아리스토텔레스의 자제력 없음과 욕망 간의 갈등 (Aristotle on Akrasia and Conflicts of Desires)

서지정보

· 발행기관 : 한국서양고전학회
· 수록지 정보 : 서양고전학연구 / 59권 / 2호 / 85 ~ 113페이지
· 저자명 : 김태훈

초록

본 연구의 목표는 『니코마코스 윤리학』 7권에서 다루어지는 자제력 없음의 문제를 욕망 간의 갈등과 욕망의 현실화를 중심으로 하는 동물 운동의 발생 과정에 비추어 탐구하는 것이다. 아리스토텔레스는 자제력 없음을 좋다고 생각하는 것을 추구하는 바람과 신체적인 즐거움을 좇는 욕구 간의 갈등으로 이해한다. 그리고 『동물운동론』에 따르면 대상에 대한 인지를 계기로 현실화한 욕망은 상응하는 행위를 낳는 동기부여 과정을 구성한다. 이를 고려하면 두 욕망이 갈등한다는 것은 경쟁하는 두 동기부여 과정이 진행된다는 것을 의미한다. 두 동기부여 과정의 충돌은 다시금 『니코마코스 윤리학』 10권에서 소개되는 소위 ‘피리 사례’를 통해 탐구된다. 이 사례에서 하나의 활동은 다른 활동에 동반하는 이질적인 즐거움에 의해 파괴된다. 이 외래적인 요인은 그 활동에 선행하는 행위자의 인지나 욕망을 수정하지 않고, 다만 행위자의 신체를 변화시킴으로써 경쟁 관계에 있는 동기부여 과정을 무력화시킨다. 이와 동일한 과정이 내적 갈등으로부터 하나의 행위를 산출하는 자제력 없음에 적용될 수 있으며, 따라서 자제력 없는 사람의 이성적인 욕망이나 판단도 자제력 없는 행위가 발생하는 과정에서 훼손되지 않았다는 것이 본 논문의 결론이다.

영어초록

The goal of this paper is to reconstruct the problem of akrasia in the Nicomachean Ethics Ⅶ in terms of two conflicting desires and their corresponding motivational processes.
One of the most discussed texts where problem of akrasia is dealt with in the Nicomachean Ethics is the third chapter of its seventh book. Due to the difficulties of identifying the proper examples of akrasia, understanding the meaning of “practical syllogism” and harmonizing arguments through the whole book, the text has brought about a lot of controversy. To find a stable foundation for further discussions over the text, I suggest focusing on a less controversial feature of the phenomenon: an akratic person shows akratic behavior. When the motivational process of akratic behavior is explained, the nature of an akratic agent would be also better understood.
Aristotle claims that akrasia is characterized by conflict between rational desire, wish (boulēsis), and non-rational desire, appetite (epithymia). Furthermore in De motu animalium, an actualized desire leads to a corresponding motivational process, which brings about bodily movement. Using this claim as main textual evidence I interpret the conflict between two desires in an akratic person as struggling between two motivational processes, which have a couple of stages. This construction enables us to understand akrasia not only as the defeat of rational desire but also as interrupted rational motivational process by the other competing motivation driven by non-rational desire.
One important point, which the investigation into each stage of motivational process reveals, is that one can keep desiring inferior pleasure even when one has completed one’s deliberation (bouleusis). This is because the way in which non-rational desire gets actualized is independent of one’s rational belief.
So one of the main questions of this paper is what happens when two motivational processes clash to win the chance to be fulfilled. An enlightening example, the “flute case” in the Nicomachean Ethics Ⅹ, sheds light on the fact that the conflict between motivational processes is resolved when one of them overpowers the other in the magnitude of pleasure, which does not have to imply the total destruction of competing desire or agent’s judgment. In light of the “flute case”, I argue that an akratic agent’s rational desire and judgment about what to do can be kept, even when they fail to bring about corresponding behavior.
The reason why rational desire fails to motivate can be explained by the fact that non-rational desire of an akratic agent has a more intense effect on her body than rational desire does. Thus, I conclude that an akratic agent is a person who has been overwhelmed by bodily changes caused by her non-rational desire, which does not necessarily affect existing activities of rational soul.

참고자료

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