금융감독체계 개편 : 어떻게 할 것인가? (Reforming Korean Financial Supervisory System : Supervisory Independence and Twin Peaks)

서지정보

· 발행기관 : 한국금융학회
· 수록지 정보 : 금융연구 / 27권 / 3호 / 71 ~ 125페이지
· 저자명 : 윤석헌, 고동원, 빈기범, 양채열, 원승연, 전성인

초록

본 논문은 현행 한국 금융감독체계의 문제점을 진단하고 금융감독체계 개편방향을 제시하는것을 목적으로 한다. 구체적으로 본 논문은 다음 네 가지 개편방향을 제안한다. 첫째,그간 우리나라에서 금융감독이 정부의 경제 또는 금융산업 정책에 압도되어 독립성이 훼손되고 위상이 저하되어감독의 부실 및 금융소비자 피해가 초래되었음을 감안하여, 금융의 산업정책과 감독정책을 분리한다. 둘째, 감독기구는 금융기관들의 건전성감독을 책임지는 금융건전성감독원(가칭)과 행위규제를 책임지는 금융시장감독원(가칭)으로 구분되는 소위 “쌍봉형(twin peaks) 체계”를 채택한다.
셋째, 감독업무의 독립성 확보와 전문성 제고를 위해서 감독기구는 민간 공적기구 형태의 설립을원칙으로 한다. 넷째, 감독권 및 정보의 독점에서 발생하는 문제를 해결하기 위해서 개별 감독유관기관 고유의 감독권을 존중하는 범위 내에서 협력체제를 구축하고 거시건전성 감독 강화를 도모하기 위한 금융안정협의체(가칭) 법제화를 제안한다.

영어초록

The savings banks fiasco, which came to light on February 2011, drew much attention to the necessity of reforming Korean financial supervisory system. After Former President Lee Myung Bak rebuked the Financial Supervisory Service (FSS) for disarrangement in financial supervision, an official task force for reshaping financial supervision was launched to prepare measures for a comprehensive reform of the Korean financial super-visory system. However, what this task force came up with was rather limited to the ways to improve financial supervisory software, including plans to increase supervisory independence and ensure transparency and accountability in supervisory activities.
However, problems with the Korean financial supervisory system are believed to be so widespread and deep-rooted that they cannot be resolved simply by some improvement in supervisory softwares, let alone the possibility of making such improvement come true. Thus, resolution of those problems is believed to require some drastic reforms of the current financial supervisory structure. Their causes seem to be the shoddy super-vision and corruption on the surface. But the real cause has been the lack of supervisory independence. Specifically, policy functions governing financial services industries by the Financial Services Committee (FSC) (or the mini-stry of finance (MOF) prior to the 2008 reform of government organization structure) overwhelmed the supervisory functions of both the FSC and the Financial Supervisory Service (FSS). It’s like the accelerator of a car suppress its brakes so that they do not function properly when needed.
Financial crises occurred in Korea such as the 1997 foreign exchange crisis,the 2003 credit card debacle, and the 2011 savings banks fiasco were all exacerbated by the loss of supervisory independence as the supervisory function captured by politics and/or government policies was not working properly. Therefore, it becomes necessary that supervisory independence be established to prevent any further financial crises.
Furthermore, the 2011 savings bank fiasco highlights the issue of financial consumer protection, which used to have low priority in financial supervision. If the issuance of subordinated bond of savings banks had been made by either the overt permission or covert acquiescence by the super-visory authorities, it amounts to pursuing the restoration of the soundness of financial institutions at the expense of financial consumers. This incidence highlights the importance of the issue of financial consumer protection,which has largely been neglected by financial institutions and financial supervisory authorities alike so far.
Some argue that fixing hardwares will not necessarily guarantee an increase in the quality of financial supervision which the Korean financial services industries are in need of. Nonetheless, it is also true that right softwares of financial supervision cannot grow on the basis of bad hardwares.
Since a combination of proper hardwares is a prerequisite for a good quality financial supervisory softwares, their reforms are believed to be a critical component of a stronger financial supervisory system.
Under these circumstances this paper identifies problems in the Korean financial supervisory system and provides reform suggestions. Specifically,four recommendations are made. First, functions dealing with financial services industries and supervision of the industries should be institutionally separated. Second, twin peaks system need to be introduced. In a twin peaks system, the establishment of two separate supervisory agencies having different objectives is recommended; one for prudential regulation and the other for market behavior and consumer protection. Third, in order to guarantee independence of financial supervision, the supervisory authorities should be organized as public institutions run by civilians, separate from the usual government body inhabited by bureaucratic government officials.
Fourth, to mitigate the problems stemming from the monopoly power of a supervisory authority, supervisory power should be properly distributed among many agencies for checks and balances. And a new coordination mechanism temporarily called Financial Stability Council is hereby proposed to be established by law for the purpose of enhancing coordination and cooperation among diverse financial supervisory agencies as well as of improving accountability and transparency. The council is expected to also contribute to the enhancement of macro-prudential supervisory function.

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