抗戰期 膠東地區의 社會救濟 활동 — 靑島市의 救濟院, 中國紅十字會, 世界紅卍字會의 사례를 중심으로 — (Social work activities in wartime Eastern Shandong — Focusing on the cases of the Qingdao Relief Institute, the Chinese Red Cross, and the World Red Swastika Society —)

서지정보

· 발행기관 : 중국근현대사학회
· 수록지 정보 : 중국근현대사연구 / 82호 / 91 ~ 115페이지
· 저자명 : 채준형

초록

In the early 1930s, the Nationalist Government instructed local governments in larger cities to create state-sponsored relief organizations since it recognized that improving public welfare was the very foundation upon which to claim its legitimate rule as a modern civilized government. While both the Qingdao Relief Institute (靑島市 救濟院) and the Qingdao chapter of the Chinese Red Cross (中國紅十字會 靑島分會) symbolized close cooperation between the state and local elites—mostly the prominent members of the city’s chamber of commerce—the World Red Swastika Society (世界紅卍字會, WRSS) was relatively independent from state authorities in terms of resource mobilization and decision-making. Close relations with the nationalist state soon made it impossible for the Relief Institute and the local Chinese Red Cross to continue with their local community relief activities when Japanese invaded China in 1937. Therefore, when Japanese forces occupied Qingdao and its surrounding counties, the WRSS was the only relief organization to continue its relief activities. The Qingdao Red Cross did not return to the city until after the war.
This cooperation with the state became a problem when the Sino-Japanese War broke out. State-sponsored relief organizations could not function efficiently, largely because of their unstable financial basis. As I demonstrated, the Qingdao Relief Institute evacuated Qingdao with its inmates and servicemen, and moved to Jinan when the Japanese troops were approaching the city in the fall of 1937. It could return to the city a year later when Japanese authorities and Chinese leaders agreed to restore the Institute. It remained difficult for the Institute, however, to sustain its service, as it could not expect reliable resources from the local government.
For the Chinese Red Cross, the situation was not so friendly either. The Red Cross may have been very successful in the Nationalists’ strongholds. In eastern Shandong, however, the Chinese Red Cross could not sustain a substantial impact on local relief as it suffered from chronic funding shortage. It was primarily due to the fact that the Red Cross did not undertake the usual tactic for securing financial basis—purchasing real estate. In addition, compared to the WRSS, it was unable to locate particularly large groups of loyal donors.
Moreover, the close relation with the Nationalist Government brought unexpected consequences when the war actually broke out. In 1936, the government enlisted the Red Cross organization in its national defense system as a medical support unit in preparation for impending war. With the continuous defeat, the Red Cross retreated from northern China alongside the Nationalist troops. The decline of state-sponsored relief organizations opened a larger window for private relief organizations such as the WRSS to operate in eastern Shandong.

영어초록

In the early 1930s, the Nationalist Government instructed local governments in larger cities to create state-sponsored relief organizations since it recognized that improving public welfare was the very foundation upon which to claim its legitimate rule as a modern civilized government. While both the Qingdao Relief Institute (靑島市 救濟院) and the Qingdao chapter of the Chinese Red Cross (中國紅十字會 靑島分會) symbolized close cooperation between the state and local elites—mostly the prominent members of the city’s chamber of commerce—the World Red Swastika Society (世界紅卍字會, WRSS) was relatively independent from state authorities in terms of resource mobilization and decision-making. Close relations with the nationalist state soon made it impossible for the Relief Institute and the local Chinese Red Cross to continue with their local community relief activities when Japanese invaded China in 1937. Therefore, when Japanese forces occupied Qingdao and its surrounding counties, the WRSS was the only relief organization to continue its relief activities. The Qingdao Red Cross did not return to the city until after the war.
This cooperation with the state became a problem when the Sino-Japanese War broke out. State-sponsored relief organizations could not function efficiently, largely because of their unstable financial basis. As I demonstrated, the Qingdao Relief Institute evacuated Qingdao with its inmates and servicemen, and moved to Jinan when the Japanese troops were approaching the city in the fall of 1937. It could return to the city a year later when Japanese authorities and Chinese leaders agreed to restore the Institute. It remained difficult for the Institute, however, to sustain its service, as it could not expect reliable resources from the local government.
For the Chinese Red Cross, the situation was not so friendly either. The Red Cross may have been very successful in the Nationalists’ strongholds. In eastern Shandong, however, the Chinese Red Cross could not sustain a substantial impact on local relief as it suffered from chronic funding shortage. It was primarily due to the fact that the Red Cross did not undertake the usual tactic for securing financial basis—purchasing real estate. In addition, compared to the WRSS, it was unable to locate particularly large groups of loyal donors.
Moreover, the close relation with the Nationalist Government brought unexpected consequences when the war actually broke out. In 1936, the government enlisted the Red Cross organization in its national defense system as a medical support unit in preparation for impending war. With the continuous defeat, the Red Cross retreated from northern China alongside the Nationalist troops. The decline of state-sponsored relief organizations opened a larger window for private relief organizations such as the WRSS to operate in eastern Shandong.

참고자료

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