미 연준과 유럽중앙은행의 비전통적 통화정책 수행원칙에 관한 고찰 (Principles of Unconventional Monetary Policy: A Comparison between the Federal Reserve System and the European Central Bank)

서지정보

· 발행기관 : 한국금융학회
· 수록지 정보 : 금융연구 / 29권 / 1호 / 63 ~ 93페이지
· 저자명 : 김진일, 김병기

초록

금번 글로벌 금융위기에 대응하면서 미 연준과 유럽중앙은행은 다양한 형태의 비전통적 통화정책을도입하였다. 본 논문은 두 중앙은행의 정책집행을 배경과 원칙을 중심으로 비교․조망한다. 미연준은 비전통적 통화정책을 금융안정과 경제안정 달성을 위한 조치로 구분하여 설명한다. 우선금융안정을 도모하기 위한 최종대부자기능 수행의 일환으로 새로운 신용공여 장치가 도입되고MMF 등 특정 시장개입 등도 시행되었는데, 이러한 조치는 중앙은행이 일시적인 유동성 부족에처한 은행들에 대해 충분한 유동성을 공급하되 벌칙금리를 적용하고 양질의 담보를 징구해야한다는 Bagehot의 원칙에 바탕을 두고 수행되었다.
또한 정책금리가 하한에 도달하면서 경제안정달성을 위한 전통적인 통화정책 수단이 무력화됨에 따라 Operation Twist, 양적완화조치 등이장기금리를 하향안정화시키기 위한 목적으로 도입되었다. 미 연준은 경제안정을 위한 통화정책에있어서는 전통적․비전통적 통화정책의 순차성을 인정하고 있다. 즉, 정책금리가 하한에 도달하고나서 비전통적 통화정책이 도입되며 출구전략에 있어서도 정책금리를 인상하기에 앞서 비전통적통화정책을 거두어들이는 것이 자연스러운 수순이라는 것이다. 반면 유럽중앙은행은 비전통적 통화정책도 전통적 통화정책과 마찬가지로 금융안정보다는 중기적 관점에서의 물가안정에 중점을두고 수행됨을 분명히 하였다.
그 결과 Bagehot의 원칙 대신 담보제공능력 내에서의 비차별적지원이 더 강조되었다. 실제로 유럽중앙은행은 새로운 신용공여 장치를 도입하지 않고 주로공개시장조작(LTRO)을 이용하여 은행에 유동성을 공급하고 있으며, 정책금리만 부담하면담보제공능력의 범위 안에서 은행이 원하는 액수만큼 유동성을 공급받도록 하고 있다.
또한유럽중앙은행은 미 연준과는 달리 정책금리가 하한에 도달하기 전이라도 비전통적 통화정책이도입될 수 있으며 출구전략에 있어서도 비전통적 통화정책이 정책금리 정상화에 앞서 먼저 정리될필요가 없다고 판단하고 있다. 이러한 수행원칙의 차이는 주로 제도적인 요인과 시장구조적요인 등에 기인하는 것으로 보인다.

영어초록

In responding to the Global Financial Crisis, both the Federal ReserveBoard (FRB) and the European Central Bank (ECB) have introduced variouskinds of “unconventional”monetary policy measures. Previous papers focusedon reviewing the measures or analyzing their macroeconomic influences.
In contrast, this paper compares the backgrounds and principles of theunconventional monetary policy conducted by these two central banks andtries to draw some implications that can shed light on monetary policynormalization process.
As explained in various speeches by former Chairman Ben Bernankeand other senior officials, FRB’s unconventional measures can be broadlyclassified into two groups: ones for financial stability and the others foreconomic stability. The first group of measures-introducing new liquiditysupply facilities such as TAF (term auction facility), and intervening inMMF (money market funds), CP (commercial paper) and ABS (asset-backedsecurities) markets, for example-corresponds to the lender-of-last-resortfunction of a central bank and has been basically guided by the Bagehot’sdictum: central bank should lend without limit to liquidity-constrained butstill-solvable banks against good collateral. These measures were introducedswiftly to help calm financial panics and rather short-lived as financialconditions improved. That is, these measures were introduced well beforethe policy rate hit the zero lower bound and were subsequently withdrawnshortly after financial market functioning was restored. Operation twistand quantitative easing fall into the second group of measures, which hasbeen adopted in order to influence longer-term interest rates directly whilethe short-term policy rate reached the effective zero lower bound at the end of 2008. FRB appears to acknowledge the sequentiality of conventionaland unconventional measures as long as economic stability is concerned:first conventional then unconventional measures, and in exiting, unwindingunconventional measures first before beginning to raise the policy rate.
In contrast, ECB makes it clear that unconventional measures havebeen designed and implemented in order to focus on its primary objective:maintaining price stability. As a result, ECB has emphasized equal treatmentof all commercial banks within their ability to provide collateral, ratherthan following the Bagehot’s dictum, in providing liquidities. In fact, ECBmainly uses open market operations (longer-term refinancing operations,in particular) and provides whatever amount of liquidity to commercial banksat its policy rate as long as the collaterals are secured. In addition, ECBhas a different view on the relationship between conventional and un-conventional measures: unconventional measures can be deployed beforethe policy rate hits the zero lower bound, and the policy rate can be raisedbefore unconventional measures in force are withdrawn. Furthermore, ECBdoes not postulate financial distress as a direct cause of unconventionalpolicy measures.
These differences regarding principles for unconventional measuresseem to reflect the institutional and financial-market structures under whichthe two central banks operate. FRB introduces unconventional policy measuresto achieve financial and economic stability; ECB emphasizes price stabilityin the medium-run perspective in implementing unconventional monetarypolicy. Behind these behaviors lies the difference of mandate of the twocentral banks. In particular, the FRB’s dual mandate (full employment andprice stability) contrasts with the ECB’s single mandate to pursue pricestability. Monetary policy operating frameworks of the two central bankshave also contributed to the differences of principles of unconventionalmeasures. FRB conducts open market operations mainly with primary dealers,consisting of 22 large commercial and investment banks (as of September2014); in contrast, ECB maintains a large number of trading partners (around900 for Deutsche Bundesbank only, as of September 2014). Against thisbackground, FRB swiftly established new lending facilities for primary dealersshortly after detecting problems in financial market functioning; ECB,however, introduced fixed-rate full allotment policy in its traditional openmarket operations to honor equal treatment mentioned above.
It should be kept in mind that the principles of FRB and ECB wouldevolve in the future as the environment surrounding the world economychanges its course-especially regarding the importance of financialstability as a possible mandate for the central bank.

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