경영자 보상 형태와 원가 비대칭성 (CEO Compensation and Asymmetric Cost Behavior)

서지정보

· 발행기관 : 한국회계학회
· 수록지 정보 : 회계저널 / 24권 / 5호 / 141 ~ 176페이지
· 저자명 : 김응길, 이용규, 한승수

초록

본 연구는 국내 유가증권 상장법인의 비대칭적 원가행태를 통해 회계이익 보상 체계와 스톡옵션 보상 체계가 경영자의 의사결정에 미치는 영향을 살펴보았다. 회계이익 보상 체계 하에서의 경영자는 상대적으로 단기적인 회계이익에 민감하게 반응하는 의사결정을 할 가능성이 있으나 이와는 달리 스톡옵션 보상 체계 하에서의 경영자는 회계이익뿐만 아니라 다른 여러 가지 요인도 고려하여 보다 장기적인 관점에서 의사결정을 내릴 가능성이 크다. 따라서 이들 보상 체계는 매출의 증감에 따른 여유자원 축소나 추가자원 확보 의사결정에도 서로 다른 영향을 줄 수 있으므로 그 결과로 나타나는 원가의 비대칭성 행태에도 차이가 있을 것으로 예상된다. 분석 결과에 의하면 회계이익 보상 체계가 존재하는 기업들은 그렇지 않은 기업에 비해 원가의 비대칭적 행태가 완화되는 결과를 보였으며 스톡옵션 보상 체계의 기업에서도 원가의 비대칭적 행태는 완화되는 것으로 나타났다. 그러나 회계이익 보상체계와 스톡옵션 보상체계 간에 차이를 보여 스톡옵션 보상체계보다 회계이익 보상체계 하에서 비대칭적(하방 경직적)인 원가행태가 더욱 완화되는 것으로 나타났다. 본 연구의 실증결과는 대표적인 두 보상체계인 회계이익 보상과 스톡옵션 보상이 경영자의 의사결정에 상이한 영향을 줄 수 있으며, 특히 회계이익보상 하에서의 경영자가 더 민감하게 여유자원 축소의사결정을 내린다는 증거를 원가의 비대칭적 행태를 통해 제시하고 있다.

영어초록

This study investigates the effect of CEO compensation type on asymmetric cost behavior. Accounting earnings help shield managers’ compensation from market-wide variations in equity values. When managers’ compensation is based on accounting earnings, managerial decisions are likely to be sensitive to short term earnings (Lambert & Larcker 1987; Dechow & Sloan 1991; Sloan 1993; Jensen & Murphy 1990; Baber et al. 1996).
However, managers with stock option possibly take into account various factors other than earnings and would tend to have a long-term perspective (Brickley et al. 1985; Core and Guay 1999; Hanlon et al. 2003; Ittner 2003). Considering these contrasting aspects, we hypothesize that managerial decision on slack resources is differently affected by the compensation plan depending on whether it is accounting earnings-based (ACP) or stock option-based (MKP). To test our hypothesis, we focus on asymmetric cost behavior which is assumed to be the results of managers’ decision.
Related to our study, Lee and Nam (2010) insist that pay-performance relationship affect managers’ decision-making. The authors find the firms with pay-performance relationship show less stickiness than those without it. The result implies that the degree of stickiness is affected by control systems like performance evaluation and compensation which are intended to influence managers’ decision behavior.
Our sample comprises the data of Korean listed companies (KOSPI) from 2001 to 2011, which yields the pooled samples of 5,037 firm-year observations. To test cost behavior, we employ regression model of Anderson et al.(2003). We measure earnings-based compensation system by using pay-performance relationship. We use four type of cost - ‘Selling, General, and Administrative expense’, ‘General Administrative expense’, ‘Cost of Goods Sold’ and ‘Wage expense’.
The empirical findings are as follows. First, when sales decrease, managers with earnings-based compensation are more likely to reduce resources faster than those without one, so alleviating the degree of asymmetric cost behavior. In addition, managers with stock option compensation have the same tendency as with those with earnings-based compensation. However, managers with earnings-based compensation plan show less asymmetric cost behavior than those with stock option-based. Those results are almost robust when we use ‘General Administration cost’, ‘Cost of Goods Sold’ and ‘Wage’ in test model.
Above results suggest that managers with earnings-based compensation more quickly and sensitively adjust the slack resources when sales decrease, as managers. This evidence is consistent with our hypothesis that earnings-based and stock option-based compensation plans can differently affect managerial decisions, more specifically the decision on the disposal of slack resources in the period of decreasing sales.
In addition, we also compare managers with stock option-based and owner-managers. We hypothesize that owner-manager reduces committed resources when sales decline in less proportion than when increasing committed resources during sales increase, but firms with employed manager seem to reduce their resources more quickly than in owner-manager firms. The result illustrates that owner-managers with no stock option show most asymmetric cost behavior among managers.

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