외부감사인 강제교체에 따른 보수주의 성향 (Mandatory Auditor Changes and Conservatism)

서지정보

· 발행기관 : 한국경영학회
· 수록지 정보 : 경영학연구 / 40권 / 5호 / 1211 ~ 1246페이지
· 저자명 : 김선미, 유승원

초록

본 연구는 2006년에서 2008년에 감사인을 강제교체한 기업과 자율교체한 기업에 대한 감사인의 보수성의 차이를 실증분석 하였다. 감사인의 보수성은 재무보고의 보수성에 영향을 미치는 요인으로(Chung et al. 2003; Ruddock et al.
2006) 감사인 강제교체 제도의 시행이 강제교체/자율교체 기업의 재무보고의 보수성에 영향을 미칠 것으로 판단된다.
감사인 강제교체 기업과 자율교체 기업의 감사인 보수성의 차이를 비교하기 위하여 본 연구는 Penman and Zhang (2002)의 보수주의 측정치를 사용하였다. 또한 본 연구의 강건성을 위하여 추가적으로 Beaver and Ryan(2000), Basu (1997), 그리고 Ball and Shivakumar(2005)의 모형을 사용하였다. Penman and Zhang(2002) 모형의 분석결과,감사인 강제교체 기업의 감사인이 자율교체 기업의 감사인보다 덜 보수적인 것으로 나타났다. 또한 Beaver and Ryan (2000)의 모형, Basu(1997)의 이익지속성 모형, 그리고 Ball and Shivakumar(2005)의 모형도 강제교체 감사인이자율교체 감사인 보다 덜 보수적임을 보였다. 이러한 결과는 자율교체의 경우 경영자와의 마찰로 인하여 감사인이 교체되었을 가능성이 존재하는 반면에, 강제교체의 경우에는 강제교체제도에 의하여 감사인을 교체해야만 하는 상황에서 교체되었으므로 강제교체 감사인은 자율교체 감사인보다 낮은 수준의 감사위험에 노출되어 있기 때문인 것으로 해석된다.
추가적으로 Penman and Zhang(2002)의 모형을 사용하여 주권상장기업과 코스닥등록법인을 구분하여 분석한 결과 코스닥등록법인에 대해서만 강제교체 감사인이 자율교체 감사인보다 덜 보수적임을 보였다. 또한 감사인 강제교체 기업과유지기업의 보수주의 성향을 Penman and Zhang(2002) 모형을 이용하여 분석한 결과, 감사인 강제교체 기업과 유지기업간의 감사인 보수성에 유의한 차이가 있다는 일관된 결론을 얻을 수 없었다.
본 연구의 결과는 강제교체 감사인과 자율교체 감사인의 보수주의 성향을 비교하여 강제교체 제도에 따라 감사인이 강제교체 되는 경우 자율교체 감사인과는 다른 감사성향을 보일 수 있음을 제시하였다는 점에서 의미가 있다.

영어초록

We investigate the relationship between auditor conservatism and auditor changes. In specific,we explore whether the mandatory or voluntary auditor changes affect auditor conservatism during the sample period of 2006-2008.
Auditor selection mechanism has been switched from the auditor assignment rule to the market competition rule in 1982, in order to improve the quality of financial information. However,the market competition rule is criticized for impairing auditor independence due to increased pressure on auditors who want a long-term audit engagement. In 2006, the Korean regulatory body introduces the mandatory auditor rotation rule which firms have to switch their incumbent auditors to new auditors if they are audited by the same auditors during the last 6 years. The rule intends to protect auditor independence. It is believed that auditors can maintain auditor independence because the mandatory auditor rotation rule provides the lower quasi-rent for new auditors (DeAngelo 1981; Geiger and Raghunandan 2002).
Prior literature shows that the voluntary auditor changes under the market competition rule may affect the new auditors' audit decisions. In particular, the newly hired auditors prefer more conservative accounting treatments in order to reduce audit failure risks stemming from information asymmetry between the auditors and the new clients (Shin et al. 2007). Since the mandatory audit rotation rule allows the client firms freely choose the new auditors, the mandatorily changed auditors may face the identical audit risks faced by the voluntarily changed auditors. That is, regardless of the mandatory or voluntary changes, the newly hired auditors may ask more conservative accounting treatments in order to alleviate the audit risks from their lack of experiences with and knowledge of the new clients. On the contrary, the mandatorily changed auditors' audit risks may be different from the voluntarily changed audits' risks. While Dhaliwal et al. (1993) and Jenkins and Velury (2008)show that some firms have an incentive to voluntarily change their incumbent auditors to increase the reported earnings (i.e., earnings management), the firms that have to change their incumbent auditors due to the mandatory auditor rotation rule may not have an earnings management incentive. In other words, voluntarily changed auditors are likely to be more conservative for new client rather than mandatorily changed auditors, because auditors with voluntarily changes may face high audit risk that may cause the negative effect on the investors'decision (Hackenbrack and Hogan 2002). This argument leads to our hypothesis that the level of conservatism is lower when the firms change the incumbent auditors mandatorily than when they change the auditors voluntarily.
Our model first uses the Penman and Zhang's (2002) conservative measure. The results show that the C score and the Q score of the mandatorily changed auditors are lower than the voluntarily changed auditors: The coefficient for the dummy variable of the mandatory auditor change (MAN) is significantly negative at least 1% level in Penman and Zhang's (2002) measure.
We further use the Beaver and Ryan(2000), Basu's (1997) and Ball and Shivakumar's (2005)models for the conservatism measure. The results confirm that the new mandatorily changed auditors are less conservative than the voluntarily changed auditors. These results support the argument that the mandatorily changed auditors evaluate their audit risks lower than the voluntarily changed auditors' risks because the mandatory auditor changes are not occurred for the earnings management purpose and/or the newly hired auditors can research potential clients' business situations in advance.
Additionally, we examine the Penman and Zhang's (2002) conservative measure of the mandatorily and voluntarily changed auditors between KOSPI-listed firms and KOSDAQ-listed firms. We find that the new mandatorily changed auditors are less conservative than the voluntarily changed auditors only for KOSDAQ-listed firms. We also compare the Penman and Zhang's (2002) conservatism measures of the mandatorily changed auditors and the retained auditors.
It shows that there is no significant difference in the conservatism measures between two groups. This result ascertains the argument that the mandatory auditor rotation does not have any impacts compared to the auditor retention case (Rho 2009).
This paper contributes to the literature of the mandatory auditor rotation by showing the significant differences in conservatism between mandatory and voluntary auditor changes. It also provides a policy implication on the auditors' contract termination rights, which are adopted in 2009, by showing the conservatism differences between the auditor changed by the external factors (i.e., the mandatory auditor rotation rule) and by the managers' voluntary decision makings.

참고자료

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