콜옵션 전환사채와 경영권 강화: 현대엘리베이터 사례 (Callable Convertible Bonds and Enhancing of Control: A Case of Hyundai Elevator)

서지정보

· 발행기관 : 한국회계학회
· 수록지 정보 : 회계저널 / 31권 / 2호 / 179 ~ 212페이지
· 저자명 : 김영준, 조미옥, 이수정

초록

최근 전환사채에 대한 콜옵션을 발행기업뿐만 아니라 제3자(주로 최대주주나 최대주주의 특수관계자)에게 부여되는 형태의 전환 사채(이하 ‘콜옵션 전환사채’) 발행이 급증하고 있다. 이러한 콜옵션 전환사채의 발행목적은 최대주주의 지분율을 높여 발행기업에 대한 경영권 강화를 위한 것으로 알려져 있다. 본 연구는 콜옵션 전환사채 중 세간의 논란이 되었던 2015년 11월 발행된 제35회차 현대엘리베이터 콜옵션 전환사채 사례를 살펴본다. 본 연구는 해당사례를 통해 전환사채와 콜옵션 관련 회계처리를 검토하며 관련 거래가 발행회사의 재무제표에 미치는 재무적 효과를 살펴본다. 본 연구는 학생들과 실무자들에게 실무에서 많이 거래되지만 회계학 교과서에는 다루지 않는 콜옵션 전환사채를 학습할 기회를 제공함으로써 이론과 실무의 간극을 좁힐 것이다. 또한 본 연구는 법적으로 발행이 금지된 금융상품을 우회하는 규제차익(regulatory arbitrage)을 통해 규제를 회피하는 금융혁신(financial innovation)의 사례를 보여준 다. 나아가 많은 기업들이 콜옵션 전환사채를 이용해 규제차익을 발생시키고 콜옵션 전환사채와 유사한 사모 분리형 신주인수권부사채 의 발행을 금지한 자본시장법을 무력화시킴으로써 현재 국내자본시장의 법의 허점(legal loophole)을 보여준다. 그리고 본 연구는 콜옵션 전환사채 관련 일련의 거래들을 회계학적 관점에서 자세히 분석함으로써 감독당국이 각 거래 단계별로 정교한 규제를 할 수 있는 바탕을 제공한다.

영어초록

Recently, numerous companies have issued convertible bonds with call options (hereinafter referred to as ‘callable convertible bonds’) to bypass the prohibition of issuing privately-placed bonds with detachable warrants effective 2013. This type of callable convertible bonds are different from traditionally issued callable bonds in that the call options embedded in convertible bonds are given to not only issuers but also unspecified third parties in the bond issuance date. It is alleged that the purpose of issuing callable convertible bonds is to increase the largest shareholders’ ownership and thus enhance their control. Callable convertible bonds are criticized for several reasons. First, the convertible bond issuer designates the call option holder as interested parties only when it is advantageous to convert the convertible bonds into shares does not specify the call option holder when issuing the convertible bonds. Persons who have been granted call options at the time when the conversion into stock is advantageous immediately exercises the call options on convertible bonds to acquire the convertible bond, exercise the conversion rights, and convert them to shares to increase their ownership. Second, it is difficult for investors or market participants to find out the call option premium of call option holders from the disclosure of call option transactions. Thus, callable convertible bonds are known to be a attractive investment vehicle for the largest shareholders who need to increase their ownership. Therefore, the call options on convertible bonds are controversial for stakeholders of companies that have disputes over the control rights. To alleviate these concerns, Financial Services Commission and Financial Supervisory Service have revised the regulation on securities issuance and disclosures in Korea. Callable convertible bonds are at the center of controversy in the Korean capital market. Thus, we review the accounting treatment related to callable convertible bonds and relevant disclosures, and also examine the effects of related transactions on issuer’s financial statements. This study examines the controversial case of Hyundai Elevator’s callable convertible bonds. Specifically, this study examines Hyundai Elevator’s 35th convertible bonds privately issued on November 8, 2015. We chose the convertible bonds of Hyundai Elevator because it is a case of much interest, and because Hyundai Elevator’s footnotes and disclosure are relatively detailed compared to other issuers, which helps readers understand the issues related to callable convertible bonds. This case study has the following academic and educational contributions. First, we describe how convertible bonds can be used to enhance control over a company. While accounting textbooks generally focus on the accounting treatment of convertible bonds, this study helps students understand how convertible bonds can be used with derivative products to affect the corporate ownership structure. Second, this study focuses on call option accounting for convertible bonds. Prior studies have focused on convertible rights in convertible bonds. However, this study investigates different types of call options as embedded derivatives and free-standing derivatives. In addition, we cover various accounting issues for convertible bonds, including firm’s own convertible bonds, refixing clauses on conversion prices, and disclosures on valuation losses on written call options. Third, this study narrows the gap between theory and practice by describing the usage of callable convertible bonds which is not covered in accounting textbooks but actively issued in practice. This study also provides implications for practitioners and policy makers. It can be useful for practitioners in the corporate finance department and in the financial investment industry. In addition, this study presents an example of financial innovation that circumvents regulation that prohibits the issuance of certain financial instruments. Further, using callable convertible bonds, many companies generate regulatory arbitrage and nullify the Financial Investment Services And Capital Markets Act, that prohibits the issuance of privately-placed bonds with detachable warrant similar to callable convertible bonds. This appears to be a legal loophole in Korean capital markets regulation. By examining a series of transactions related to callable convertible bonds from an accounting perspective, this study provides a basis for regulators to implement sophisticated regulations at each stage. Finally, this study suggests that the convertible bond market needs to implement fair rules, by showing that callable convertible bonds are unilaterally beneficial to designated recipients, the largest shareholders.

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