하였다. 첫째 기술 중립성의 보장과 함께 기존 이용자에게 재할당하고 기존 이용자가 할당 기간 내에 새로운 기술을 적용하는 경우에는 유사한 대역에서의 낙찰가격을 재할당 대가에 반영하고, 그 이외의 경우에는 재할당 대상 주파수를 신규 할당을 하여 경쟁 입찰을 통하여 할당대가가 정해지도록 하거나 재할당을하는 경우에는 매출액의 3% 혹은 최저낙찰가격 수준의 (3+)%라는 일반적인 틀을 벗어나지 않토록 하는 것이 바람직하다. 둘째 재할당 대가의 수준을 높이는 것이 주파수 자원 이용의 효율성이나 이동통신시장의 효율성을 제고할 가능성은 크지 않다. 이번 재할당 대상 주파수 대역 모두에 동일한 정책을 실시할 필요는 없다. 각 주파수대역이 당면한 상황에 맞추어 바람직한 정책 대안을 적용하는 것이 바람직하다. 그리고기술 중립성과 함께 기존 이용자에게 재할당하는 경우에는 해당 주파수의 용도 (혹은 무선통신 기술)가 전환될 시점과 용도 전환 이후의 경제적 가치를 반영하여 재할당 대가를산정하는 것이 필요하다

영어초록

Recently, reassignment of radio frequencies for mobile communication is a hot issue. The Radio Act stipulates that the government should determine the price of a spectrum license as 3% of the mixed sum of actual and expected sales during the license period. However, if a frequency band with the same or similar use has been allocated before through an auction, the government may consider the winning bid of the previous auction to calculate the price of a spectrum license. The price of spectrum license of the frequency reassigned is also to be determined in the same manner as the price of spectrum license of original spectrum allocation with necessary modifications.
It is a controversial issue whether the winning bid of similar frequency bands in the past is to be considered in calculating the price of spectrum license for the frequencies to be reassigned. Mobile network operators argued that the level of price of spectrum licensees in Korea is relatively higher than that of foreign countries, and requested not to use the winning bid in calculating the price of spectrum license for the frequencies to be reassigned.
However, the current Radio Act does not seem to have clear guidelines on how much and in what case the winning bid of the previous auctions should be considered in the calculation of the price of spectrum licenses for the frequencies reassigned. This study examines some of the main reasons for the difference between 3% of the mixed sum of expected and actual sales and the winning bid of the past auctions, and derive the following implications. When the frequencies are reassigned to an existing licensee with the guarantee of technology neutrality and the existing licensee applies a new technology during the license period, it is desirable to consider the winning bid of the past auctions for calculating the price of spectrum licenses. Otherwise, it is advisable to newly allocate the frequencies through competitive bidding or to reassign them based on the general framework of 3% or (3+)% of expected/actual future sales. Table 3 below summarizes the policy measures proposed for the various cases discussed in the paper.
<Table 1> Policy measures proposed for various cases policy measures various cases New allocation through auctions the profit generated by a new user () is large enough an existing licensee can immediately generate a large profit with a new service Reassignment with a fee of 3% or (3+)% of sales.
 is sufficently small  is sufficently large but reassignment is preferred for public interest reassigned without technological neutrality Reassignment with a fee the winning bid reflecting previous auction results reassigned with technological neutrality but new service is expected later during the license period Raising the level of the price of spectrum licenses is unlikely to enhance the efficiency of spectrum use or the efficiency of the mobile communication market. In addition, regarding the impact of relatively a high price of spectrum licenses on the mobile service market, existing research focuses on the concerns that high entry costs will reduce mobile operators' investment and/or increase retail prices. We can hardly find an existing research arguing that raising the price of spectrum licenses reassigned improves the performance of the mobile communication market.
It is not desirable to implement the same policy for all spectrum bands subject to reassignment. It is advised to apply a policy option that is well suited to each frequency band. In addition, if a frequency band is reassigned to an existing licensee with technology neutrality, it would be necessary to forecast the timing of the change in the use of the frequency band and the increase in the economic value of the frequency band in order to calculate the price of spectrum licensees to be reassigned.

참고자료

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