감리지적기업의 감사보수와 감사시간: 감리조치 전후 기간 및 사유별 비교 분석을 중심으로 (Audit Fees and Audit Hours of Audit Reviewed Firms)

서지정보

· 발행기관 : 한국회계학회
· 수록지 정보 : 회계학연구 / 39권 / 1호 / 217 ~ 253페이지
· 저자명 : 최정운, 이재은, 배길수

초록

본 연구는 감리지적을 받은 기업(감리지적기업)과 감리지적을 받지 않은 기업(감리비지적기업)의 감사시간과 감사보수 차이와, 감리지적기업의 감리지적 전과 후의 체계적인 차이를 조사한다. 아울러 감리지적은 그 사유, 성격 및 중요성에 따라 여러 가지로 구분할 수 있는 바 이들 사유, 성격 및 중요성이 감사시간과 감사보수 및 감리지적 후 이들의 변화와 체계적인 관련이 있는지를 조사한다. 감리지적기업의 감리지적 대상기업-연도의 감사시간과 감사보수는 감리비지적기업에 비해 유의한 차이가 나타나지 않았다. 감리지적기업의 감리지적 전-후의 감사시간과 보수를 비교한 결과 감리지적 후 감사시간과 감사보수는 감리지적 전에 비해 모두 유의하게 높았다. 이는 예상대로 감리지적 이후 감사인이 감리지적기업을 감사위험이 높은 기업으로 인식하고 더 높은 감사시간을 투입하며 따라서 감사보수도 더 높아진다는 것을 의미한다. 마지막으로 감리지적을 받은 후 감리조치기업의 감사시간과 감사보수를 감리비지적기업과 비교한 결과, 감사시간과 감사보수는 감리지적기업이 감리비지적기업에 비해 유의하게 높았다. 이는 감사인이 감리지적을 받은 기업을 위험한 기업으로 인식하여 상대적으로 높은 감사보수를 요구한다는 해석과 일치한다. 감사시간과 감사보수의 차이를 사유, 성격 및 중요성으로 분류한 결과도 대체로 이러한 예상과 일치한다.

영어초록

This study examines the systematic differences in audit hours and audit fees between the pre- and post-sanction periods of the firms that have been sanctioned in the regulatory reviews by the Financial Supervisory Service (FSS). Our work also compares audit hours and audit fees of the sanctioned firms and those of the firms that have never been sanctioned in the regulatory audit reviews during the sample period (“non-sanctioned firm”). Specifically, we examine (1) whether audit hours and audit fees are different between the sanctioned firm-years (i.e. the misstated firm-years) and non-sanctioned firms, (2) whether audit hours and audit fees increase after the sanction relative to those of the pre-sanction period, and (3) whether audit hours and audit fees in the post-sanction period of the sanctioned firms relative to those of the firms that have never been subject to sanctions in the regulatory audit reviews during the sample period. Since regulatory audit reviews can be grouped by several characteristics, the differences in the review characteristics might be related to audit hours and audit fees, and their changes after the regulatory audit review. We examine this possibility as well.
The current regulatory reviews of the audit reports focus on the determination of the consistency of firms’ financial reporting with the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). If GAAP violations of financial reporting are detected, then the FSS might require firms to restate the previous financial reporting to correct the violations, and also impose sanctions on the firms, and possibly on auditors who audited the financial statements of the firm. The FSS believes that this practice improves the credibility of financial reporting. However, only limited evidence is currently available either to support or refute the contention that the regulatory reviews improve the quality of financial reporting. This study attempts to provide some additional insights into understanding the effect of the regulatory reviews on audit fees and hours of sanctioned firms.
If auditors had perceived that subsequently sanctioned firms were risky, they might have extended audit hours in those firms to protect themselves from the increased audit risks. Moreover, it is likely that the increased audit hours led to higher audit fees.
We find that audit hours and audit fees of the year of the sanctioned firms subject to the regulatory audit review are not significantly different from those of the firms that have never been sanctioned. One possible explanation for this result is that auditors did not perceive high risk in the subsequently sanctioned firms when they audited them before they received a sanction. However, we find that audit hours and audit fees of the sanctioned firms in the post-sanction period increases significantly relative to their pre-sanction period audit hours and audit fees. This finding suggests that auditors, perhaps recognizing higher audit risks in the sanctioned firms, extend more hours and as a consequence they charge higher audit fees. In addition, we also demonstrate that audit hours and audit fees are higher in the post-sanction period firm-years relative to audit hours and audit fees of the non-sanctioned firms. This difference is consistent with the interpretation that auditors exert more audit hours and charge higher fees responding to the higher risks associated with the firms that have been sanctioned by the FSS. Furthermore, we find that audit hours and audit fees are higher in the firms that have been sanctioned because of more egregious problems in the financial statements. Also, the increase in audit hours and fees are positively associated with the severity of a sanction that the firm receives.
Our findings have several implications to regulators and practitioners alike. To the extent that higher audit efforts are positively associated with audit quality, our finding provides evidence that regulatory reviews can improve financial reporting quality, consistent with the regulators’ contention. Given that there are doubts about the effectiveness of the regulatory reviews of audit reports, our finding demonstrates that the regulatory actions can significantly affect auditors’ behavior.

참고자료

· 없음