감사위험과 감사보수의 관련성 (A Study on the Relationship between Audit Risk and Audit Fees)

서지정보

· 발행기관 : 한국경영학회
· 수록지 정보 : 경영학연구 / 39권 / 3호 / 633 ~ 663페이지
· 저자명 : 박재완, 이상철, 정갑수

초록

본 연구에서는 감사위험과 관련된 영업활동의 복잡성, 재무상태의 건전성, 경영자 특성 및 이사회 특성이 감사보수에 미치는 영향에 대해 살펴보았다. 2000년부터 2006년까지 한국증권선물거래소 유가증권시장에 상장된 12월 결산 제조기업가운데, 감사보수 자료가 존재하는 2,724개 기업-연 자료를 분석대상으로 선정하였다. 선정된 표본을 대상으로 감사위험이 감사보수에 미치는 영향을 살펴본 주요 연구결과는 다음과 같다.
첫째, 통제위험과 관련된 경영자 특성인 경영자주식소유비중, 경영자 스톡옵션 보유 여부, 그리고 대규모기업집단 소속경영자 여부는 감사보수에 유의적인 양의 영향을 미치는 것으로 나타났다. 경영자 주식소유 비중이 높은 경우, 경영자가스톡옵션을 보유한 경우, 그리고 대규모 기업집단에 소속된 경영자인 경우 통제위험이 높아질 수 있다. 따라서 외부감사인은 감사계약 체결 시, 목표적발위험 수준을 낮게 설정하여 감사보수를 높게 요구할 수 있다는 결과로 해석하였다.
둘째, 통제위험과 관련된 이사회 특성인 사외이사비율, 사외이사 재임기간, 이사회 내 하부위원회 수 그리고 이사회 개최횟수가 감사보수에 유의적인 양의 영향을 미치는 것으로 나타났다. 이사회의 독립성, 전문성 및 활동성이 높아지면, 이사회가 경영자를 효과적으로 감시하기 위해 높은 품질의 외부감사인을 고용할 가능성이 높아지기 때문에, 감사보수가 높아질 수 있다는 결과로 해석하였다.
셋째, 영업활동의 복잡성을 나타내는 총자산과 매출채권비중이 감사보수에 유의적인 양의 영향을 미치는 것으로 나타났다. 또한 재무상태의 건전성을 나타내는 손실더미는 감사보수에 유의적인 양의 영향을 미치는 것으로 나타났으며, 총자산이익률은 감사보수에 유의적인 음의 영향을 미치는 것으로 파악되었다. 영업활동이 복잡해지거나 재무상태의 건전성이 낮아지면 고유위험이 증가하기 때문에, 외부감사인은 증가된 고유위험을 고려하여 목표적발위험 수준을 낮게 설정하므로,감사범위를 확대하고 설득력 있는 증거를 수집해야 하므로 감사보수가 높아질 수 있다.
본 연구는 선행연구에서 주목하지 않았던 통제위험으로서의 경영자 및 이사회 특성이 감사보수에 미치는 영향을 살펴봄으로써, 감사보수의 결정요인을 이해하는데 도움을 줄 수 있다. 또한 외부감사인과 피감사대상인 기업이 감사보수 수준을협의하고 결정하기 위한 가이드라인을 만드는데 활용될 수 있으며, 부적절한 감사보수 할인으로 외부감사의 신뢰성과 유효성을 저해하는 행위를 규제하기 위한 감독기관의 정책 수립에 활용될 수 있다.

영어초록

Since Simunic(1980), a large body of research has examined the determinants of audit fees over the past 30 years. Most prior research following Simunic(1980) has explored a supply view of audit fee which assumes that higher audit risk is associated with more audit work and higher audit fees. However, since audit fees had been regulated by 1999 in Korea, there are not many studies which examine the determinants of audit fees.
Based on both the audit risk model and prior research, this paper systematically identifies audit risk factors which may have an effect on audit fees and examines the relation between audit risk factors (inherent risk, control risk, and detection risk) and audit fees. According to the audit risk model, auditors decide the level of tolerable detection risk, based on targeted audit risk and the evaluation of the inherent and control risk of the auditee firms.
If targeted audit risk is assumed to be constant, acceptable detection risk is inversely related to both inherent and control risk. Lower level of tolerable detection risk demands more audit hours to achieve the targeted audit risk which lead to higher audit fees from the auditor’s perspective. In this paper, the inherent risk factors include operation complexity and financial status of the auditee firms and the control risk factors include characteristics of both managements and board of directors. In this paper, it is hypothesized that higher inherent risk factors is associated with higher audit fees. We also hypothesize that characteristics of management such as managers’ ownership percentage, the existence of managers’ stock option compensation plan, and whether managers belong to the business group called “Chaebol” in Korea, have a significant positive effect on audit fees. Lastly, we hypothesize that characteristics of board of directors are significantly associated with audit fees. We don’t predict whether the risk factors are positively or negatively associated with audit fees. The supply viewpoint of auditing services may predict that more effective boards means lower control risk which leads to lower audit fees. However, the demand viewpoint of auditing services may demand higher quality of auditing service in order to effectively monitor management’s financial reporting process, which may lead to higher audit fees.
This paper uses 2,724 firm-year data of the manufacturing firms listed on the Korean Stock Exchange from 2000 to 2006. Our specific regression model is as follows:

LN(FEE) = α + β1 LN(ASSETS) + β2 RECEIV + β3 INV + β4 FORSALES + β5 DEBT+ β6 ROA + β7 LOSS + β8 MANOWN + β9 STOCKOP + β10CHAEBOL + β11OUTDIR + β12 OUTTEN + β13 SUBCOM + β14 BODMEET + β15 BODACT + β16 AC + β17 BIG + β18 AUDITTEN + β19NONATFEE +   βi IND +   βt YEAR + ε

LN(FEE) : the natural log of audit fees ; LN(ASSETS) : the natural log of total assets ;RECEIV : receivables / total assets ; INV : inventories / total assets ; FORSALES : foreign sales / total sales ; DEBT : total debt / total assets ; ROA : return on total assets ; LOSS :dummy variable indicating whether the firm had prior 3 consecutive year losses ; MANOWN :management’s ownership percentage ; STOCKOP : dummy variable indicating existence of stock option plan given to management ; CHAEBOL : dummy variable indicating whether managers belong to the business group called “Chaebol” ; OUTDIR : ratio of outside directors on the board ; OUTTEN : outside directors’ tenure ; SUBCOM: number of subcommittee on the board ;BODMEET: number of board meetings ; BODACT : ratio of outside directors attending board meetings ; AC : dummy variable indicating whether audit committee exists ; BIG :dummy variable indicating whether auditors are Big or not ; AUDITTEN : auditor’s tenure ;NONATFEE : dummy variable indicating existence of non-audit fees ; IND : variables indicating the industry the firm belongs to ; YEAR : variable indicating the year each observation belongs to. Based on the above regression model, Our main findings are as follows.
First, our results show that among managers’ characteristics considered, managers' ownership percentage, the existence of managers’ stock option compensation plan, and whether managers belong to Chaebol have positive associations with audit fees. As managers’ ownership percentage increases, the owner-manager may have incentives to manage earnings, which may increase control risk and thus increase audit fees. When there exists manager’s stock option compensation plan, the manager may have incentives to manipulate short-term earnings to maximize his own profits. This opportunistic financial reporting behavior of the manager may lead to increase in control risk and audit fees. It is difficult for managers belonging to Chaebol to criticize majority owners’ opportunistic reporting behaviors, which may lead to increase in both control risk and audit fees.
Secondly, this paper finds that among board characteristics considered, percentage of outside directors on board of directors, outside directors’ tenure, the number of subcommittees on the board, and the frequency of directors’ meeting are positively associated with audit fees.
To protect its reputation and avoid legal liability, a more independent, expert, and diligent board may demand higher audit quality. That is, consistent with foreign prior studies, the demand side effect of higher audit quality may dominate the supply side effect based on the audit risk model, which predicts a negative relation between effectiveness of board of directors and audit fees.
Thirdly, consistent with prior results, we find significant positive relations between audit fees and inherent risk factors such as total assets, receivables-to-total assets ratio, and loss dummy variable and significant negative associations between audit fees and inherent risk factors such as return on assets and debt-to-total assets ratio. We also find that the characteristics of the auditors such as Big auditor variable, auditor tenure and the existence of non-audit fees are positively associated with audit fees.
Our results add to the growing body of literature documenting association between management and corporate governance characteristics and audit fees, as well as to our systematic understanding of the determinants of audit fees. Our results can be used as a guide line in negotiating audit fees between auditors and clients, and can help the regulation body to control improper audit fee discounts in the audit service industry.

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