퇴계 리발(理發)설의 수반론적 해명 ― 고봉과의 사단칠정 논변을 중심으로 ― (Toegye's Conception of li-fa(理發) Explained fromthe Theory of Supervenience)

서지정보

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· 저자명 : 이승환

초록

퇴계의 리발(理發) 설은 조선유학 연구자들에게 가장 뚫기 어려운 관문이라 할 수 있다. 퇴계가 ‘리발’설을 제기하고 율곡이 이를 비판한 이래, 450여 년에 걸쳐 리발(理發)은 리동(理動) · 리도(理到)와 더불어 조선유학의 풀리지 않은 공안(公案)으로 전해져왔다. 율곡 계열의 학자들은 퇴계가 ‘리’의 무위(無爲)를 부정하고 활물(活物)로 여겼다고 비판하는 한편, 퇴계의 후학들은 선사(先師)의 설을 옹호하기 위해 갖가지 추가적 설명을 보태왔다. 현대의 조선유학 연구자들 또한 아직까지도 ‘리의 능동성’ 테제를 붙들고 씨름 중이다.
퇴계의 ‘리발’ 명제와 관련하여, 본고에서는 다음과 같은 세 단계의 논증을 통하여 ‘리발’ 명제가 결코 ‘리의 능동성’을 뜻하지 않는다는 점을 주장하고자 한다. 첫째, 주자가 ‘리발’을 말하지 않았다는 기존의 억측과 달리 주자는 ‘리발’에 관한 수많은 언급을 남겼으며, 주자의 ‘리발’은 수반이론(superveniance theory)을 전제로 하고 있다는 점을 밝힐 것이다. 둘째, 퇴계의 리발·기발 주장에 사용된 리·기 개념은 마음 안에 간직된 심리적 속성(또는 성향)으로서 ‘리’적 성향(본연지성)과 ‘기’적 성향(기질지성)을 의미하며, ‘리발’과 ‘기발’의 발(發) 자는 결코 운동(motion)의 의미가 아니라 심리적 속성(또는 성향)의 실현(actualization) 또는 예화(exemplification)의 의미임을 밝힐 것이다. 이 두 단계의 논증을 통해 퇴계의 ‘리발’설이 ‘리’의 능동성을 의미하지 않는다는 점이 밝혀지게 될 것이다.
본고에서는 ‘리의 능동성’ 테제를 반증하는데 그치지 않고, 한 걸음 더 나아가 퇴계­고봉 간 사단칠정 논변에 개입된 핵심 의제 중의 하나가 수반이론이라는 점을 밝히고, 퇴계의 리발(理發)설과 고봉의 리동(理動)설 또한 수반이론에 기초해있음을 밝히고자 한다. 퇴계의 ‘리발’설이 수반이론에 기초해있다는 사실이 논증된다면, 기존 연구자들이 주장해온 ‘리의 능동성’ 테제는 퇴계사상의 독창성을 드러내기보다 오히려 퇴계의 성향이론과 감정이론을 붕괴시키는 걸림돌이 될 것이다. 이러한 세 단계의 논증을 통해, 과거 450여 년간 퇴계의 ‘리발’을 ‘리의 능동성’으로 해석해오던 관행은 이제는 폐기되어야 할 ‘오해’임을 밝히는데 본 논문의 최종 목적이 있다.

영어초록

For Korean Neo-Confucian scholars, Toegye's argument of 'issuance of li''(li-fa 理發) has been regarded most difficult to understand. Toegye, in the process of debate with Gobong on the moral psychological issue of the origin of four beginnings(四端) and seven feelings(七情), proposed an argument that “Four beginning are the issuance of li, and seven feelings are the issuance of ch'i.” After Toegye's passing away, Yulgok started to provoke a severe criticism on Toegye's argument of the ‘issuance of li.’ From this on, between Toegye school and Yulgok school, regarding the subject of ‘issuance of li,’ mutual criticism has been continued for more than four hundred years. Even contemporary Neo-Confucian scholars of Korea still are struggling with each other on the very subject of ‘issuance of li.’Most of contemporary Korean scholars interpret Toegye's argument of the ‘issuance of li'’ in terms of ‘activeness of li’ or ‘creativeness of li.’ The aim of this paper is to analyse the correct meaning of the statement, ‘issuance of li'’ from a viewpoint of philosophy of psychology. In this paper, I tried to prove that Toegye's conception of li-fa, instead of meaning ‘the activeness of li,’ or ‘creativeness of li,’ actually means ‘the manifestation of li'’ on the presupposition that li is the mental property or disposition which is equipped in human mind.
My demonstration is composed of two steps. Firstly, I prove that li, in Zhu Xi's philosophical scheme, does not contain the very attribute of activeness or creativeness. In Zhu Xi's ontological scheme, li manifests through the ontological mechanism of supervenience. In other words, li supervenes on ch'i, just like a person rides on a horse. What is active or movable is only the ch'i but not the li, just like what is running is the horse but not the riding person.
Secondly, I prove that Toegye's argument of ‘issuance of li'’ actually is based on a theory of supervenience just as Zhu Xi's theory of li and ch'i. For Toegye, li designates moral disposition which belongs to a mental property, and ch'i designates appetitive disposition which also belongs to mental property. Li, as well as ch'i, as a mental property, in order to be realized, necessarily requires a supervenience base. For Toegye, the concept of ch'i plays a double function; one as an appetitive disposition which belongs to a mental property, the other as a supervenience base which belongs to a physical property. The double meaning of ch'i actually was the main source that caused so much confusion and trouble for Choseon Neo-Confucian scholars.
As a conclusion, Toegye's argument can be reconstructed as the following form: “Four beginnings are the exemplification of li (which is a mental property) through supervening on the supervenience base ch'i* (which is a physical property); while seven feelings are the exemplification of ch'i (which is a mental property) by supervening on the supervenience base, ch'i* (which is a physical property).”Through the above demonstration, we can clearly understand that Toegye's argument of ‘issuance of li'’ is based on a theory of supervenience. After all, Toegye's argument of ‘issuance of li'’ can never imply the meaning of ‘creativeness of li’ or ‘activeness of li.’ Through the analysis of Toegye's argument, we can newly find that the 16th century Choseon Neo-Confucian scholars already knew how to apply the theory of supervenience to explain the ontological mechanism of issuance of disposition (as a mental property) in relation with it's supervenience base which is a physical property. It is surprising that, while the concept of supervenience has appeared so late as in the middle of 20th century in the West, Toegye and Gobong, who lived in the 16th century Choseon, already knew how to employ the concept of supervenience in their moral-psychological debate. I think here lies the real originality of Toegye's scholarlship.

참고자료

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