미국 M&A 비정상수익률에 영향을 끼치는 변수 분석 / Determinants of Market reaction to M&A event study in U.S.

목차

1. Overview
2. Determinants of Market reaction to Merger and acquisition
3. Data sources and Methodology
4. Empirical analysis
5. Robustness

본문내용

1. Overview
I study how deal, bidder, and firm characteristics are associated with the bidder and target firms’ stock price reaction to merger and acquisition based on 5,407 events from 1980 to June 2016. Consistent with the literature, bidders, on average, experience -1.2% while shareholders of target firms enjoy 21.2% during one day before and one day after announcement date. In addition to the characteristics considered in the literature, I also study how M&A history of bidders are related to the market reaction. The empirical analysis shows that M&A history positively affects both bidder and target firms returns. Overall, the characteristics have predicted coefficient signs and robust to year fixed effect, idiosyncratic risk, illiquidity control, and other benchmark models to calculate normal returns.

2. Determinants of Market reaction to Merger and acquisition
In this section, I briefly explain the deal, bidder, and target characteristics considered in this paper which can potentially explain the market reaction to the takeover based on the literature.

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