한국과 미국의 공급사슬보안 생태계 비교 및 시사점 연구 (Supply Chain Security Ecosystem: Comparison between Korea and United States and Its Implication)

서지정보

· 발행기관 : 한국해운물류학회
· 수록지 정보 : 해운물류연구 / 32권 / 4호 / 663 ~ 688페이지
· 저자명 : 고현정

초록

2001년 미국에서 발생한 9/11 테러는 글로벌 공급사슬보안에 대한 관심을 부각시켰고, 최근 IS의 테러위협, 세월호 참사, 북한 핵위협 등의 국내 사회경제적 변화는 공급사슬보안(Supply Chain Security)의 중요성을 재조명하고 있다. 우리나라는 SCS 강화를 위해 AEO 프로그램을 도입하여 기업의 참여를 유도하고 있으나 참여율이 저조한 실정이다. 따라서 본 연구는 국가차원의 SCS 생태계를 점검하고 이를 활성화하는 방안을 모색하고자 하였다. 이를 위해 국가 SCS 생태계는 정부-민간과 기업-기업 관계로 구조화하고 게임이론을 적용하여 분석하였다. 분석 결과, AEO 인증의 비용부담이나 높은 평가기준으로 참여가 어려운 기업에게 협력을 통해 복수기업 단위로 인증을 획득할 수 있는 기회를 제공하고, 공급사슬 간 파트너의 통합 보안체계 구축을 활성화는 제도가 필요한 것으로 나타났다. 또한 상대적으로 테러위협에 취약한 물류기업의 인증프로그램 참여를 확대하고, 통관 관련 부처 간 협력 체계의 강화가 필요한 것으로 나타났다.

영어초록

After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks against the United States, attention to global supply chain security(SCS) has increased. In addition, recent socioeconomic changes in Korea such as its inclusion in a list of potential terrorist targets by Islamic State, the advancement of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, the Sewol ferry disaster, have prompted further review of SCS. In response, Korea has adopted the authorized economic operator(AEO) program. However, the rate of company participation to the AEO program is gradually shrinking. Therefore, this study aims to analyze whether the national SCS ecosystem is well formed and to determine methods to activate it. In particular, the study categorizes this ecosystem into government-private and company-company securities and uses game theory to analyze both.
The government–private security game deals with customs clearance of cargoes that is modeled according to queuing theory, while the interaction between government and the private sector is descried as a principal–agent Stakelberg game. The outcomes of the game indicate that a scheme to overcome the differences of financial burden on private parties for AEO certification costs, according to the characteristics of their scales and types, is required. The study suggests two schemes. First, the AEO certification program should be expanded to include multiple companies as one unit, which can provide an advantage for small businesses as it would allow them to cooperate to overcome the security certification cost and demanding standards. Second, cooperation between customs-related authorities should be strengthened to provide a one-stop customs clearance with effective benefits for private sectors.
The company–company security game is a three-player game dealing with interactions between manufacturers, logistics providers, and terrorists. In this game, manufacturers and logistics providers attempt to ensure their security by minimizing expected loss, while terrorists strive to maximize the probability of successful attacks. Thus, the strategies of the supply chain against terrorist attacks can be considered in terms of distributed or centralized. The outcomes of the game are follows. First, a measure to overcome the relative terror vulnerability of logistics providers compared to manufacturers is required: A national specialized logistics security program is required in which most logistics providers can participate regardless of their size and type. Second, a policy should be framed to integrate security activities of the supply chain so as to minimize national security costs without adversely impacting national security.
Thus, this study’s significance is that it quantitatively shows that it is necessary to overcome the weakness of the current AEO program in order to vitalize the national SCS ecosystem, in accordance with the characteristics of business scale and type. In this way, the AEO program can encourage voluntary participation from private sector entities of various sizes and types, thereby enhancing the level of national security while minimizing related costs.

참고자료

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