북핵 폐기를 위한 글로벌 파트너십 (Global Partnership for the Dismantlement of North Korean Nuclear Program)

서지정보

· 발행기관 : 북한대학원대학교 북한대학원대학교
· 수록지 정보 : 현대북한연구 / 11권 / 1호 / 88 ~ 113페이지
· 저자명 : 전봉근

초록

There is growing interest in “nonproliferation assistance” or “cooperative
threat reduction” recently as tools to induce or accelerate denuclearization
of North Korea as the Six-party Talks make progress. Since the United
States agreed to lead the disablement activities and provide the initial funding
for those activities at the October 3rd Six-party Agreement(2007), we may
say that initial CTR measures on North Korea have already begun.
In consideration of the case of the former Soviet Union, the CTR
program for North Korea should focus on the following three areas:
First, there should be a system to safely store and dispose of nuclear
material. For this, it is necessary to support the building of a facility
for the safe storage of nuclear material, establish the nuclear accounting
system, educate technical people, and dispose of and transfer nuclear
material abroad. Secondly, there should be a redirection and support
system that helps prevent nuclear scientists from selling their nuclear
bomb knowledge and skills. An International Science and Technology
Center and light-water reactor project in North Korea would help redirect
nuclear scientists to civilian areas. Lastly, there will be a support program
to help set up and strengthen export and border control systems.
Considering North Korea’s active international trade of weapons of mass
destruction, the export and border control systems become critical.
In order to make nonproliferation assistance to North Korea successful,
we need to pay attention to nine guidelines as agreed upon at the 2002
Global Partnership: transparency and access guarantee, environment and
safety, performance management, peaceful use, physical protection, transfer
prohibition, expense exemptions, protection from liability, and protection
of intellectual rights and sensitive information. In consideration
of North Korea’s resistance and inability, there is a need to be cautious
when demanding transparency and access guarantee and liability protection,
and exercise a right to stop the project.
Finally, in order to prepare for the resumption of the light-water reactor
project, there should be a careful analysis of the causes for the failure
of the KEDO project. It is important to develop strategies to deal with
such problems as North Korea’s noncompliance with agreements, its
inability to receive and operate light-water reactors, liability protection
in case of nuclear accidents, and continuous political support for the
project.

영어초록

There is growing interest in “nonproliferation assistance” or “cooperative
threat reduction” recently as tools to induce or accelerate denuclearization
of North Korea as the Six-party Talks make progress. Since the United
States agreed to lead the disablement activities and provide the initial funding
for those activities at the October 3rd Six-party Agreement(2007), we may
say that initial CTR measures on North Korea have already begun.
In consideration of the case of the former Soviet Union, the CTR
program for North Korea should focus on the following three areas:
First, there should be a system to safely store and dispose of nuclear
material. For this, it is necessary to support the building of a facility
for the safe storage of nuclear material, establish the nuclear accounting
system, educate technical people, and dispose of and transfer nuclear
material abroad. Secondly, there should be a redirection and support
system that helps prevent nuclear scientists from selling their nuclear
bomb knowledge and skills. An International Science and Technology
Center and light-water reactor project in North Korea would help redirect
nuclear scientists to civilian areas. Lastly, there will be a support program
to help set up and strengthen export and border control systems.
Considering North Korea’s active international trade of weapons of mass
destruction, the export and border control systems become critical.
In order to make nonproliferation assistance to North Korea successful,
we need to pay attention to nine guidelines as agreed upon at the 2002
Global Partnership: transparency and access guarantee, environment and
safety, performance management, peaceful use, physical protection, transfer
prohibition, expense exemptions, protection from liability, and protection
of intellectual rights and sensitive information. In consideration
of North Korea’s resistance and inability, there is a need to be cautious
when demanding transparency and access guarantee and liability protection,
and exercise a right to stop the project.
Finally, in order to prepare for the resumption of the light-water reactor
project, there should be a careful analysis of the causes for the failure
of the KEDO project. It is important to develop strategies to deal with
such problems as North Korea’s noncompliance with agreements, its
inability to receive and operate light-water reactors, liability protection
in case of nuclear accidents, and continuous political support for the
project.

참고자료

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