仁祖代 對後金(對淸) 방어책의 추진과 한계 - 守城 전술을 중심으로 - (Joseon’s Defense Plan against the Hu'geum(後金[Qing,淸]) forces, and the plan’s flaws, during King Injo/仁祖’s reign -Examination of tactics displayed in fortress defenses[守城]-)

서지정보

· 발행기관 : 조선시대사학회
· 수록지 정보 : 조선시대사학보 / 61호 / 79 ~ 114페이지
· 저자명 : 허태구

초록

이 논문은 병자호란 당시 敗戰의 대표적 원인 가운데 하나로 지적된 守城 전술의 실패를 중심으로, 인조대 對後金(對淸) 방어책의 실상과 한계를 재검토한 연구이다.
조선은 이미 선조대 이후부터 전투력이 월등한 建州女眞(後金)의 기마병을 상대하기 위해 들판을 淸野한 뒤, 野戰을 피해 방어 거점이 되는 (山)城에 웅거하면서, 火器를 사용하여 적을 방어하는 전술을 꾸준히 준비하고 있었다. 守城 전술의 효과를 높이기 위해서는 성곽의 수축과 개축을 비롯하여 守城用 火器 및 火藥의 공급, 守城軍의 확보, 군량의 조달이 원활하게 이루어져야 했으나, 이러한 조치는 불안한 국가 재정과 민심 악화 등의 이유로 인하여 원활하게 수행되지 못하였다.
그리고 守城 위주의 방어 전술은 後金(淸)이 월등한 功城戰 능력을 보유했다면 근본적으로 무력화될 가능성이 높았다. 정묘호란 당시 조선의 守城 전술은 각각의 고립․분산된 守城處가 너무나 빠른 시간 내에 각개 격파당함으로써 그 실효성을 잃고 말았다. 따라서 조선은 적군이 각 守城處의 공략을 생략하고 都城 근처로 신속히 진격하는 直攻의 위험성을 일찌기 예상했음에도 불구하고, 부득이하게 大路邊에 위치한 城을 포기하고 방어가 용이한 인근의 山城으로 방어 거점을 옮길 수밖에 없었다.
그러나 병자호란 당시 청은 정묘호란 때와 달리 13만여 명의 대병력을 동원하였고, 각 守城處의 공략에도 크게 집착하지 않았다. 淸軍은 조선이 방어하는 守城處를 그대로 지나쳐도 계속 후속 부대가 파견되고 있었기 때문에, 후미 차단의 부담을 느끼지 않고 조선의 內地로 곧바로 진군할 수 있었다. 청군은 선발대와 본대를 분리하여 기동시킴으로써, 선발대로 하여금 강화도로 피난하려는 인조를 견제하는 데 결국 성공하였다.
이처럼 병자호란 당시 山城 위주의 守城 전술은, 전체적 戰力의 열세 속에서 조선이 直攻의 위험성을 감수하고 고육지책으로 택한 방어책이었지만 애당초 많은 한계를 갖고 있는 것이었다. 문제의 본질은 당시의 조선이 이보다 더 나은 군사적 代案을 선택하기 매우 어려웠다는 점에 있었다.

영어초록

Examined in this article, is the Joseon government's failure to effectively defend the fortresses, a failure which has been one of many failures that are usually cited for the reason of Joseon's ultimate defeat in the Byeongja Ho'ran war. This particular aspect of the Joseon government's war efforts(or lack of it) is examined here in order to determine the nature of the Joseon defense plan employed against the Hu'geum(後金[Qing,淸]) forces, and its glaring flaws and eventual limitations.
Since the reign of King Seonjo, in order to fight the cavalry forces of the Geonju/建州 area's superior Jurchen forces(Hu'geum), the Joseon government had already been preparing for a suitable tactic, designed to first vacate plain areas, retreat into (mountain) fortresses that would serve as defense bases, and then defend the fortresses from the enemy by using fire weapons(火器). In order to maximize the effects of such fortress- based defense, the fortresses would have to be repaired and renovated, and firearms and gun powder would have to be provided undisrupted. And needless to say, soldiers, as well as supplies that would feed them would have to be adequately delivered. Yet the government's monetary condition at the time was rather bad to accommodate such needs, and the society was already too unstable to sufficiently facilitate such efforts of the government.
Added to that, the defense plan based upon tactics designed to mainly defend fortresses, had inherent problems of its own. Such plan would leave the entire Joseon defense line extremely vulnerable to exterior invasion force, if the Hu'geum forces had superior skills of efficiently attacking such fortresses. In the Jeong'myo Ho'ran war, the defense points of such mountain fortresses were isolated from each other, and were also scattered around the regions too much. They were swiftly picked up one by one by the Hu'geum forces. Joseon government had predicted that the enemy forces would skip such attacks upon the fortress defense points and head directly toward the capital on a direct one-line attack mode(直攻), but in the end was left with no other choice but to abandon all the mountain fortresses on the main trunk line, and move to the nearby mountain fortresses which would be more easy to defend.
Yet unlike the Jeong'myo Ho'ran period, during the Byeong'ja Ho'ran stage, Qing brought roughly 130,000 troops to the Korean peninsula, and this time they did not bother to attack the fortress defense points. With continuing dispatches of backup forces from China, the Qing forces did not worry about their rear being cut off by the Joseon forces, even after they passed a defense point without attacking it. The Qing forces separated the advance parties and the main force, and successfully disrupted King Injo's plan to move over to the Gang'hwa-do island.
As we can see, the Joseon government's fortress defense plan, designed to defend mountain fortresses during the Byeong'ja Ho'ran stage, was grudgingly chosen by the Joseon government which was overwhelmed by the size of Qing forces and was also concerned of the prospect of the Qing forces' one-line attack upon the capital, yet was full of flaws to say the least. Unfortunately, there was no other more viable military option in the hands of the Joseon government at the time.

참고자료

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