보험설계사 보수구조가 불완전판매에 미친 영향 (Effects of Insurance Agents’ Biased Incentive Scheme on Misselling Behavior)

서지정보

· 발행기관 : 한국금융학회
· 수록지 정보 : 금융연구 / 35권 / 2호 / 75 ~ 100페이지
· 저자명 : 정원석, 이경희

초록

본 논문에서는 보험설계사의 보수구조가 불완전판매에 미치는 영향을 생명보험 설계사의 보험상품판매현황 데이터를 활용하여 분석하였다. 보험설계사는 보험료가 높을수록, 저축성보험보다는보장성보험 판매 시 그리고 보험회사의 영업정책에 따른 보험료 환산율(초회보험료 대비 환산초회보험료 비율)이 높을수록 높은 보수를 받는다. 분석 결과 보수 지급률이 높은 보장성보험의판매비율이 높은 설계사에게서 불완전판매가 발생하는 경우가 많은 것으로 나타났다. 이러한분석 결과는 정보경제학에서 이론적으로 예측한 전문가의 자기이익을 위한 편향된 정보전달행위가 실제 보험판매에서 존재함을 보였다는 점에서 학술적 기여를 갖는다. 또한, 보험설계사의불완전판매 감소를 위한 보수설계에서 고려해야 할 사항에 대한 기초자료를 제공한다는 점에서정책적 의의를 가진다.

영어초록

Many communication(or Cheap Talk) game literature theoretically expected that experts could falsely recommend a product, called biased recommendation, to the decision-maker if the expert could get a higher payoff by selling the product than the others. If the decision-maker is aware of the biased incentive scheme of the expert he(or she) could discounts the recommendation and the communication is still possible. In the insurance market, insurance agents receive higher commissions when they sell protection-type insurance products than sell saving-type. So the agents have an incentive to the biased recommendation, such as laying, exaggerating of the benefits, to sell protect type insurance. From a financial supervisor’s perspective, those kinds of behaviors are considered misselling or incomplete sales.
In this paper, we analyze the insurance agents’ sales behavior using the individual sales data, including the amount of sales commission and the number of misselling or incomplete sales, belonging to a large life insurance company. We set up a hypothesis that the agents have an incentive to falsely recommend the protection type insurance product which gives a higher commission rate to earn more payoffs. In the data, there are about 4,000 insurance agents in the company. Most of them do not have any or very few, 2 or less, misselling records. However, some agents do have more than ten misselling records. We analyze the causal relationship between the number of misselling and the sales of the portion of protection-type insurance which incentive scheme using the negative binomial regression analysis. If the coefficient of the portion in the estimation model is statistically significant which means, if other conditions are the same, the insurance agent is more likely to falsely recommend when he/she sells the insurance.
Our empirical analysis results show that if the number of new sales contracts increases the number of misselling increases. the result also shows a statistically significant positive relationship between the portions of the sales of the protection-type product and the number of misselling. Our study shows that biased recommendation for the self-interest of experts, which is expected in the theoretical research, exists in the life insurance sales field. This paper provides evidence on a supervisory regulatory framework for the re-designing of insurance agents’ incentive schemes to reduce misselling incentives.

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