토마스 아퀴나스의 영혼-원동자 이론 비판의 이중적 성격 -신학대전 1부 76문 1항의 “principium intellectivum” 개념 재검토- (Duplex Character of Thomas Aquinas’s Critique Against Soul-Mover Theory: “Principium intellectivum” in Summa Theologiae, Ia, q.76, a.1, co. Revisited)

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초록

It is a difficult task to determine the exact coverage of the term “principium intellectivum” used in Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae, Ia, q.76, a.1, co. And it becomes more challenging when this term is coupled with his seemingly indifferent usage of “intellectus” and “anima intellectiva,” because this indifference seems to undermine the central thesis of the Thomistic theory of soul: the distinction between intellective soul and intellect. However, thanks to some eminent medievalists of the Twentieth century, we can at least comfortably settle some difficulties and doubts relative to Thomas’s lifelong consistency on the distinction between the two. It remains however uncertain of the reason why he has used such an expansive or ambiguous term like “principium intellectivum” which can entail some serious misunderstandings concerning his famous distinction between “intellectus”, and “anima intellectiva.” Apropos of this uncertainty, some have suggested taking the terminology in question as “une façon de parler.” However, even though we admit that this could be one of the safest ways to account for the uncertainty therein, we cannot but confess that it is not completely satisfactory. That is why we have attempted in this paper a strong reading on Thomas’s critique against the soul-mover theory in Summa Theologiae, Ia, q.76, a.1. in the context of the medieval controversy over unicity or plurality of substantial form. In this processus, we could find a possible way to interpret that this critique has double objectives and that Thomas serves, before he addresses his full-dress refutations in q, 76 aa. 2-4, the term “principium intellectivum” to set a preliminary critique against his opponents in two camps: the Latin Averroists and the Pluralists. In this line of interpretation, we could conclude that the seemingly indifferent usage of Thomistic terms “intellectus” and “anima intellectiva” are not “une façon de parler,” but “une façon strategique de parler” in strict consistency with his central thesis of the distinction between intellect and intellective soul.

영어초록

It is a difficult task to determine the exact coverage of the term “principium intellectivum” used in Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae, Ia, q.76, a.1, co. And it becomes more challenging when this term is coupled with his seemingly indifferent usage of “intellectus” and “anima intellectiva,” because this indifference seems to undermine the central thesis of the Thomistic theory of soul: the distinction between intellective soul and intellect. However, thanks to some eminent medievalists of the Twentieth century, we can at least comfortably settle some difficulties and doubts relative to Thomas’s lifelong consistency on the distinction between the two. It remains however uncertain of the reason why he has used such an expansive or ambiguous term like “principium intellectivum” which can entail some serious misunderstandings concerning his famous distinction between “intellectus”, and “anima intellectiva.” Apropos of this uncertainty, some have suggested taking the terminology in question as “une façon de parler.” However, even though we admit that this could be one of the safest ways to account for the uncertainty therein, we cannot but confess that it is not completely satisfactory. That is why we have attempted in this paper a strong reading on Thomas’s critique against the soul-mover theory in Summa Theologiae, Ia, q.76, a.1. in the context of the medieval controversy over unicity or plurality of substantial form. In this processus, we could find a possible way to interpret that this critique has double objectives and that Thomas serves, before he addresses his full-dress refutations in q, 76 aa. 2-4, the term “principium intellectivum” to set a preliminary critique against his opponents in two camps: the Latin Averroists and the Pluralists. In this line of interpretation, we could conclude that the seemingly indifferent usage of Thomistic terms “intellectus” and “anima intellectiva” are not “une façon de parler,” but “une façon strategique de parler” in strict consistency with his central thesis of the distinction between intellect and intellective soul.

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