산업 내 경쟁과 선도기업의 비대칭적 원가행태 (Competition in an Industry and Asymmetry Cost Behavior of Leading Company)

서지정보

· 발행기관 : 한국회계학회
· 수록지 정보 : 회계저널 / 24권 / 5호 / 103 ~ 139페이지
· 저자명 : 김현아, 유승원, 정석우

초록

본 연구는 시장경쟁과 선도기업을 결합하여 경쟁이 높은 산업에 속한 선도기업의 원가행태가 추종기업에 비해 유의하게 비대칭적인지 여부를 분석한다. 선도기업은 높은 명성, 안정적인 매출 등 다양한 혜택을 향유하기 때문에 선도지위를 유지하기 위해 매출액 변동에 관계없이 지속적으로 판매관리비를 지출할 유인이 존재한다. 이와 더불어 산업경쟁도는 경영자의 원가행태에 영향을 미치기 때문에 기업이 속한 산업의 경쟁이 심할수록 선도기업이 경쟁우위를 유지하기 위한 판매관리비 지출 성향이 강하게 나타나고, 이로 인해 추종기업과는 차별적인 비대칭적 원가행태를 보일 것으로 예상된다.
본 연구는 선도기업을 한국표준산업분류표상 소분류를 기준으로 연도별 시장점유율 1위 기업으로 정의하고, Kama and Weiss(2013)의 방법을 이용하여 분석하였으며, 1983년부터 2010년까지 금융업이 아닌 12월 결산 유가증권 상장 및 코스닥 등록법인 19,441개 기업-연도가 이용되었다.
분석결과, 독점표본에서는 선도기업의 원가행태가 유의하게 비대칭적으로 나타나지 않았으나, 경쟁표본에서는 선도기업이 유의하게 비대칭적 원가행태를 보이는 것으로 나타났다. 또한, 경쟁표본을 고경쟁, 중간경쟁, 과점으로 구분한 분석에서는 고경쟁에서만 유의한 결과가 관찰되었다. 이상의 결과는 경쟁이 심한 시장에서 선도기업이 추종기업과 차별적인 원가행태를 나타냄을 의미한다. 한편 과점시장의 선도기업을 시장지배력을 고려하여 재정의하여 분석한 결과 시장지배력이 높은 시장의 선도기업만 유의하게 비대칭적 원가행태를 보이는 것으로 나타났는데 이는 과점시장의 선도기업도 비대칭적 원가행태가 존재함을 보여줌과 동시에 시장의 특성을 고려하여 선도기업을 정의할 필요가 있음을 나타낸다.
본 연구는 산업경쟁도를 기업의 경쟁지위와 결합하여 비대칭적 원가행태를 분석함으로써 기업의 경쟁지위가 경영자의 비용 의사결정에 영향을 미친다는 증거를 제시했다는 점에서 의의를 가진다.

영어초록

This study combines market competition and leading companies and examines whether leading companies in high competitive industry have more asymmetric cost behavior than following companies. Leading companies enjoy various benefits from their status such as high reputation and stable sales, thus they have incentives to pay selling, general, and administrative costs consistently to maintain leading position regardless of changes in sales. However not all managers are required to make efforts at the same level because the cost losing leading status is different depending on market competition. Considering the impact of industry competition on managerial cost behavior, the more competitive industry leading companies are in, the more strongly they tend to spend selling, general, and administrative costs, which may lead for leading firms to show differential cost stickiness. We define a firm as a leading company if it has the largest market share in the industry and adopt the approach for analyzing cost stickiness used by Kama and Weiss (2013). We use 19,441 non-financial and december year-end firm/year observations listed in the Korean KOSPI and KOSDAQ market during 1983 and 2010 period.
The results are as follows. For monopoly subsample, we find that leading companies are not more cost sticky than followers. But we find that leading companies have significant asymmetric cost behavior in competitive subsample. This result indicates that whether the company is a leading firm or a follower affects cost stickiness in competitive markets. Additionally, the analysis dividing competitive samples into high competition, medium competition and oligopoly shows that leading firms have cost stickiness in high competitive markets. These results imply that leading companies in high competitive markets show differential cost behavior from following companies and could be interpreted as the results of managerial decision-making to maintain largest market share, reputation and profitability.
Meanwhile, sensitivity tests where the definition of leading companies is extended to two or three largest market share holders show that only leading companies defined as having the largest market share have more significant sticky cost behavior than followers. This is consistent with Moon (2003) suggesting that the characteristics of market leading companies exist only in the best company of the market. In contrast, empirical results related to oligopoly markets show that the cost of leading firms is more sticky than that of following companies when market leaders are defined as three largest market share holders. Considering the importance of market dominance in oligopoly markets we additionally divide those markets into high and low oligopoly market depending market dominance of leading companies and analyze whether leading companies have stronger sticky cost than followers. We find that the cost of leading companies is more sticky only in high oligopoly market in which leading firms have high market dominance. These results suggest that leading companies in oligopoly markets also show sticky cost behavior and the definition of leading companies need to change considering the market characteristics.
The additional test examines whether the differential cost behavior between leading companies and following firms varies depending on industries. The results show that merchandising industry is significant at one percent level and that manufacturing and information service industries are significant at five percent level. Contrary to this, the result of construction industry shows that the changes in selling, general, and administrative costs of leading companies are larger than that of following firms when sales decrease. However it may need additional investigation to find the reason why empirical results of each industry are different considering that various factors can affect industries.
This study contributes to the asymmetry cost behavior literature by providing the evidence that the competitive position of a firm influences managerial cost decision through the combination of industrial competition and status in the industry. Prior literature identifies managerial private incentives as major factors affecting asymmetry cost behavior. These managerial incentives could be mitigated by strong monitoring over managers or replacing managers. However, the leading status in competitive markets shown as in this study is an industry structure thing, thus it is difficult to find the way to solve this. Our results suggest that investors need to consider these potential risks to evaluate firms effectively and invest because sticky cost of leading companies may be a potential risk when they lose their position.

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