전기 비적정 감사의견이 감사인 교체방향과 이익조정에 미치는 영향 : 비상장기업의 의견구매 (The Effect of Non-unqualified Prior Audit Opinion on Auditor Switching and Earnings Management: Opinion Shopping in Private Firms)

서지정보

· 발행기관 : 한국회계학회
· 수록지 정보 : 회계학연구 / 39권 / 6호 / 1 ~ 56페이지
· 저자명 : 박종일, 남혜정

초록

본 연구는 비상장기업을 대상으로 감사인 교체기업이 전기 비적정 감사의견에 따라 의견구매 현상이 나타나는지를 분석하였다. 또한 전임 감사인으로부터 비적정 감사의견을 받은 기업이 감사인을 교체한 후 재량적 발생액(AM) 또는 실제 이익조정(RM)을 통해 보고이익을 상향조정하는지를 분석하였다. 이와 함께 감사인 교체시 보고이익을 상향조정한다면 이러한 현상이 감사인 교체방향과 체계적인 관계가 있는지 살펴보았다. 이를 위하여 본 연구는 비상장기업을 대상으로 2000년부터 2008년까지 감사인이 교체된 8,305개 기업/연 자료를 분석했으며, 주요변수인 AM과 RM의 측정오차 문제를 최소화하기 위해 성과조정 측정치(Kothari et al. 2005; Cohen et al. 2011)를 이용하였다.
실증결과는 다음과 같다. 첫째, 감사인 교체기업 중 전임 감사인이 Big 4이면서 이들에게 비적정 감사의견을 받은 비상장기업이 감사인을 교체하면 후임 감사인으로 non-Big 4 감사인을 더 선호할 가능성이 높은 것으로 나타났다. 이는 전기 비적정 감사의견이 감사인 교체방향에 영향을 미치고 있다는 결과로서 감사인을 교체한 비상장기업에서는 낮은 품질의 감사인을 보다 선호하는 의견구매 현상이 존재한다는 것을 보여준다. 둘째, 감사인 교체기업 중 전기 비적정 감사의견을 받은 비상장기업은 적정의견을 받고 감사인을 교체한 기업보다 교체연도에서 AM과 RM 수준 모두가 더 높은 결과로 나타났다. 이는 전임 감사인으로부터 받은 비적정 감사의견이 비상장기업의 경영자에게 감사인을 교체할 동기를 제공할 뿐만 아니라, 감사인 교체연도에서 AM과 RM의 이익조정 수단 모두를 이용해 보고이익을 상향조정한다는 발견이다. 이러한 결과는 상장기업을 분석한 선행연구들에서는 발견되지 않았던 새로운 결과이다(DeFond and Subramanyam 1998; Davidson III et al. 2005 등). 셋째, 감사인 교체기업 중 전임 감사인의 유형과 관계없이 감사인을 non-Big 4로 교체한 경우가 RM 수준이 유의하게 증가된 결과로 나타났다. 이는 비상장기업이 감사인을 교체하면 보고이익을 높이기 위해 낮은 품질의 후임 감사인을 선호할 뿐만 아니라, 감사인 교체연도에서 감사범위에 속하지 않는 이익조정 수단인 RM을 더 증가시키고 있다는 발견이다. 넷째, 감사인 교체기업 중 전임 감사인 non-Big 4로부터 비적정 감사의견을 받고 후임 감사인 역시 non-Big 4로 수평교체한 비상장기업이면 교체연도에서 RM을 통해 보고이익을 상향조정하는 것으로 나타났다. 이는 비상장기업에서 전임 감사인의 감사의견과 후임 감사인의 교체방향에 따라 이익조정의 정도뿐 아니라 두 이익조정 수단에도 영향을 미치고 있음을 보여준다.
이상의 연구결과는 전임 감사인에게 비적정 감사의견을 받은 기업의 상황이 감사인의 교체방향과 감사인 교체 후 이익조정 수준에 영향을 주고 있음을 비상장기업을 대상으로 보여주었다는데 의미가 있다. 또한 규정상으로는 비적정 감사의견을 받고 감사인 교체가 제한되는 상황임에도 불구하고 전기 비적정 감사의견을 받은 비상장기업이 감사인 교체를 이용해 낮은 품질의 감사인을 선임하는 의견구매 현상이나 교체시점에서의 이익의 상향조정행위가 나타난다는 본 연구의 발견은 학계, 실무계, 규제기관에게 유익한 정보를 제공할 뿐만 아니라 정책당국에게는 제도 정비와 관련된 정책적 시사점을 제공해 줄 것으로 기대된다.

영어초록

This paper examines earnings management behaviors on changing a auditor depending on the type of prior audit opinions in private companies. Specifically, this study tests whether the non-unqualified opinion from a prior auditor influences auditor change and the level of earnings management measured by discretionary accruals and real earnings management. In addition, this study identifies that a relationship between auditor change and earnings management varies depending on the type of auditors (Big 4 and non-Big 4 audit firm). Prior studies suggest that one of the reasons in switching auditor is the conflicts of interest on conservative or strict auditing procedures and audit firms with low quality are preferred as a changed auditor. However, most studies related to auditor change focus on listed companies and there is little study on the effect of audit opinion on a relationship between auditor change and earnings management in private companies. This paper tries to fill the gap.
We examine related three issues in private companies. The first, we test whether private firms with non-unqualified opinion and auditor change tend to shop audit opinion. The second, we test whether private firms with non-qualifies opinion and auditor change tend to manage earnings. In this paper, we measure discretionary accruals using Kothari et al.(2005)’s methodology and real earnings management using Cohen and Zarowin (2011)’s methodology as proxies for earnings management. The third, we test whether the earnings management is associated with the direction of auditor change. These issues are based on the general prediction that when firms do not receive an unqualified audit opinion and then switch from a Big 4 to a non-Big 4 audit firm (lower quality auditors), they may be engaging in audit opinion shopping. We also expect that these firms are more likely to engage in aggressive earnings management.
To test these predictions, we examine motivations of auditor change using a sample of 8,305 auditor changes in private firm-year observations from 2000 to 2008 and estimate discretionary accruals and real earnings management variables as proxies for earnings management. We set four hypotheses to test the effect of auditor change and opinion shopping on earning management. First of all, we divide the sample into two groups depending on the type of auditor change, that is, Big to small versus small to small. We then investigate a relationship between audit opinion and auditor change. We also investigate a relationship between auditor change and earnings management using different models. Therefore, the subsample is used for the analysis of the first hypothesis while total sample is used for the remaining hypothesis. Several control variables such as size, leverage, cash flows from operations, growth, loss, and so on are included in the model.
Empirical findings of this paper are following. First, firms received non-unqualified opinion from Big 4 audit firm in previous year are more likely to engage with non-Big 4 audit firm as a next auditor. However, firms received non-qualified opinion from non-Big 4 audit firm in previous year are indifferent to switch auditor type. This result is consistent with the findings of Davidson III et al. (2005) and suggests that audit opinions in previous year affect choice of auditors next year. Specifically, this finding implies that private firms with non-unqualified opinion tend to prefer auditors with low quality for opinion shopping.
Second, among firms switched their external auditors, firms received non-unqualified opinion in previous year are more likely to have high level of discretionary accruals and real earnings management, compared to firms received unqualified opinion. This indicates that receiving non-unqualified opinion motivates firms to change auditors and leads to earnings management. This result is not consistent with prior study with listed companies. Davidson III et al. (2005) find a insignificant relationship between audit opinion and earnings management in listed companies.
Third, among firms switched their external auditors, when a firm changes auditor to non-Big 4 audit firm, real earnings management rather than discretionary accruals significantly increases. Our results suggest that these firms may subsequently engage in greater real activities based earnings management. While accrual-based earnings management only affects accrual numbers, real activities based earnings management boosts short-term earnings at the expense of distorting real operations (Roychowdhury 2006). It causes real operations to deviate from their optimal levels, thereby dampening a firm’s ability to generate future cash flows and performance in the long run. It implies that private firms switched from Big audit to non-Big audit firm provide financial statements with low quality.
Finally, firms that change a auditor from non-Big 4 audit firm to non-Big 4 audit firm show a higher real earnings management than that of other firms. This result suggests that both type of prior auditor and audit opinions affect a choice of earnings management methods. We extend our analyses by dividing the sample with prior audit opinion and successor auditor type. We also test above analyses with change variables rather than level variables of earnings management again and find identical results. Thus, our results provide a solid evidence that audit opinion affects auditor change and earnings management in private firms.
In sum, this paper provides the evidence that both audit opinion in previous year and auditor change influence the level of earnings management. And these findings suggest that private firms may engage in opportunistic behaviors when they change auditors. This paper contributes to related studies by providing the evidence that non-unqualified opinion can affect the level of earnings management and auditor change in private firms. Our empirical findings provide meaningful implications to regulators, academic researchers who interested in private firms's behaviors on a relationship between auditor change and earnings management, and practitioner.

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