중국의 대미 데탕트 시도와 북‧중 동맹 관계의 재조명 (Sino-U.S. Rapprochement during the early 1970s and Sino-North Korean Alliance Revisited)

서지정보

· 발행기관 : 고려대학교 아세아문제연구원
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· 저자명 : 최명해

초록

Extensive studies have been made as to examine how the Sino-U.S. rapprochement during the early 1970s affected South Korea’s relations with the U.S., Japan and North Korea. Regrettably, however, relatively a few researches on the Sino-DPRK security relationship have been attempted and left much to be desired. Previous works on this particular topic, generally focusing on the ‘mutual assistance’ between the two countries, appeared on the surface but failed to recognize their alliance’s growing laxity as well as its internal dynamics generated by different threat perceptions.
This paper argues that the difference in their ‘comprehensive threat assessments’ has precisely shaped and managed the Sino-DPRK alliance diplomacy thus far. Strictly speaking, the seemingly close tie between Beijing and Pyongyang, especially in the era of Sino-U.S. reconciliation, was not exactly based on mutual consultation but dictated by China’s ‘preemptive diplomacy.’ In order to prove this point, this paper illustrates how China’s strategic concerns were changed in the early 1970s and describes why Beijing has been so obsessed to keep a close tie with Pyongyang. It also uncovers the hidden picture of “same bed, different dreams” in the Sino-DPRK relations by way of observing the changes of China’s external threat perception. In a word, the gap between their external threat perceptions produced considerably different expectations of the alliance. Lastly, this paper explains why and how Pyongyang moved away from Beijing and ‘tilted’ instead toward Washington in anticipation of a ‘direct bilateral talks’.

영어초록

Extensive studies have been made as to examine how the Sino-U.S. rapprochement during the early 1970s affected South Korea’s relations with the U.S., Japan and North Korea. Regrettably, however, relatively a few researches on the Sino-DPRK security relationship have been attempted and left much to be desired. Previous works on this particular topic, generally focusing on the ‘mutual assistance’ between the two countries, appeared on the surface but failed to recognize their alliance’s growing laxity as well as its internal dynamics generated by different threat perceptions.
This paper argues that the difference in their ‘comprehensive threat assessments’ has precisely shaped and managed the Sino-DPRK alliance diplomacy thus far. Strictly speaking, the seemingly close tie between Beijing and Pyongyang, especially in the era of Sino-U.S. reconciliation, was not exactly based on mutual consultation but dictated by China’s ‘preemptive diplomacy.’ In order to prove this point, this paper illustrates how China’s strategic concerns were changed in the early 1970s and describes why Beijing has been so obsessed to keep a close tie with Pyongyang. It also uncovers the hidden picture of “same bed, different dreams” in the Sino-DPRK relations by way of observing the changes of China’s external threat perception. In a word, the gap between their external threat perceptions produced considerably different expectations of the alliance. Lastly, this paper explains why and how Pyongyang moved away from Beijing and ‘tilted’ instead toward Washington in anticipation of a ‘direct bilateral talks’.

참고자료

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