멀티 브랜드 소매업체의 추천 보상 프로그램에 관한 연구 (A Multiple-Brand Dealer's Referral Reward Program)

서지정보

· 발행기관 : 한국유통학회
· 수록지 정보 : 유통연구 / 18권 / 3호 / 79 ~ 103페이지
· 저자명 : 김현식

초록

고객의 추천행동을 촉진하려는 마케터의 노력이 진척되면서 최근에는 멀티 브랜드를 유통하는 소매업체들도 추천 보상 프로그램을 운용하는 사례가 목격되고 있어 멀티 브랜드 소매업체의 추천 보상 프로그램 설계 방향에 대한 조명 필요성이 대두되고 있는 것이 현실이다. 그런데 최근까지 이루어진 추천행동 촉진 방안 연구는 주로 특정 마케터에 초점을 두고 진행되고 있어 멀티 브랜드 소매업체가 주도하는 유통채널에 적용하기에는 제한점이 있는 것이 사실이다.
이에 본 연구에서는 멀티 브랜드 소매업체가 주도하는 유통채널 차원에서 고객 추천행동 촉진 인센티브를 제시하는 상황을 게임이론을 통해 조명함으로써 멀티 브랜드 소매업체가 주도하는 유통채널 차원에서의 고객 추천행동 촉진 인센티브 설계 방향을 제시하기 위한 이론적 연구를 시도하였다.
본 연구의 주요결과는 다음과 같다:(1) 멀티 브랜드 소매업체는 브랜드간 경쟁강도가 높을수록 추천보상 수준을 높여가는 것이 바람직하며, 나아가 유통채널 전체의 추천 보상 수준에서 차지하는 비중을 높여가는 것이 유리하다.,(2) 멀티 브랜드 소매업체 이윤은 브랜드간 경쟁강도의 증가함수이다.,(3)멀티 브랜드 소매업체는 고객 추천행동 점화수준이 높을수록 추천 보상 수준을 높게 제시하는 것이유리하지만, 유통채널 전체에서 멀티 브랜드 소매업체가 제시하는 추천 보상 비중은 낮추어가는 것이바람직하다.,(4) 멀티 브랜드 소매업체 이윤은 추천행동 점화수준의 감소함수이다.

영어초록

As customer referral is known to be a key driver for success in marketing, we can often observe marketers' diverse marketing programs to stimulate customers' referral behaviors.
These efforts are not limited to the cases of service marketers or manufacturers, but also retailers are inclined to use referral reward scheme to stimulate customers' referral behavior.
Recently we can see multiple-brand retailers' efforts to stimulate customers' referral behavior.
Ramsey car dealer, Kmart, and Best-buy are to be examples of them.
However, despite increasing needs for helpful guidelines for them, there have been scarce studies that elaborate on manufacturer-retailer channel's optimal referral reward scheme to stimulate customers' referral behavior. Especially, even fewer research shed light on the case of the distribution channel wherein multiple-brand retailers are included.
In this paper, we investigate via game-theoretic modeling what referral reward scheme is optimal for multiple-brand retailers in a distribution channel to stimulate customers' referral behavior.
We investigated some topics as follows:(1) What level of referral rewards is optimal for the multiple-brand retailer under diverse level of differentiation between multiple brands ?,(2)What level of referral rewards is optimal for the multiple-brand retailer under diverse level of customer's threshold to ignite referral behavior ?We focus on the optimal referral reward level for a mutlple-brand retailer in a distribution channel to stimulate customers to refer new customers. We consider three players in the game,a mutlple-brand retailer and two competing multiple brand manufacturers. Our model is of complete information game type. We build and analyze a game model of retailer Stackelberg leader channel structure. In our model, multiple-brand retailer moves first, and two competing manufacturers move next simultaneously. Our model is of a single period.
Competing manufacturers' objective functions in the game are as follows:Max w1,Rm1Πm1=[1-(w1+m1)+b(w2+m2)]w1+a [1-T-(w1+m1)+b(w2+m2)+Rm1+Rr 12](w1-Rm1) and Max w2,Rm2Πm2=[1-(w2+m2)+b(w1+m1)]w2+a [1-T-(w2+m2)+b(w1+m1)+Rm2+Rr 22](w2-Rm2) .
Retailer's is as follows:Max m1,Rr 1,m2,Rr 2π=[1-(w1+m1)+b(w2+m2)]m1+a [1-T-(w1+m1)+b(w2+m2)+Rm1+Rr 12](m1-Rr 1)+[1-(w2+m2)+b(w1+m1)]m2+a [1-T-(w2+m2)+b(w1+m1)+Rm2+Rr 22](m2-Rr 2) .
Stages of the game are as follows.
(Stage 1) A multiple-brand retailer sets performance-based referral reward level(Rri), and retail margins for each brand items(mi).
(Stage 2) Two manufacturers simultaneouly set performance-based referral reward level (Rmi), and wholesale prices of each brnad item(wi). Then, representative customer refers new customers based on total referral reward from manufacturer and retailer.
Our model is a dynamic game of complete information. So we try to find a subgame perfect equilibrium to derive useful implications. In order to obtain the subgame perfect equilibrium,we solve the problems backward from stage 2 to stage 1. By completely knowing follower's optimal reaction to the leader's potential actions, we can fold back the game tree backward.
Our findings are as follows:(1) As competitiveness between multiple brands distributed in a channel gets higher, multiple-brand retailer had better increase referral reward level but each manufacturer had better decrease it.,(2) Profit of multiple-brand retailer is a increasing function of competitiveness between multiple brands distributed in a channel.,(3) The referral reward level of multiple-brand retailer is a increasing function of the threshold level of expected surplus to ignite customer referral behavior. when low and middle level of competitiveness between multiple brands, but decreasing function when sufficiently high level of competitiveness between multiple brands.,(4) Profit of multiple-brand retailer is a decreasing function of the threshold level of expected surplus to ignite customer referral behavior.
One of the major contributions of this study is that the current study firstly suggest some managerial implications for marketers in a multiple-brand retailer how to stimulate the customers to refer new customers.

참고자료

· 없음