원자력산업 정책결정 과정과 발전에 나타난 멕시코 국가자율성과 국가능력 고찰: 1955-1990 (A Study of the State Autonomy and Capacity in the Development of Policy of Nuclear Power Industry and its Decision-Making Process in Mexico: 1955-1990)

서지정보

· 발행기관 : 한국외국어대학교 중남미연구소
· 수록지 정보 : 중남미연구 / 29권 / 2호 / 225 ~ 262페이지
· 저자명 : 하상섭

초록

This thesis seeks to understand the nuclear power policies and trends of the Mexico in the nuclear renaissance era and discuss about decision-making processes in this industry on the basis of concepts of 'state autonomy' and 'state capacity'. By looking into the history of Mexico’s nuclear power policy and status quo of their nuclear industry in depth, it is possible to see the changes made in the nuclear industry accordingly to national policy changes. Initiated in 1955, Mexico set forth an industry policy with unprecedented technological complexity and extremely difficult problems. The fact that in took almost 2o years to make the program for activating the Laguna Verde Nuclear Power Station as policy shows the nature of the problem. Mexico’s nuclear energy policy can be divided into 4 periods: initial nuclear energy policy formulating and agenda selection period (1955–1972); the Echeverria and Portillo administration’s nuclear energy industry implementation period (1972–1982); the de La Madrid administration’s policy crisis and commercial nuclear energy operation period (1983–1990); and up to the present is defined as nuclear energy management and new agenda selection period. The actual realization of Mexico’s nuclear industry started in the 1970s. In that period, nuclear energy rose as an alternative energy source due to the rise in international oil prices and the increase in domestic energy consumption, which meant more imports of oil. This naturally turned the spotlight to nuclear energy. In the starting point, Mexico chose to rely on and adopt foreign technology (mostly from the United States). Mexico also had no chose but to focus on commercial and peaceful use of nuclear energy because it was the leading nation of the 1967 Tlateloco Treaty which aimed to prevent nuclear proliferation. In 1967, the early part of the first period, Mexico’s Comisión Federal de Electricidad(CFE) commenced joint cooperation with the Stanford Research Institute(SRI) bearing in mind the possibility of constructing commercial nuclear energy facilities. However, the policy making process encountered obstacles from the beginning. Scientists (especially those of The National Nuclear Energy Commission) argued for investment in basic science before building nuclear power plants while the CFE’s strategy concentrated on quickly acquiring the know-how of nuclear power technology by importing a power plant from abroad. Such strategy of the CFE hindered the progress in Mexico’s nuclear power development profoundly. The turnkey-based construction of the nuclear power plant did not bring much benefit. Not only did Mexico fail to gain technological self-reliance, it also failed to become financially independent. In 1970 Mexico’s first nuclear power plant was funded by the World Bank, the export-import banks of the United States and Japan, and other sources of foreign capital. Moreover, internal and external conflicts blocked the way of Mexico’s nuclear power policy aiming for energy diversification, comparative advantage, transference of technology, and elevation of its international status. The Mexican government’s policy brought limitations of its national freedom. Nuclear energy development was delayed because of public opinion and internal conflicts of nuclear power agencies even in the 1980s. Although the official objective was consistently to obtain technological independence, Mexico still remained reliant on foreign technology even after Laguna Verde became operational. The situation was the same even in the 1990s. In addition, Mexico’s vision to become a technologically developed nation or a nuclear power nation only created disputes within the country and did not lead to progress. Laguna Verde became a lesson that shows how difficult it is for developing countries to earn technological self-reliance in nuclear energy. Indeed, there were many external factors that made Mexico to constantly depend on foreign technology and investment. Examples of these factors would be the Chernobyl incident, instability of the international oil market, Mexico’s susceptibility to foreign financial market, public opinion, problems of the policies carried out by the Mexican government with strong state autonomy and weak state capacity, and other structural factors that fundamentally did not allow self-reliance for Mexico in any aspect.

영어초록

This thesis seeks to understand the nuclear power policies and trends of the Mexico in the nuclear renaissance era and discuss about decision-making processes in this industry on the basis of concepts of 'state autonomy' and 'state capacity'. By looking into the history of Mexico’s nuclear power policy and status quo of their nuclear industry in depth, it is possible to see the changes made in the nuclear industry accordingly to national policy changes. Initiated in 1955, Mexico set forth an industry policy with unprecedented technological complexity and extremely difficult problems. The fact that in took almost 2o years to make the program for activating the Laguna Verde Nuclear Power Station as policy shows the nature of the problem. Mexico’s nuclear energy policy can be divided into 4 periods: initial nuclear energy policy formulating and agenda selection period (1955–1972); the Echeverria and Portillo administration’s nuclear energy industry implementation period (1972–1982); the de La Madrid administration’s policy crisis and commercial nuclear energy operation period (1983–1990); and up to the present is defined as nuclear energy management and new agenda selection period. The actual realization of Mexico’s nuclear industry started in the 1970s. In that period, nuclear energy rose as an alternative energy source due to the rise in international oil prices and the increase in domestic energy consumption, which meant more imports of oil. This naturally turned the spotlight to nuclear energy. In the starting point, Mexico chose to rely on and adopt foreign technology (mostly from the United States). Mexico also had no chose but to focus on commercial and peaceful use of nuclear energy because it was the leading nation of the 1967 Tlateloco Treaty which aimed to prevent nuclear proliferation. In 1967, the early part of the first period, Mexico’s Comisión Federal de Electricidad(CFE) commenced joint cooperation with the Stanford Research Institute(SRI) bearing in mind the possibility of constructing commercial nuclear energy facilities. However, the policy making process encountered obstacles from the beginning. Scientists (especially those of The National Nuclear Energy Commission) argued for investment in basic science before building nuclear power plants while the CFE’s strategy concentrated on quickly acquiring the know-how of nuclear power technology by importing a power plant from abroad. Such strategy of the CFE hindered the progress in Mexico’s nuclear power development profoundly. The turnkey-based construction of the nuclear power plant did not bring much benefit. Not only did Mexico fail to gain technological self-reliance, it also failed to become financially independent. In 1970 Mexico’s first nuclear power plant was funded by the World Bank, the export-import banks of the United States and Japan, and other sources of foreign capital. Moreover, internal and external conflicts blocked the way of Mexico’s nuclear power policy aiming for energy diversification, comparative advantage, transference of technology, and elevation of its international status. The Mexican government’s policy brought limitations of its national freedom. Nuclear energy development was delayed because of public opinion and internal conflicts of nuclear power agencies even in the 1980s. Although the official objective was consistently to obtain technological independence, Mexico still remained reliant on foreign technology even after Laguna Verde became operational. The situation was the same even in the 1990s. In addition, Mexico’s vision to become a technologically developed nation or a nuclear power nation only created disputes within the country and did not lead to progress. Laguna Verde became a lesson that shows how difficult it is for developing countries to earn technological self-reliance in nuclear energy. Indeed, there were many external factors that made Mexico to constantly depend on foreign technology and investment. Examples of these factors would be the Chernobyl incident, instability of the international oil market, Mexico’s susceptibility to foreign financial market, public opinion, problems of the policies carried out by the Mexican government with strong state autonomy and weak state capacity, and other structural factors that fundamentally did not allow self-reliance for Mexico in any aspect.

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