공급사슬 네트워크에서 협상력을 고려한 의사결정 조정 방안에 관한 연구 (Coordinate Decisions Considering Bargaining Power in the Supply Chain Network)

서지정보

· 발행기관 : 한국경영과학회
· 수록지 정보 : 한국경영과학회지 / 45권 / 1호 / 61 ~ 75페이지
· 저자명 : 서용원, 차운아

초록

The bargaining power of a member in a supply chain is significantly affected by its network location. Bargaining power affects the sensitivity to incentives and penalties to the supply chain member. This behavioral bias is necessary for designing incentive and penalty functions to coordinate supply chain decisions for achieving global optimum. Thus, in this research, we propose a model to derive optimal incentive and penalty functions considering behavioral bias induced from the bargaining power. We model a supply chain network consisting of multiple tiers of members that make transactions with one another. Each member transacts with its partner, determining their level of effort in the transaction and affecting the demand and performance of the transaction. Members making transactions with multiple partners have the economy of scale by exploiting the flexibility in the efforts among partners and thus have a higher power. In this setting, we analyze the equilibrium and global optimum of members’ decisions and provide methods to design efficient incentive and penalty functions. Results show that considering the difference in sensitivity to incentives and penalties induced from the bargaining power in designing yields significantly improves the efficiency of coordination.

영어초록

The bargaining power of a member in a supply chain is significantly affected by its network location. Bargaining power affects the sensitivity to incentives and penalties to the supply chain member. This behavioral bias is necessary for designing incentive and penalty functions to coordinate supply chain decisions for achieving global optimum. Thus, in this research, we propose a model to derive optimal incentive and penalty functions considering behavioral bias induced from the bargaining power. We model a supply chain network consisting of multiple tiers of members that make transactions with one another. Each member transacts with its partner, determining their level of effort in the transaction and affecting the demand and performance of the transaction. Members making transactions with multiple partners have the economy of scale by exploiting the flexibility in the efforts among partners and thus have a higher power. In this setting, we analyze the equilibrium and global optimum of members’ decisions and provide methods to design efficient incentive and penalty functions. Results show that considering the difference in sensitivity to incentives and penalties induced from the bargaining power in designing yields significantly improves the efficiency of coordination.

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