공시품질이 재무분석가의 수에 미치는 영향 (The Effect of Disclosure Quality on the Analyst Following)

서지정보

· 발행기관 : 한국기업경영학회
· 수록지 정보 : 기업경영연구 / 19권 / 6호 / 59 ~ 74페이지
· 저자명 : 김성혜, 이아영

초록

재무분석가는 일반 투자자들을 대표하여 기업을 분석, 평가하여 효율적인 자본시장이 작동하도록 하는데 핵심적인 역할을 담당하는 주요 회계정보 이용자이며 정보중개자이다. 본 연구는 2005년부터 2009년 까지의 상장기업을 대상으로 공시품질이 재무분석가의 수에 미치는 영향을 통해 우리나라 자본시장에서의 재무분석가의 역할에 대해 살펴본다. 공시품질은 한국기업지배구조원(Korean Corporate Governance Service, KCGS)의 기업지배구조 점수 중 공시점수를 통해 측정하였으며 통제변수로 규모 및 총자산수익률, 주식수익률 및 이익의 변동성, 주가-이익상관계수를 포함하였다. 실증분석 결과 재무분석가의 수는 전체 공시점수에 대하여 5% 수준 이내에서 유의한 양(+)의 회귀계수 값을 보였다. 또한 우리나라 재무분석가가 분석대상기업을 선정할 때 기업의 규모를 가장 큰 기준으로 고려하는 것을 감안하여, 기업의 규모를 통제변수로 추가하기 전과 후의 결과를 관찰했을 때도 전체 공시점수는 규모변수의 포함과 관계없이 재무분석가의 수에 유의한 영향을 미치고 있음을 관찰하였다. 이는 재무분석가가 기업의 공시정보를 중요한 정보의 원천으로 활용하며, 공시품질이 향상될수록 재무분석가의 분석기업종목에 포함될 가능성이 높다는 의미이다. 또한 우리나라의 재무분석가는 공시정보를 대체하는 새로운 정보를 발굴하는 정보공급자이기보다는 기업이 제공하는 정보를 가공하고 해석하는 정보매개자의 역할을 수행하는 것으로 추론된다. 세부적으로는 전체 공시점수 중에서도 인터넷 공시점수보다는 공시일반점수가 재무분석가의 수에 더 유의한 영향을 미치는 결과가 관찰되었다. 본 연구는 보다 정교하고 타당성이 높은 공시품질 측정치를 사용하여 상대적으로 논의가 미진했던 한국 자본시장에서의 재무분석가의 역할에 대해 살펴보았다는데 의의가 있다

영어초록

In this paper, we examines the role of financial analysts in the domestic market by investigating the association between firms’ disclosure practices and the number of analysts following. Analysts play an important role in capital market by providing variable information to investors such as earnings forecasts, buy and sell recommendations. In their evaluation, analysts use information which is mostly provided by firms. However, firms have substantial discretion in the informativeness and the amount of disclosures, analysts information environment also could be influenced by the firms’ disclosure quality.
In Bhushan(1989), the equilibrium number of analysts is determined by the intersection of the aggregate demand and supply curves for analyst service. Based on this, Lang and Lundholm(1996) focused on how firm-provided information affects the supply and demand for analysts service. According to their study, the effect of additional disclosure on the demand for analyst services depends on the role that analysts play in the capital market. If analysts are primarily information intermediaries, then increased disclosure increase the number of analysts. On the other hand, if analysts are primarily information providers, then the number of analysts will decreases. Since Korean accounting researchers have provided limited evidence on the role of analysts in the capital market, we extend and reinforce the discussion on this research question by investigating whether Korean analysts play a role of information intermediaries or information providers.
For the main test, we use a large sample of Korean firms over the 5 year period, 2005~2009, and total disclosure score among the corporate governance index obtained from KCGS(Korean Corporate Governance Service) as a comprehensive measure of firms’ disclosure quality. We measure analyst following as the number of analysts with annual earnings forecast for the current fiscal year. We collect the number of analysts data from Fn-guide. When we regress the number of analysts on disclosure score, we also include firm size, return on asset, earnings volatility, return volatility, correlation between annual stock returns and earnings as control variables. The regression results show that the coefficient on the total disclosure score(TDQ) is positive, and statistically significant. This result suggests that analysts use the firm-provided disclosure as an main source of information in their evaluations, and that disclosure quality is an important determinant of analyst following. In other words, the firms adopting more aggressive disclosure can attract more analysts and reduce information asymmetries in the capital market. In addition, the finding that more analysts follow firms with more informative disclosure quality is consistent with analysts serving primarily as information intermediaries who process the information and transmit it to capital market rather than as information providers who compete with firm-provided disclosure information.
Consistent with prior research, the coefficient on the control variables exhibit expected values. The coefficient on firm’s performance(ROA) exhibit significantly positive, which suggest that analysts prefer to analyze well-performing firms. The coefficient on stock return volatility(VolRET) is negative and also significant, and this implies that the number of analysts decrease since the cost of information gathering is larger for the firms with high stock volatility. we also find a negative coefficient on earnings volatility(VolEPS) and this means that analyst tend to follow firms that generate more predictable earnings. In addition, we observe that analyst are more likely to follow firms that belong to large business group.
Lastly, when we distinguish the total disclosure score into general disclosure score(DQ1) and online disclosure score(DQ2), the magnitude of significance for general disclosure score(DQ1) is larger than that of online disclosure score(DQ2). Our main results suggesting that the analyst following is significantly greater for firms with higher disclosure quality is still robust, after adding the size as control variable or using lag regression to control for simultaneous bias.

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