기대감사시간과 감사품질이 비상장기업의 감사보수 결정에 미치는 영향 (The Effect of Expected Audit Hours and Audit Quality on Audit Fees of Non-listed Firms)

서지정보

· 발행기관 : 한국중소기업학회
· 수록지 정보 : 중소기업연구 / 32권 / 2호 / 1 ~ 28페이지
· 저자명 : 곽수근, 박종일

초록

본 연구는 권수영 등(2005)에서 상장기업을 대상으로 분석된 감사시간과 감사품질이 감사보수 결정에 영향을 미치는지를 살펴본 연구에 대해 회계정보의 신뢰성과 투명성이 상대적으로 낮은 비상장기업의 경우에는 어떠한 결과들이 관찰되는지에 대하여 검증하였다. 이를 알아보기 위하여 본 연구에서는 한국공인회계사회의 데이터베이스에서의 회계법인의 감사계약서상 감사보수 및 감사인이 감사수임과정에서 예상한 기대감사시간 자료를 추출하여 감사보수의 결정요인을 통제하고 나서도 추가적인 감사시간의 투입이 예상될 때 감사보수가 추가로 결정되어지는지 여부를 분석하였다. 또한 Big 4 제휴법인의 감사보수 프리미엄이 있는지 여부와 만일 프리미엄이 있다면 확신수준을 높이기 위해 보다 많이 투입하는 감사시간 때문인지 아니면 높은 품질의 감사서비스를 제공하는 평판으로 인한 프리미엄인지를 검증하였다. 더 나아가 감사보수의 결정요인에 추가 기대감사시간과 Big 4 제휴법인 자체의 평판까지 통제하고 나면 Big 4 제휴법인이 추가 감사시간 당 추가 감사보수에 있어 Non-Big 4 국내법인과 현저한 차이를 보이는지 여부를 검증하였다.
상장기업과 달리 비상장기업에 대한 실증적 자료가 부족하고 특히 비상장기업에 대한 감사보수의 제반 결정요인이 일반 상장기업과 비교하여 어떠한 차이가 있는지 아니면 없는지에 관한 사항은 기존 연구들에서 비상장기업의 자료의 방대성 및 자료수집의 한계로 인해 이를 체계적으로 분석되지 못한 실정이다. 한편, 본 연구는 권수영 등(2005)의 연구에서 제시된 5가지 가설을 비상장기업에 적용하여 분석하는데 있어 분석상 두 가지 문제점을 지적하고 이를 개선시킨 방법에 따라 검증함으로써 보다 정교한 분석적 틀을 이용하고, 이와 관련한 검증결과들을 제시하고 있다.
비상장기업을 대상으로 한 분석결과에 의하면, 첫째, 감사보수의 결정요인을 통제하고도 감사인이 감사보수 책정과정에서 예상한 기대감사시간이 감사보수에 대하여 추가적인 설명력을 가지는 것으로 나타났다. 이는 감사환경이 다른 비상장기업에서도 감사인이 필요하다고 판단할 때 감사시간을 추가 투입하는 유인을 제공하도록 감사보수가 결정되고 있음을 나타낸다. 둘째, 감사보수 결정모형에 비정상 기대감사시간을 통제하고 나서도 Big 4와의 제휴법인인지 여부에 따라 가격이 달리 책정되어지는 것으로 나타났다. 이는 Big 4가 받는 감사보수 프리미엄이 평판의 손상으로 인한 손실에 대비해 더 많은 감사시간을 투입하는 노력에 대한 보상이라기보다는 Big 4 제휴법인이 가지고 있는 높은 감사품질에 대한 평판으로 인한 것임을 보여주는 것이다. 셋째, 감사보수의 결정요인에 비정상 기대감사시간과 Big 4 제휴법인 여부 변수까지 통제하고 나면 Big 4 제휴법인과 Non-Big 4 국내법인 간에 시간당 비정상 감사보수에 차이가 있는 것으로 나타났다. 이상의 결과는 비상장기업의 경우도 기대감사시간 및 감사품질에 따라 감사보수에 영향을 주고 있음을 시사한다. 본 연구는 상장기업과 시장여건이 다른 비상장기업의 감사보수 제반 결정요인에 대해 잘 알려져 있지 않은 상황에서 감사인이 예상한 기대감사시간 및 감사품질이 감사보수 결정요인에 영향을 주는지 여부를 체계적으로 알아보았다는 점에서 의의가 있다.

영어초록

This study investigates the relationship between expected audit hours and audit quality, and audit fees of unlisted firms in Korean stock market. Kwon et al. (2005) investigate similar relationship with data on listed Korean firms. Because the transparency and reliability of unlisted firms are not comparable to those of listed firms, this study focuses on unlisted firms and replicate the study. It is because the documented findings in Kwon et al.'s (2005) study are not apparent if they are applicable to the setting for unlisted firms.
Private firms reporting is interesting in its own right, due the predominance of private firms in the economy. The private firms setting is particularly interesting, because the markets for private and public financial reporting are substantially different. We expect private firms to have significantly different demand and supply functions for audits as compared to listed firms. This makes them an interesting sample to independently evaluate audit theories for the existence of a Big 4 fee premium that have been developed almost exclusively based on evidence in listed firms. Moreover, it is the very difference in the environment that provides an optimal setting in which to identify and evaluate new dimensions, such as the cost of providence audit services, along which audit markets could potentially be segmented.
Examining the relationship between audit fees and audit effort is likely to aid the understanding of quality and independence, and also provide a better insight into the market of audit services. This understanding is of importance to users of financial statements, consumers and providers of audit services and to those who attempt to regulate the market.
For this purpose, this study use expected audit hours data collected by Korean Institute of Certified Public Accountants (KICPA). The KICPA collect the expected audit hour data from the audit contract that auditor and client firms made before the start of actual audit works. Then, the expected audit hour data are compared with actual audit fee data. Though the expected audit hour is determined based on expected audit fee, the actual audit fee may vary from expected audit fee (for which the data are not available publicly) because some problems occurred during the audit process. For example, if auditors find some previous unknown problems in the internal control system of the client firms, they may spend more audit hours than expectation and charge higher audit fees. It is known that audit fee is mostly fixed-amount contract in Korea. However, if there are some substantial findings during the audit process and auditors can change the negotiated term in ex post basis, the actual audit fees may vary.
Furthermore, this study examines if the clients of Big 4 auditors pay higher fee premium for the increased audit hour or only reputation premium without increased audit hour. The higher-audit quality can be achieved through more input (i. e., auditor's effort), which implies more audit hours. Since audit hour is the most important determinant of audit fee, the evidence documented in this study represents why Big 4 auditors charge higher audit fees than non-Big 4 auditors.
The sample used in the empirical analyses are 23,335 firm-year observations from the recent period of year 2007 and 2008. The sample includes both registered firms at Financial Supervisory Service and other firms subject to external audit. Empirical results using ordinary least squares regression methods are summarized as follows. First, after controlling for other factors that influence the audit fees, expected audit hours are positively associated with actual audit fees. Although somewhat obvious, the results imply that auditors can charge higher fees when they spend more audit hours than the originally expected hours.
Second, the hiring of Big 4 auditors itself, after controlling for other factors, is significantly associated with audit fees with positive sign. It implies that Big 4 auditors can charge higher audit fees than the other non-Big 4 auditors do. The subsequent analyses reveal that the study fails to find evidence that Big 4 auditors spend more audit hours to audit a client, compared with non-Big 4 auditors. The finding suggests that the documented audit fee premium for Big 4 is due to higher reputation of the Big 4 auditors, rather than higher-quality audit services and this relationship is consistent even among unlisted firms as listed firms.
Finally, the coefficients on abnormal expected audit hours (actual expected audit hours minus the expected estimated audit hours from audit hour determination model) are positive. In addition, the coefficient for Big 4 auditors are substantially greater than that for non-Big 4 auditors. It implies that Big 4 auditors can charge for higher audit fees for the extended audit hours.
These findings should draw the attention of regulators to specific groups of audits of unlisted companies where there appears to exist a room for further action. From the findings of this study, any recommendation to raise the awareness of unlisted companies on the issue should be directed to smaller companies, companies less dependant on external financing and companies audited by large audit firms. Auditees from these groups and their auditors are expected to be more affected the new regulation. Hence, before any massive redirection and regulation of audit is introduced to satisfy the public's concerns, any measure should be carefully examined with regard to potential consequences. This study could be of assistance to auditors, regulators, academics, investors, and practitioners.
Our study contributes to the literature as follows. First, we analyze audit fee model in a different setting than most prior studies. Second, our study is one of the few studies to empirically examine the implications of audit study where audit quality influence financial accounting and where an audit provides value to interested parties because it improves the quality (reliability) of information in financial statements. Third, our study contributes to the existing literature on auditor quality differentiation. This is the informational role of auditing. This paper fills a widely acknowledged gap in the literature regarding the determinants of audit time and the concept of audit quality, particularly in a newly unlisted firms markets.
We expect private firms to have significantly different demand and supply functions for audits as compared to listed firms. Relative to listed companies, financial statements of private firms are less widely distributed, and managers of private firms are more likely to make reporting decision that are influenced by income tax objectives and dividend policies. Hence, even though private firms face substantially the different regulations, demand for high quality financial reporting and auditing may be lower for private firms. Hence, based on these arguments, the demand for a high quality auditor may also be lower among private firms relative to listed firms.
Several arguments have been presented in the literature to explain observed fee differential across Big 4 and non-Big 4 auditors. These hypotheses are, however, primarily focused on listed firms and so may not directly extend to private firms. Private firms differ in important ways from listed firms in terms of their ownership, corporate governance, across to public capital markets, and litigation risks. As a consequence of these differences, the demand for financial reporting and auditing is also likely to differ substantially across these firms. we extrapolate predictions from the literature on audit fees paid by listed firms to private firm setting, including discussions of their relevance in our setting. Several recent studies have relied upon samples of private firms to improve our understanding of the financial accounting literature.

참고자료

· 없음