중국공산당의 新疆 農業區 토지분배와 향촌권력 改造(1951～1953) (The Land Allocation and Rural Power Reforms in the Xinjiang Agricultural Region by the Communist Party of China(1951～1953))

서지정보

· 발행기관 : 중국근현대사학회
· 수록지 정보 : 중국근현대사연구 / 83호 / 143 ~ 174페이지
· 저자명 : 이은주

초록

Under the name of “Democratic Reform” to terminate the pre-modern components, the communist party confirmed the logic that the reform would liberate people from feudal oppressions and destroy the exploitation relationship between the land owners and the peasants. Rural Survey Team declared the agricultural region of Xinjiang as “feudal rural economy’ through the southern Xinjiang rural survey, and claimed the need of the land reform in order to dismiss the feudalism. According to this, 2 years later than the mainland, the land reform was conducted ranging from the rent hegemony movement to redistribution of the land under the policy of “centering on the poor peasants and farm laborers, uniting with middle peasants, and neutralizing rich peasants politically and economically.” The land reform led to increasing agricultural productivity and end of exploitation through land rent by the land owners. Also through the reform, by organizing the networks to control from the top to bottom units of the Xinjiang society, CCP succeeded in the innovation of the rural power. The rent hegemony movement and redistribution of land resulted in growing the number of the activists, some of whom participated in People’s congress as a Youth League member or gained the authority to dominate the substratum of the power after appointed as the head of township or the district mayer. Subsequently, the new born country abolished the old system operated by Baojia system, and founded the rural power connecting districts, rural and villages. The smallest rural power, associated with the People’s Governments in provinces, counties, and cities, played a major role of deploying a variety of national projects to the corners of the rural villages.
Unlike the different areas, however, in the Xinjiang area deeply influenced by their religion, religious leaders had social, political and economic powers in dominating the villages. The lands owned by the religious leaders account for 20% of the whole agricultural lands. The ownership of the lands was under the control of the religious group, and the peasant who rent the lands had to pay to the religious temples and schools. In the case that the rights of the lands were not under the religious authority, the land owners used the lands on private purpose and also exploited the land rent from the peasants. The People’s Republic of China claimed that the representative method of feudal exploitation was “the exploitation of land rent” and religious lands were not the exception.
Nevertheless, the people’s government didn’t execute the reform of religious lands, taking a temperate approach and treating religious leaders differently from general owners. This action resulted from considering the influence of religion on the Xinjiang area and preventing the dangers of ‘the criticism from the four sides’ in advance. Consequently, the religious lands were not confiscated throughout the land reform and the religious land rent was sustained. The land reform conducted in the Xinjiang agricultural region made achievement in that it increased the productivity and led to the termination of feudal exploitation by the land owners. By the failure of the reform of religious leaders and the exploitation of religious land rent, there still remained the limitation of not completely accomplishing the aim of “democratic reform” pursued by the Communist Party of China.
The Significance of the present study lies in investigating the land reform in the Xinjiang area, which was not mentioned by the academic world of China before, concerning the problem of realization of “democratic reform” of CCP and the innovation of rural powers through the case study. Moreover the meaningful approach of this study represents the possibility of being open to a variety of interpretations of the reform by signifying the problems of the land reform in the Xinjiang area.

영어초록

Under the name of “Democratic Reform” to terminate the pre-modern components, the communist party confirmed the logic that the reform would liberate people from feudal oppressions and destroy the exploitation relationship between the land owners and the peasants. Rural Survey Team declared the agricultural region of Xinjiang as “feudal rural economy’ through the southern Xinjiang rural survey, and claimed the need of the land reform in order to dismiss the feudalism. According to this, 2 years later than the mainland, the land reform was conducted ranging from the rent hegemony movement to redistribution of the land under the policy of “centering on the poor peasants and farm laborers, uniting with middle peasants, and neutralizing rich peasants politically and economically.” The land reform led to increasing agricultural productivity and end of exploitation through land rent by the land owners. Also through the reform, by organizing the networks to control from the top to bottom units of the Xinjiang society, CCP succeeded in the innovation of the rural power. The rent hegemony movement and redistribution of land resulted in growing the number of the activists, some of whom participated in People’s congress as a Youth League member or gained the authority to dominate the substratum of the power after appointed as the head of township or the district mayer. Subsequently, the new born country abolished the old system operated by Baojia system, and founded the rural power connecting districts, rural and villages. The smallest rural power, associated with the People’s Governments in provinces, counties, and cities, played a major role of deploying a variety of national projects to the corners of the rural villages.
Unlike the different areas, however, in the Xinjiang area deeply influenced by their religion, religious leaders had social, political and economic powers in dominating the villages. The lands owned by the religious leaders account for 20% of the whole agricultural lands. The ownership of the lands was under the control of the religious group, and the peasant who rent the lands had to pay to the religious temples and schools. In the case that the rights of the lands were not under the religious authority, the land owners used the lands on private purpose and also exploited the land rent from the peasants. The People’s Republic of China claimed that the representative method of feudal exploitation was “the exploitation of land rent” and religious lands were not the exception.
Nevertheless, the people’s government didn’t execute the reform of religious lands, taking a temperate approach and treating religious leaders differently from general owners. This action resulted from considering the influence of religion on the Xinjiang area and preventing the dangers of ‘the criticism from the four sides’ in advance. Consequently, the religious lands were not confiscated throughout the land reform and the religious land rent was sustained. The land reform conducted in the Xinjiang agricultural region made achievement in that it increased the productivity and led to the termination of feudal exploitation by the land owners. By the failure of the reform of religious leaders and the exploitation of religious land rent, there still remained the limitation of not completely accomplishing the aim of “democratic reform” pursued by the Communist Party of China.
The Significance of the present study lies in investigating the land reform in the Xinjiang area, which was not mentioned by the academic world of China before, concerning the problem of realization of “democratic reform” of CCP and the innovation of rural powers through the case study. Moreover the meaningful approach of this study represents the possibility of being open to a variety of interpretations of the reform by signifying the problems of the land reform in the Xinjiang area.

참고자료

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