인공 타인과 더불어 살기― AI와 더불어 있음에 대한 현상학적 연구 (Living with Artificial Others: A Phenomenological Study on “Being-with” Artificial Intelligence)

서지정보

· 발행기관 : 한신대학교 한신신학연구소
· 수록지 정보 : 신학연구 / 56권 / 1호 / 95 ~ 123페이지
· 저자명 : 임현진

초록

In this article, I explore the phenomenological origin of ethos for living with “artificial others” through Heidegger’s phenomenology and his analytic of solicitude (Fürsorge). We live in a world domineered by technology and the so-called “fourth industrial revolution.” It is crucial to establish Christian ethics of technology that converses with current culture’s engagement with artificial others and expects a future life of coexisting with artificial general intelligence (AGI). To approach this goal for Christian ethics, it is necessary to examine the primordial framework of who we are as humans interacting with other humans and non-human things. In Being and Time, Heidegger elucidates Dasein as being-with (Mitsein) who is “the they” fascinated with “concernful solicitude” (besorgende Fürsorge). According to Heidegger, Dasein “proximally and for the most part” misleads solicitude for other humans toward concern (Besorge) for non-human things. I argue that Dasein’s treatment of artificial others shows the reverse aspect of the same misleading. As a result Dasein is sloped toward treating artificial others as humans, while treating humans as non-human things. By this misleading, Dasein opens to losing its existentiality (Existenzialität) and falls into the inauthentic possibility of losing its ontological priority as the path to the meaning of being. Therefore, I suggest that ethical judgments about if it is “better” or “worse” to live with artificial others should be based upon who we are as beings with others and artificial others as well, and that we should orient our ethical questions towards restoring authenticity for our own ontological priority as we deal with the phenomenological inclination of misleading between others and artificial others.

영어초록

In this article, I explore the phenomenological origin of ethos for living with “artificial others” through Heidegger’s phenomenology and his analytic of solicitude (Fürsorge). We live in a world domineered by technology and the so-called “fourth industrial revolution.” It is crucial to establish Christian ethics of technology that converses with current culture’s engagement with artificial others and expects a future life of coexisting with artificial general intelligence (AGI). To approach this goal for Christian ethics, it is necessary to examine the primordial framework of who we are as humans interacting with other humans and non-human things. In Being and Time, Heidegger elucidates Dasein as being-with (Mitsein) who is “the they” fascinated with “concernful solicitude” (besorgende Fürsorge). According to Heidegger, Dasein “proximally and for the most part” misleads solicitude for other humans toward concern (Besorge) for non-human things. I argue that Dasein’s treatment of artificial others shows the reverse aspect of the same misleading. As a result Dasein is sloped toward treating artificial others as humans, while treating humans as non-human things. By this misleading, Dasein opens to losing its existentiality (Existenzialität) and falls into the inauthentic possibility of losing its ontological priority as the path to the meaning of being. Therefore, I suggest that ethical judgments about if it is “better” or “worse” to live with artificial others should be based upon who we are as beings with others and artificial others as well, and that we should orient our ethical questions towards restoring authenticity for our own ontological priority as we deal with the phenomenological inclination of misleading between others and artificial others.

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