太祖王建의 一利川戰鬪와 諸蕃勁騎 (The Battle of Illicheon and Je-Beon-Gyung-Gi during the Reign of Wang Geon, the Founder of Goryeo Dynasty)

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· 저자명 : 김명진

초록

This study is summarized as follows.
Firstly, Wang Geon(王建), the founder of Goryeo, had just reasons for the Battle of Illicheon(一利川戰鬪)：Goryeo had been acquiring its power and the time was ripe for a war with Hubaekje(後百濟). What constituted the actual cause for the Battle of Illicheon was when Dae Gwang-hyeon(大光顯), the last Crown Prince of Balhae(渤海), as well as Gyeon Hwon(甄萱), the king and founder of Hubaekje(Later Baekje) who had been forced out by his son Shin Gom(神劒), was warmly accepted by Wang Geon. To crown it all, the last king of Shilla, King Gyeongsun, surrendered his title and country to Wang Geon. This came from the embracement policy Wang Geon had consistently maintained since his enthronement, in addition to an impressive display of Goryeo’s power through the battles at Gochanggun(古昌郡) and Unju(運州). After all this, Wang Geon reached a definite decision to completely conquer Hubaekje, and in September 936, he implemented the Battle of Illicheon.
Secondly, Wang Geon chose a detour attack strategy to go round Illicheon in Gyeongsang-do, instead of moving straight southwards, with the purpose of letting Baekje soldiers be caught on the wrong foot. The existence of the Samyeon Mountain Fortress(三年山城) could have been much of a burden in the eyes of Wang Geon if the troops of Goryeo had moved from Cheonanbu(天安府) straight southwards to attack Baekje. In July 928, Wang Geon himself led his troops to attack the Samyeon Mountain Fortress, but to no avail. Hence, he chose the strategy of luring the Shin Gom-led army into a place where the troops of Goryeo could avoid the Samyeon Mountain Fortress. Knowing that mobilizing a large-scale force all at once involved economic burdens and some problems with human resources, Wang Geon mustered friendly forces in an effort to ease such burdens and make his trickery work wonders. In addition, Gyeon Hwon was deliberately encouraged to lead a host of troops as a means of destroying the morale of the whole soldiers in the service of Baekje. Wang Geon, who furtively called in amicable forces, selected Illicheon in Gyeongsang-do as a great place for enticing the Shin Gom-led army and won a sweeping victory.
Thirdly, when it comes to the routes taken by Goryeo’s troops, this paper presented a dispersion movement method that used sea and river routes, and overland routes on which no examination was conducted in the previous studies. The point of argument this paper makes is that such routes based on the dispersion movement method can ensure the maximization of the Wang Geon-devised trickery. Naturally, the key to such kind of successful trickeries is fast-paced marching. The troops of Goryeo, including the Wang Geon-led one, started from Gaegyeong(開京) where they took different sea and river routes, and overland routes. Having arrived in Cheonanbu earlier than they had expected, they must have made a sudden change in the path to be taken by the marching troops toward the east－more precisely－toward Illicheon. After all, the Shin Gom-led army met with a disastrous defeat in the Battle of Illicheon and Shin Gom yielded to Wang Geon.
Lastly, an examination was performed on the “extraordinarily strong cavalry units of northern races” (hereinafter referred to as “Je-Beon-Gyung-Gi”) as a unique entity that took part in the Battle of Illicheon. Wang Geon won Je-Beon-Gyung-Gi over to his side for the Battle of Illicheon, thereby maximizing his trickery against the Shin Gom’s army. In return for Je-Beon-Gyung-Gi’s participation in the Battle of Illicheon, Goryeo did not advance farther north. In other words, Je-Beon-Gyeong-Gi’s participation in the Battle of Illicheon explains why Goryeo’s northern borderline stretched from the lower reaches of the Chungchun River via the Maheoltan River(馬歇灘) to the Bay of Youngheung during Taejo’s reign.(Wang Geon’s reign)

영어초록

This study is summarized as follows.
Firstly, Wang Geon(王建), the founder of Goryeo, had just reasons for the Battle of Illicheon(一利川戰鬪)：Goryeo had been acquiring its power and the time was ripe for a war with Hubaekje(後百濟). What constituted the actual cause for the Battle of Illicheon was when Dae Gwang-hyeon(大光顯), the last Crown Prince of Balhae(渤海), as well as Gyeon Hwon(甄萱), the king and founder of Hubaekje(Later Baekje) who had been forced out by his son Shin Gom(神劒), was warmly accepted by Wang Geon. To crown it all, the last king of Shilla, King Gyeongsun, surrendered his title and country to Wang Geon. This came from the embracement policy Wang Geon had consistently maintained since his enthronement, in addition to an impressive display of Goryeo’s power through the battles at Gochanggun(古昌郡) and Unju(運州). After all this, Wang Geon reached a definite decision to completely conquer Hubaekje, and in September 936, he implemented the Battle of Illicheon.
Secondly, Wang Geon chose a detour attack strategy to go round Illicheon in Gyeongsang-do, instead of moving straight southwards, with the purpose of letting Baekje soldiers be caught on the wrong foot. The existence of the Samyeon Mountain Fortress(三年山城) could have been much of a burden in the eyes of Wang Geon if the troops of Goryeo had moved from Cheonanbu(天安府) straight southwards to attack Baekje. In July 928, Wang Geon himself led his troops to attack the Samyeon Mountain Fortress, but to no avail. Hence, he chose the strategy of luring the Shin Gom-led army into a place where the troops of Goryeo could avoid the Samyeon Mountain Fortress. Knowing that mobilizing a large-scale force all at once involved economic burdens and some problems with human resources, Wang Geon mustered friendly forces in an effort to ease such burdens and make his trickery work wonders. In addition, Gyeon Hwon was deliberately encouraged to lead a host of troops as a means of destroying the morale of the whole soldiers in the service of Baekje. Wang Geon, who furtively called in amicable forces, selected Illicheon in Gyeongsang-do as a great place for enticing the Shin Gom-led army and won a sweeping victory.
Thirdly, when it comes to the routes taken by Goryeo’s troops, this paper presented a dispersion movement method that used sea and river routes, and overland routes on which no examination was conducted in the previous studies. The point of argument this paper makes is that such routes based on the dispersion movement method can ensure the maximization of the Wang Geon-devised trickery. Naturally, the key to such kind of successful trickeries is fast-paced marching. The troops of Goryeo, including the Wang Geon-led one, started from Gaegyeong(開京) where they took different sea and river routes, and overland routes. Having arrived in Cheonanbu earlier than they had expected, they must have made a sudden change in the path to be taken by the marching troops toward the east－more precisely－toward Illicheon. After all, the Shin Gom-led army met with a disastrous defeat in the Battle of Illicheon and Shin Gom yielded to Wang Geon.
Lastly, an examination was performed on the “extraordinarily strong cavalry units of northern races” (hereinafter referred to as “Je-Beon-Gyung-Gi”) as a unique entity that took part in the Battle of Illicheon. Wang Geon won Je-Beon-Gyung-Gi over to his side for the Battle of Illicheon, thereby maximizing his trickery against the Shin Gom’s army. In return for Je-Beon-Gyung-Gi’s participation in the Battle of Illicheon, Goryeo did not advance farther north. In other words, Je-Beon-Gyeong-Gi’s participation in the Battle of Illicheon explains why Goryeo’s northern borderline stretched from the lower reaches of the Chungchun River via the Maheoltan River(馬歇灘) to the Bay of Youngheung during Taejo’s reign.(Wang Geon’s reign)

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