대리인 비용과 권력의 결합:기업 소유구조가 경영진의 보상 수준에 미치는 영향에 대한 연구 (The Combination of Agency Costs and Power:The Effects of Corporate Governance Structure on theLevel of Top Management Team Compensation)

서지정보

· 발행기관 : 한국경영학회
· 수록지 정보 : 경영학연구 / 34권 / 5호 / 1475 ~ 1500페이지
· 저자명 : 김경묵

초록

본 연구에서 저자는 주식 소유에 기반을 둔 권력이 경영진의 보상 수준에 미치는 영향을 분석했다. 우리나라 증권거래소에 상장된 기업 158개를 대상으로 하여 실증 분석한 결과, 기업의 성과와 규모, 그리고 최고 경영자의 지분율은 경영진의 보상 수준에 긍정적인 영향을 미치는 것으로 나타났다. 또한, 최고경영자 및 기관투자가 지분율은 기업 성과가 경영진의 보상에 미치는 영향을 負的으로 조절하는 것으로 나타났다. 본 연구의 말미에는 이러한 연구 결과가 함의하는 바와 미래 연구의 방향에 대한 토론이 이어진다.

영어초록

Since the financial crisis of 1997 Korean firms have enthusiastically invited foreign investment along with employing Anglo-Saxon models of corporate governance system. Some scholars argue that national systems of corporate governance evolve in order to exploit the advantages of the firm’s form of organization while mitigating against concomitant agency costs in a manner consistent with a country’s economic background. In this regard, it is interesting to examine whether Anglo-Saxon-based top management team (TMT) compensation models can be applied in explaining a newly transformed Korean firms’ governance structures.
The most researched topic in the field of TMT compensation is the relationship between TMT compensation level and firm performance. Although the assumption of interest coalignment between shareholders and TMT by employing performance-contingent compensation system appears to be widely held, many scholars have doubts about the overall explanatory power of the empirical model for performance-contingent compensation. Previous researches suggest that firm performance is only one of many influences that impact TMT compensation. This leads me to opine that some more variables should be employed to explain TMT compensation more precisely. First of all, I think power is the missing variable that will improve our ability to predict and explain how TMT compensation is determined.
According to previous research, TMT compensation is an outcome of a political struggle between TMT who attempt to extract the most favorable pay packet and shareholders who would like to limit the level of compensation and increase the portion of performance-contingent pay. More directly, some scholars have asserted that stock ownership serves as structural base of power, arguing that stock ownership is a valuable source of power that can be exercised in the decision-making processes concerning TMT compensation levels. My study addresses that reasoning by employing two key propositions. The first proposition is that stock-based power of CEOs stock enhance TMT compensation levels, whereas it neutralizes a performance-contingent compensation system. The second proposition is that the institutional investors’ vigilant monitoring lessens the need for employing the performancecontingent compensation system.
Sample firms were identified from the 158 listed Korean firms. I used average monetary compensation as the dependent variable. I also used economic value added (EVA) to measure firm performance; CEO’s percentage of stock ownership to measure managerial power; and percentage of aggregate ownership held by such institutions as insurance companies, brokerage houses, and trusts to measure institutional stock ownership. I also introduced such variables as CEO type, blockholders stock ownership, board size, foreigner stock ownership, R&D intensity, and sales for controls. I used a three-stage ordinary least squares (OLS) multiple regression analysis to estimate models for TMT compensation.
The results indicate that firm performance is positively related to the level of TMT compensation. The results further indicate that the relationship between firm performance and TMT compensation level is contingent upon the level of CEO’s and institutional investors’ stock ownership. These results have important implications for work on firm’s governance structure and its upper echelons. First, the results suggest that Anglo-Saxon-based agency theory can be well applied in a non-Anglo-Saxon business world such as in an Asian cultural context. Second, the results suggest that a CEO can exercise his or her ownership-based power to enhance TMT compensation level while simultaneously neutralizing the performancecontingent compensation system. The results for independent and moderate effects of CEO stock ownership on TMT compensation level highlights the importance of power theory for the explanation of TMT compensation. Third, the results suggest that institutional investors’ scrupulous monitoring serve as proxy for a good part of the performance- contingent compensation system’s monitoring functions. Lastly, the results of this study suggest new directions for research on TMT compensation. That is to say, the combination of agency theory and power theory can better explain TMT compensation than either perspective alone.

참고자료

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