Why League of Nation has failed to prevent World war Ⅱ? (국제연맹이 제 2차 세계대전을 막지 못한 원인은 무엇인가?)

소개

국제연맹(LN : League of Nations)이 제 2차 세계대전을 막지 못한 이유를 국제정치의 몇가지 이론들을 통해 분석한 에세이입니다. 영문으로 작성되었습니다. 원인 분석에 사용된 국제정치 이론은 집단행동의 딜레마(Dilemma of Collective action), 공공재와 무임승차 문제(Public goods and Free rider problem), Robert Putnam의 Two-level Game, 게임 이론(Game Theory - Prisoners' Dilemma, Stag Hunt, Chicken Game, Gridlock)입니다.

목차

Ⅰ. Introduction
1. Motive of the research
2. Necessity and goal of the research
3. Methods and range of the research

Ⅱ. Ascertainment of Historical Truths
1. after World War Ⅰ
2. Wilsonism and Fourteen Points Speech
3. Establishment and Failure of LN (League of Nation)
4. Establishment of UN (United of Nation)

Ⅲ. Why League of Nations has failed to prevent World War Ⅱ?
1. Theoretical Review
2. Dilemma of Collective Action
3. Public Good and Free-rider problem
4. Two-level Game
5. Game Theory

Ⅳ. Conclusion - for better cooperation between countries

Ⅴ. References

본문내용

Ⅰ. Introduction

1. Motive of the research The reason of researching this topic is that, the reason of why LN has failed to prevent World War Ⅱ is similar to the reason of why today's countries sometimes fail to cooperate each other. We can apply the situation of 1920's and 1930's when the League of nation has been established and failed to prevent World War Ⅱ, to today's international politics. The idea of collective security of Wilson, which is the idea that all countries of the world have to cooperate to solve the international problems like world war, is still used by UN and today's countries. But the failure of cooperation has been repeated from time of LN to today.

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Second, the point of Stag Hunt is that each actors know that the cooperation is the best choice to maximize their profit, but they are scared to be abandoned by other actors. So all actors choose to abandon other actors first before they are abandoned by other actors. In LN situation, all countries might know that the world peace which is achieved by their cooperation is the best option they can choose

참고자료

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