원산지규정의 엄격성으로 인한 FTA 체결국들간 스파게티 볼 효과 및 무역전환효과에 관한 연구 (A Study on the Effects of Restrictiveness of FTA Rule of Origin on the Spaghetti Bowl Effects and Trade Diversion Effects Between FTA Member Countries)

서지정보

· 발행기관 : 한국무역연구원
· 수록지 정보 : 무역연구 / 17권 / 4호 / 191 ~ 206페이지
· 저자명 : 박재관

초록

Purpose This paper analyzes the possibility of strategic behavior of the importing country which attempts to facilitate the restrictiveness of rule of origin to the member countries of FTA equally or discriminately.
Design/Methodology/Approach For this purpose, we introduced the 2-stages game which described the importing country’s strategic behavior for maximizing social welfare, and by using the backward induction approach, we attempt to solve the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium(SPNE).
Findings As a result of this study, it was found that the multilateral FTA system in which importing countries facilitate the more restrictive rules of origin to the member countries of FTA equally will help encourage the free trade between intra-FTA members and make the international production system more efficient. However, if the importing country’s government seeks to utilize the FTA rules of origin strategically, none of them will have the incentive to voluntarily facilitate the multilateral FTA system to all the exporting countries because they suffer a decrease in social welfare such as a decrease in tariff revenue.
Research Implications These findings suggest that to applying a multilateral FTA system that facilitates the same and equal restrictiveness of rule of origin to all the member countries, it is necessary to develop a reasonable incentive that could attract the importing country to the multilateral FTA system.

영어초록

Purpose This paper analyzes the possibility of strategic behavior of the importing country which attempts to facilitate the restrictiveness of rule of origin to the member countries of FTA equally or discriminately.
Design/Methodology/Approach For this purpose, we introduced the 2-stages game which described the importing country’s strategic behavior for maximizing social welfare, and by using the backward induction approach, we attempt to solve the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium(SPNE).
Findings As a result of this study, it was found that the multilateral FTA system in which importing countries facilitate the more restrictive rules of origin to the member countries of FTA equally will help encourage the free trade between intra-FTA members and make the international production system more efficient. However, if the importing country’s government seeks to utilize the FTA rules of origin strategically, none of them will have the incentive to voluntarily facilitate the multilateral FTA system to all the exporting countries because they suffer a decrease in social welfare such as a decrease in tariff revenue.
Research Implications These findings suggest that to applying a multilateral FTA system that facilitates the same and equal restrictiveness of rule of origin to all the member countries, it is necessary to develop a reasonable incentive that could attract the importing country to the multilateral FTA system.

참고자료

· 없음