산업 내 선도기업의 선(先)공시이익이 후(後)공시기업의 결산일 이후 이익조정 및 시장반응에 미치는 영향 (The Effect of a Leading Firm’s Early Reported Earnings on Late Announcing Firm’s Earnings Management After Fiscal Year-end and Stock Market Response)

서지정보

· 발행기관 : 한국회계학회
· 수록지 정보 : 회계저널 / 24권 / 2호 / 37 ~ 83페이지
· 저자명 : 두서영, 최우석, 윤성수

초록

기업은 이익기준점을 달성하기 위하여 보고이익을 조정하려는 유인을 가지고 있으며, 기업의 이익기준점 달성에 대한 시장의 기대는 동일산업 내 다른 기업의 이익기준점 달성 여부에 따라 달라질 수 있다. 즉, 투자자들이 기업에 대한 투자의사결정을 하는 과정에서 다른 기업의 성과를 고려하고 그 결과 기업의 보고이익에 대한 시장기대치가 달라진다면, 기업이 보고이익을 조정하고자 하는 유인 또한 다른 기업의 보고이익에 따라 달라질 것이다. 이에 본 연구는 이익을 먼저 공시하는 동일산업 내 대규모 기업(선공시기업)의 보고이익이 당해 기업(후공시기업)의 보고이익 결정과정 및 보고이익에 대한 시장반응에 미치는 영향에 대해 분석한다.
2007년부터 2012년까지의 기간 동안 재무분석가 이익예측치를 가지는 상장기업 중 82개의 선공시기업-연도, 1,825개의 후공시기업-연도를 대상으로 실증 분석한 결과, 선공시기업의 보고이익이 재무분석가 이익예측치에 부합 또는 초과하는 경우 후공시기업의 경영자는 자본시장의 이익압력 증가에 대응하여 재량적 발생액을 이용하여 이익을 상향조정하는 것으로 나타났다. 또한 선공시기업의 보고이익이 재무분석가 이익예측치를 달성(미달)하는 경우 후공시기업의 비기대이익에 대한 시장반응은 약화(강화)되는 것으로 나타났다.
본 연구는 산업선도기업의 선공시이익이 기업의 이익조정 행태 및 투자자의 반응에 영향을 미친다는 것을 실증함으로써 기업의 이익조정 동기와 산업 내 정보이전 효과에 대한 선행연구를 확장하였다는데 그 공헌점이 있다.

영어초록

Corporate manager has an incentive to meet or beat earnings thresholds and is willing to manage earnings to achieve target earnings. The investor’s expectation on firm performance can be affected by another firm’s performance. If the investor revises expected earnings of a target firm based on another firm’s earnings news within the same industry, the manager’s incentive to manage earnings is also likely to be affected by another firm’s performance. Especially, early announced earnings performance of a leading firm in the industry may be useful for the investor to analyze industry trends and to revise expectation of target firm that have not yet announced.
In this study, we focus the effect of a leading firm’s (“early announcing firm”) earnings performance on management and investor behavior of the firm (“late announcing firm”) in the same industry and investigate two research questions. First, we examine the association between one firm’s financial reporting behavior, specifically, discretionary earnings management, and other firm’s early reported earnings. Second, we examine the association between market response to one firm’s earnings announcement and other firm’s early reported earnings.
When early announcer meets or beats earning target, managers of late announcers have incentives to engage in upward earnings management in response to increased earnings pressure from market participants. On the other hands, when early announcer fails to meet earnings target, managers of late announcers may expect a lower market penalty for bad news. In this case, managers of late announcers are likely to reduce the extent of upward accruals or to reserve accruals to a future period. Based on this reasoning, we examine late announcer’s earnings management behavior after fiscal year-end and stock market participant’s expectation revise in response to leading firms’ early reported earnings.
We use listed firms with analyst forecasts for the period from 2007 to 2012 to test our research questions. Based on Bratten et al.(2013), early announcing firm is defined as the first firm to report earnings and in the first quartile of market capitalization within each industry. Late announcing firm is defined as the firm that reports earnings at least five days subsequent to early announcer’s earnings announcement. We use consensus of analysts’ earnings forecasts as earnings threshold. The sample consists of 82 early announcing firm-year observations and 1,825 late announcing firm-year observations.
We find that early announcer’s reported earnings affect late announcer’s earnings management behavior after fiscal year-end. Specifically, late announcing firm is more likely to report higher discretionary accruals in response to increased earnings pressures when early announcing firm reports earnings that meet or beat analyst forecasts. However, there is no significant relation between late announcer’s tax expense management and early announcer’s reported earnings. These results imply that late announcing firm is more likely to engage in upward after-tax earnings management by reporting higher pre-tax discretionary accruals rather than lowering tax expense.
We also find that stock market response to late announcing firm’s unexpected earnings is weaker(stronger) when early announcing firm’s reported earnings beat(miss) analyst forecasts. These results indicate that investors may expect good news of target firm when early announcing leading firm reports good news, therefore market premium(penalty) for positive(negative) earnings surprise of the target firm decreases(increases). These results give an empirical evidence for prior research’s assumption that investor evaluates future performance of the target firm on a relative basis.
This study extends the prior literature on the determinants of earnings management and information transfer within the industry by providing evidence that early reported earnings of the leading firm within the industry affect financial reporting behaviors of managers and earnings expectations of investors. Our study has an implication to external auditors and investors by showing empirical evidence for information effect of reported earnings of the leading firm in the industry.

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