자율공시와 보수주의가 자기자본비용에 미치는 영향 (The Effect of Voluntary Disclosure and Conservatism on the Cost of Equity)

서지정보

· 발행기관 : 한국회계학회
· 수록지 정보 : 회계학연구 / 37권 / 1호 / 267 ~ 308페이지
· 저자명 : 정성환, 유승원

초록

본 연구는 악재성 정보의 자율공시와 보수주의 간의 상호작용이 자기자본비용에 어떠한 영향을 미치는지를 실증 분석하였다. 보수주의는 정보비대칭의 완화를 위해 자본시장 참여자들에 의해 요청되었지만, 선행연구의 결과에 의하면 보수적 회계처리는 자기자본비용을 감소시키지 못한다는 것으로 나타났다. 본 연구는 이러한 현상이 기업의 보수적 회계처리 정책에 대한 자본시장의 낮은 신뢰 수준에 기인할 것이라 예상하고, 보수주의가 자기자본비용의 감소로 이어지게 하기 위한 전제 조건으로서 악재성 정보의 자율공시를 통한 자본시장의 신뢰 구축을 제시하였다. 보수주의 회계처리와 악재성 정보의 자율공시는 기업의 재무상태에 부정적 영향을 미치는 정보를 적시에 알리려는 경영자의 보수적 정책이라는 점에서 공통점을 지니므로, 악재성 정보의 자율공시는 기업의 보수적 정책을 알리는 사전 정보로서의 역할을 수행하게 될 것이다. 사전 정보로서의 악재성 정보의 자율공시는 정보이용자가 보수주의의 정보효과를 보다 쉽게 인지하는데 도움을 주게 될 것이고, 기업의 보수적 정책의 일관성에 보다 높은 확신을 갖게 할 것이다. 나아가 이는 정보비대칭을 완화시켜 자기자본비용을 감소시키리라 예상한다. 실증분석 결과는 악재성 정보의 자율공시 빈도가 증가할수록 보수주의의 자기자본비용 감소효과가 증대되는 것으로 나타났다. 또한 악재성 정보의 자율공시와 보수주의의 상호작용 효과를 통제할 경우 이들 각각의 순수한 자기자본비용 감소효과는 미미한 것으로 드러났다. 이는 보수주의 회계처리와 악재성 정보의 자율공시를 통한 일관된 보수적 정책이 자본시장 참여자의 정보비대칭을 완화시키고, 자기자본비용을 감소시킬 수 있음을 의미한다. 본 연구는 자기자본비용에 대한 보수주의와 악재성 정보의 자율공시 간의 상호작용 효과를 확인하였다는 점에서 공헌점이 있다. 또한 일관된 정책을 통해 자기자본비용을 감소시킬 수 있음을 보임으로써 자본시장에서 신뢰를 획득하고, 이를 통해 자본조달비용을 감소시키려는 경영자에게 많은 시사점을 제공하고 있다.

영어초록

This paper examines the effects of the interaction between conditional conservatism and bad-news disclosure on the cost of equity. Prior literature shows that conservative accounting treatments do not decrease the cost of equity (Francis et al. 2004) although they are supposed to decrease information asymmetry in the market (Easley and O'Hara 2004). We claim that it may be a result of information users' lack of confidence on firms' conservative accounting choices. Conservative accounting choices increase earnings variations and reduces earnings persistence. Investors, who have no prior knowledge about firms' conservative accounting choices, may attribute low earnings persistence to low earnings quality, and hence, conservative accounting choices do not decrease the cost of equity as predicted by prior research.
We expect that information users' confidence level on conservative accounting choices can be improved if firms establish the financial market participants' trust by voluntarily releasing timely bad news. Both conservative accounting choices and voluntary disclosure of bad news are managers' policy choices of releasing information that may hurt firms' financial values. However, the voluntary release of bad news serves as a tool to pre-communicate the firms' commitment to conservative accounting treatments. Once the disclosure of bad news builds the information users' confidence on the firms' conservative accounting choices, firms' conservatism would be properly evaluated in the market, which, in turn, results in the lower cost of equity due to alleviating information asymmetry.
However, a one-time voluntary disclosure of bad news may not be enough to convey the firms' overall commitment to accounting conservatism to the market. The one-time release of bad news is likely to increase the cost of equity by increasing information asymmetry. Prior literature finds that the market participants' confidence on voluntary disclosure is a function of number of disclosures. Therefore, we expect that the extent to which conditional conservatism reduces cost of equity increases with the number of bad news disclosures. The paper's main results (Table 3 and Table 4) show that conditional conservatism decreases the cost of equity as the number of voluntary disclosure of bad news increases. However, after controlling the interaction between conservatism and the number of bad news disclosures, neither conservatism nor the bad news disclosure affects the cost of equity. It implies that voluntary disclosures of bad news play a role of conveying the firms' overall commitment to conservative accounting choices, and thus, make investors to discern accounting conservatism from volatile or low quality earnings. The results also show that the managers' consistent policy choices on both conservatism and the disclosures of bad news decrease information asymmetry in the market and the cost of equity.
In order to confirm our main results, we performed the additional tests by controlling the followings: (1) the contents of bad news by excluding the cases of insignificant bad news (Table 5), (2) the effect of fair disclosure rule by changing the test periods (table 6), (3) industry effect (Table 7), (4) earnings quality (Table 8), (5) the use of realized earnings instead of analysts' forecast (Table 9) and (6) recency effect (Table 12). Our main results are maintained qualitatively even after we control the above factors.
The paper contributes the literature by confirming the interactive effect of conservatism and voluntary disclosure policy on the cost of equity. Prior literature focuses on the effects of either conservatism or voluntary disclosure on the cost of equity. In contrast, we focus on the interaction effect between conditional conservatism and voluntary disclosure of bad news on the cost of equity. By observing the significant interaction effect between conditional conservatism and voluntary disclosure of bad news on the cost of equity, our evidence gives an answer to the question of why conservatism doesn't reduce the cost of equity. Our evidence shows that the positive effect of conservatism on the cost of equity may be realized only if the level of investors' confidence on the firms' conservative accounting policy is high.
We also provide useful insight to managers who want to reduce the cost of equity through the optimal choice of the disclosure policy. Our evidence shows that the consistent policy choices of conservatism and voluntary disclosure can reduce the cost of equity by improving the market participants' confidence on the firms' conservative accounting policy.

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