太宗代 節制使･牌頭와 중앙군의 지휘 (Command of the central army through Chŏljesa and P’aedu during the reign of king T’aejong)

서지정보

· 발행기관 : 고려사학회
· 수록지 정보 : 韓國史學報 / 39호 / 77 ~ 108페이지
· 저자명 : 이재훈

초록

As invasion of Waegu(Japanese pirate raiders) and Honggŏnjŏk(a group of thieves in the late Yuan dynasty) continued while military system was disintegrating at the end of Koryŏ Dynasty, Nongmin Siwigun(an army composed of ordinary farmers who served in the capital occasionally, in rotation) was organized and supplemented and its temporary commander, Wŏnsu, was established to strengthen its military power. With this system established, military system was able to acquire its basic features. However with nation's administrative structure in paralysis, Wŏnsus began to exercise their right of requisition over soldiers and soon each state's forces became subordinate to Wŏnsu.
Being able to acquire the initiative after the Wihwado Withdrawal, Lee Sŏng-gye's faction undermined and limited the Wŏnsu's command by establishing Chŏljesa and made a decision to return soldiers to each state. But they were unable to completely eradicate the private relationship between soldiers and Chŏljesa, and this situation continued through the establishment of Chosŏn Dynasty.
However in the september of the 2nd year of King T’aejo, as the powerful military command center, Ŭihŭngsamgunbu, was established with its P’ansa as Jŏng Do-jŏn, serious decisions were made to limit the power of Chŏljesa. Especially Chinbŏb Training, which subjected regional army as well as central army, met with tremendous backlash and did not produce much results. Even so, excess reforming of military structure such as abolition of Siwip’ae in the August of the 7th year of King T’aejo ultimately became one of the important basis for the 'Rebellion of the Prince.'After the chaos that followed the 'First Rebellion of the Prince', Chŏljesa's power during the reign of King Chŏngjong was permitted to be almost as strong as that of during the reign of King T’aejo. In this situation, the reason for fundamental change was when T’aejong took over the reign. Right before T’aejong took over, on April of the 2nd year of King Chŏngjong, T’aejong abolished Chŏljesa that had strong commanding authority and established Ch’ongje. However, because of the confusion among chain of command this incident created, central army's ultimate commander became Kyŏm Ch’ongje and Kyŏm Sanghogun and then finally came into the jurisdiction of Chŏljesa in July of the 12th year of King T’aejong.
Chŏljesa during the reign of King T’aejong commanded its forces and had a duty to perform Ipchik(taking one's turn in office during night duty) and Sunjak(patrol during night). In principle, they were supposed to be appointed to the branch of army such as Naegŭmwi, Pyŏlsiwi and Ŭngyangwi. But they were not appointed to certain branches as Pangp’ae or Sŏpyuksip. At the time, those Chŏljesa who were appointed to Samgun or each Wi were judged to be improving efficiency of administration and followed idea of central army divided into Samgun, Chunggundoch’ongjebu, Chwagundoch’ongjebu, Ugundoch’ongjebu thus appointed accordingly. Also, for each position, 2~3 people were appointed and Ijo managed this.
However, the command of Chŏljesa during the reign of King T’aejong was very limited compared to highest command of central command before the change. Not only were the right of personal administration such as selecting soldiers was limited, but separate Chŏljesa was appointed to Kangmu(military training through hunting) and Haenghaeng(the king leaving the palace). This change was in line with newly established army's chain of command in October of the 9th year of King T’aejong and more detailed explanation appears in Ch’wigakryŏng, emergency call-up training.
Ch’wigakryŏng is very similar to modern military's preliminary training. But Ch’wigakryŏng is not a simple emergency call-up training. As king himself mobilized the forces and appointed the general who commands these forces, central army learned and adapted to newly established chain of command. Therefore Ch’wigakryŏng confirmed the king as a true commander of the armed forces. As such, T’aejong appointed Chŏljesa as the central army's commander and limited his command to disallow him to take over. Through Ch’wigakryŏng soldiers learned the chain of command by repetition and affirmed who really was the head of the armed force.
On the other hand, after the foundation of Chosŏn Dynasty, commanders of central army consisted of Samgun-10Wi system were appointed so that each Ryŏng was appointed with one Janggun, who were later called Hogun. But according to the record of 'Rebellion of Prince' on August of the 7th year of King T’aejo, It was P’aedu who commanded the Gapsa not Janggun. The reason why Gapsa was subordinate to P’ae and was commanded by P’aedu was because at the time central army's Samgun-10Wi system was not fairly organized and was affiliated with Ŭihŭngch’ingunwi. Thus Ŭihŭngch’ingunwi was to be part of 10Wi but as it was the case of Lee Seong-Gye's force at the end of Koryŏ Dynasty, they were similarly organized along the line of P’ae. And this practice of P’aedu commanding not only Gapsa, but also Pyŏlsiwi and Naegŭmwi continued through the reign of King Chŏngjong to King T’aejong.
P’aedu means the head of P’ae and they were in practice of the commanders of those soldiers who were under P’ae. Except on special occasions, Sanghogun and Daehogun were appointed and when Byŏngjo recommended three candidates, the king himself selected one among the three. Although the method of how P’aedu was selected during the reign of King T’aejo cannot be verified, considering the fact that Chŏljesa controlled its subordinate units, P’aedu were commanded by Chŏljesa regardless of how they were appointed. However, as central army reform was proceeded during the reign of King T’aejong, central army commander's power continued to diminish. But T’aejong kept using his power to appoint P’aedu and was thus able to control central army more than King T’aejo could during his reign.
As such, during the early days of Chosŏn, central army were formulated during the reign of King T’aejong as: King-Chŏljesa- P’aedu-soldiers. T’aejong had to endure through two incidents of "Rebellion of Price", and showed profound understanding of management of central army and commanding role. Before his time, he attempted to limit the rights of the commanders and put forces under the direct command of the king. But he was able to successfully reorganize the chain of command after series of small changes during his reign. This command system of central army continued to the reign of King Sejo without significant changes and even affected 5Wi command system immensely.

영어초록

As invasion of Waegu(Japanese pirate raiders) and Honggŏnjŏk(a group of thieves in the late Yuan dynasty) continued while military system was disintegrating at the end of Koryŏ Dynasty, Nongmin Siwigun(an army composed of ordinary farmers who served in the capital occasionally, in rotation) was organized and supplemented and its temporary commander, Wŏnsu, was established to strengthen its military power. With this system established, military system was able to acquire its basic features. However with nation's administrative structure in paralysis, Wŏnsus began to exercise their right of requisition over soldiers and soon each state's forces became subordinate to Wŏnsu.
Being able to acquire the initiative after the Wihwado Withdrawal, Lee Sŏng-gye's faction undermined and limited the Wŏnsu's command by establishing Chŏljesa and made a decision to return soldiers to each state. But they were unable to completely eradicate the private relationship between soldiers and Chŏljesa, and this situation continued through the establishment of Chosŏn Dynasty.
However in the september of the 2nd year of King T’aejo, as the powerful military command center, Ŭihŭngsamgunbu, was established with its P’ansa as Jŏng Do-jŏn, serious decisions were made to limit the power of Chŏljesa. Especially Chinbŏb Training, which subjected regional army as well as central army, met with tremendous backlash and did not produce much results. Even so, excess reforming of military structure such as abolition of Siwip’ae in the August of the 7th year of King T’aejo ultimately became one of the important basis for the 'Rebellion of the Prince.'After the chaos that followed the 'First Rebellion of the Prince', Chŏljesa's power during the reign of King Chŏngjong was permitted to be almost as strong as that of during the reign of King T’aejo. In this situation, the reason for fundamental change was when T’aejong took over the reign. Right before T’aejong took over, on April of the 2nd year of King Chŏngjong, T’aejong abolished Chŏljesa that had strong commanding authority and established Ch’ongje. However, because of the confusion among chain of command this incident created, central army's ultimate commander became Kyŏm Ch’ongje and Kyŏm Sanghogun and then finally came into the jurisdiction of Chŏljesa in July of the 12th year of King T’aejong.
Chŏljesa during the reign of King T’aejong commanded its forces and had a duty to perform Ipchik(taking one's turn in office during night duty) and Sunjak(patrol during night). In principle, they were supposed to be appointed to the branch of army such as Naegŭmwi, Pyŏlsiwi and Ŭngyangwi. But they were not appointed to certain branches as Pangp’ae or Sŏpyuksip. At the time, those Chŏljesa who were appointed to Samgun or each Wi were judged to be improving efficiency of administration and followed idea of central army divided into Samgun, Chunggundoch’ongjebu, Chwagundoch’ongjebu, Ugundoch’ongjebu thus appointed accordingly. Also, for each position, 2~3 people were appointed and Ijo managed this.
However, the command of Chŏljesa during the reign of King T’aejong was very limited compared to highest command of central command before the change. Not only were the right of personal administration such as selecting soldiers was limited, but separate Chŏljesa was appointed to Kangmu(military training through hunting) and Haenghaeng(the king leaving the palace). This change was in line with newly established army's chain of command in October of the 9th year of King T’aejong and more detailed explanation appears in Ch’wigakryŏng, emergency call-up training.
Ch’wigakryŏng is very similar to modern military's preliminary training. But Ch’wigakryŏng is not a simple emergency call-up training. As king himself mobilized the forces and appointed the general who commands these forces, central army learned and adapted to newly established chain of command. Therefore Ch’wigakryŏng confirmed the king as a true commander of the armed forces. As such, T’aejong appointed Chŏljesa as the central army's commander and limited his command to disallow him to take over. Through Ch’wigakryŏng soldiers learned the chain of command by repetition and affirmed who really was the head of the armed force.
On the other hand, after the foundation of Chosŏn Dynasty, commanders of central army consisted of Samgun-10Wi system were appointed so that each Ryŏng was appointed with one Janggun, who were later called Hogun. But according to the record of 'Rebellion of Prince' on August of the 7th year of King T’aejo, It was P’aedu who commanded the Gapsa not Janggun. The reason why Gapsa was subordinate to P’ae and was commanded by P’aedu was because at the time central army's Samgun-10Wi system was not fairly organized and was affiliated with Ŭihŭngch’ingunwi. Thus Ŭihŭngch’ingunwi was to be part of 10Wi but as it was the case of Lee Seong-Gye's force at the end of Koryŏ Dynasty, they were similarly organized along the line of P’ae. And this practice of P’aedu commanding not only Gapsa, but also Pyŏlsiwi and Naegŭmwi continued through the reign of King Chŏngjong to King T’aejong.
P’aedu means the head of P’ae and they were in practice of the commanders of those soldiers who were under P’ae. Except on special occasions, Sanghogun and Daehogun were appointed and when Byŏngjo recommended three candidates, the king himself selected one among the three. Although the method of how P’aedu was selected during the reign of King T’aejo cannot be verified, considering the fact that Chŏljesa controlled its subordinate units, P’aedu were commanded by Chŏljesa regardless of how they were appointed. However, as central army reform was proceeded during the reign of King T’aejong, central army commander's power continued to diminish. But T’aejong kept using his power to appoint P’aedu and was thus able to control central army more than King T’aejo could during his reign.
As such, during the early days of Chosŏn, central army were formulated during the reign of King T’aejong as: King-Chŏljesa- P’aedu-soldiers. T’aejong had to endure through two incidents of "Rebellion of Price", and showed profound understanding of management of central army and commanding role. Before his time, he attempted to limit the rights of the commanders and put forces under the direct command of the king. But he was able to successfully reorganize the chain of command after series of small changes during his reign. This command system of central army continued to the reign of King Sejo without significant changes and even affected 5Wi command system immensely.

참고자료

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