희귀금속 및 희토류의 전략성과 국가안전보장: 자원의 편재성과 희귀자원 확보정책의 관점에서 (The Strategy of Rare Earth Elements and National Security in terms of Maldistribution of Resources and Securing Rare Resources Policy)

서지정보

· 발행기관 : 한국국가정보학회
· 수록지 정보 : 국가정보연구 / 9권 / 1호 / 117 ~ 163페이지
· 저자명 : 김종호

초록

본고의 연구를 시작한 계기는 희귀금속 및 REE, 특히 희토류에 대한 세계적 동향의언론보도에 있다. 필자는 본고 집필 중에 상상 이상으로 전세계에 걸쳐 자원확보 전쟁이 어지럽게 발생하고 있다는 사실을 확인할 수 있었다. 특히 주요 공급원인 중국에서는 희토류 자원고갈, 환경보호 측면 및 밀수단속 등을 이유로 수출 면에서 제한적 경향이 나타나고 있어 향후 세계적으로 중국의 상황이 주목된다.
어떤 종류의 자원이 한 나라의 안보전략상 중요한 물자인지 여부, 부족한 양을 어느정도 충족시킬 것인가는 수요의 대상이 되는 자원의 공급량, 기술력, 국제정세와 시대배경과 같은 여러 요인으로 구성되어 있다고 생각한다. 과거 유럽의 석탄과 철광석에대해서는 그 이상의 분쟁을 회피할 수 있도록 공동관리 체제 하의 관련국들이 상생 공영하는 방안 현대식으로 말하면 Win-Win방향 설정이 이루어진 것은 잘 알려진 사실이다. 희귀금속 및 REE는 그 자체의 성질이나 그것들을 첨가함으로써 얻을 수 있는효과가 현재는 대체성이 거의 없을 정도로 다양한 고성능을 가진 것에서부터, 민생용도, 우리 생활주변의 폭넓은 기계 및 기구에 응용되었고 현대생활에서는 없어서는 안될 필수적인 소재이다.
본고는 그러한 자원의 전략성과 필요성이라는 점에 주목하면서 현대에서 발생하는희귀자원 문제에 대해서 그 안보적 측면과의 관계에서 분석하고 이러한 자원의 확보방안을 검토하였다. 자원문제는 상당히 널리 논의가 확대될 수 있는 가능성을 가진 것이지만, 본고에서는 특히 군사적 전략상 중요한 자원에 초점을 맞추고, 최근 주목받고 있는 희귀(희소)금속 및 희토류 금속(Rare Earth Elements, REE)에 대하여 논의하였다.

영어초록

Many Koreans received their first introduction to rare earth elements (REEs) in 2010, when the previously obscure commodities became the subjects of front-page headlines.
Amid news of an alleged Chinese embargo on REE exports and ensuing concerns over potential supply disruptions, the news-reading public suddenly realized that these raw materials underpin products they care about. REEs are no doubt important strategic materials, and for policymakers, China’s alleged 2010 embargo marked an important new chapter in China’s willingness to use its growing market strength to punctuate a geopolitical point. But the actual events that unfolded in the global REE market following the 2010 episode proved these initial concerns were just the newest entry in a long line of exaggerated fears and panics about leading economies’ access to raw materials.
Policymakers and industry executives voiced concern over the many high-tech products reliant on REEs-ranging from state defense systems to green technologies such as wind turbines and electric cars. Meanwhile, average Korean citizens not motivated by policy battles or supply-chain vulnerabilities wanted rare earth products to make their cell phones vibrate, their earphones sound perfect, and their gasoline a little cheaper. As the occasional story had noted for years, REEs are wonder materials. The central problem brought into sharp relief in 2010 was that China had cornered the supply.
If ever China were looking for natural resources that its political leaders could use to extract high profits and geopolitical leverage, rare earths appeared a near-perfect candidate. At the time of the alleged 2010 embargo, Chinese firms accounted for 97 percent of rare-earth oxide production and a large fraction of the processing business that turns these into rare earth metals, alloys, and products like magnets. This near-monopoly was in a market with surging demand and intense political resonance in consuming countries. And the most dependent countries-primarily Japan and the United States, but also several European stateshappened to be those over which China most wanted influence. Panicked policymakers in the United States and elsewhere began to consider extraordinary measures to protect their countries from potential Chinese leverage. But even with such apparently favorable circumstances, market power and political leverage proved fleeting and difficult to exploit.
Each crisis is different, but the largely successful market response in rare earths offers lessons for policymakers for the next crisis over raw materials imports. Future crises are unlikely to seem so perfectly orchestrated to make the Korea and its allies vulnerable: the materials in question may be more prosaic or the country where supplies are concentrated may loom less ominously than China. But even in the apparently most-dangerous case of rare earth elements, the problem rapidly faded-and not primarily due to government action.
In the 2000s, the United States came to depend on China for its supply of rare earth materials, and American consumers came to expect the high performance that those imports allowed in defense systems, consumer electronics, and the growing green economy. Experts projected only further growth in demand for rare earths, so when China ratcheted down its export quota and tried to use its leverage in this market to put political pressure on Japan, pundits and politicians feared the worst. Conditions seemed ideal for China to earn extra-high profits and to compel foreign policy concessions. Supply was extremely concentrated in China, consumer demand seemed large and inelastic, substitute products appeared markedly inferior in quality and price terms, and consumption of critical intermediate goods was focused in a few countries that were specifically the ones China wanted to target with its foreign policy. China may have won the immediate release of a fishing captain, but potential Chinese leverage dissipated rapidly thereafter.
The rare earths panic was an instructive test case. The broad lesson is that policymakers should not succumb to pressure to act too quickly or too expansively in the face of raw materials threats. The global economy constantly moves and adjusts, investing in supply diversification and innovation to alleviate potential bottlenecks. Governments should gratefully accept the help. The strategic risks and market opportunities are rarely perfectly matched-some strategic risks may well be real, and market failures may sometimes require a government role in the response.

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